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Abstract 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Schizophrenia is a debilitating mental illness that strikes approximately 1 in 100 
people in the population during their lifetimes. It is an illness that can have a 
severe impact on the sense of self of people affected. It is the purpose of this 
thesis to examine the processes by which such a sense of self is disrupted, 
rebuilt and maintained in people diagnosed with schizophrenia. Twelve people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia were interviewed with regards to the ongoing 
impact of their illness. In particular, interviews focused on processes relevant 
to their sense of identity before, during and after the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. The thesis also thematises issues of power and social structure 
surrounding the person diagnosed with schizophrenia.  
 
It was found that, after medication, a number of social processes were 
important to rebuilding a sense of identity. These included the development of 
illness narratives, interaction with family and friends, illness management, life 
management, the setting of life goals and, in some cases, participation in 
organised religion. Identity was typically maintained through processes of 
stigma concealment and passing. The influence of psychiatrists, 
psychopharmaceutical companies and a deinstitutionalised environment in 
which severe mental illness is treated all emerged as significant factors in the 
process of rebuilding a sense of identity. 
 
The thesis seeks to make contributions to the sociology of schizophrenia and 
severe mental health concerns more widely. In particular, it deploys concepts 
of biographical crisis to make sense of the intensity of identity disruption 
people diagnosed with schizophrenia may experience. It also seeks to revise 
the perspectives of symbolic interactionism and phenomenology to better 
understand the emotive and embodied nature of identity processes in 
schizophrenia. Beyond this, the thesis explores the relationship between 
language, power and agency and its significance in shaping the experience of 
the patient diagnosed with schizophrenia. The concept of negotiated power 
networks is put forward to help make sense of these power relationships in a 
deinstitutionalised environment. Finally, the thesis proposes the concept of 
identity work as a way of understanding the operations of agency and relevant 
processes affecting identity.    
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CHAPTER 1 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Schizophrenia is a debilitating mental illness that strikes approximately 1 in 100 people in the 
population during their lifetimes (Sadock and Sadock, 2007). The illness strikes regardless of class, 
gender, sexuality or ethnicity. It can seriously affect cognition, emotion and behaviour in the 
sufferer. Schizophrenia, and accompanying treatment, can cause significant damage to the sufferer’s 
identity; to his or her capacity to project and maintain a viable self. It is also an illness over which 
psychiatrists, mental health workers and psychopharmacologists exert significant influence. 
 
The latest Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [the DSM] released by the American 
Psychiatric Association [the APA] (5th Edition, 2013, p. 871) suggests diagnostic criteria for the 
“schizophrenia spectrum” of disorders; that is, disorders involving a schizoid or psychotic element: 
Schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders include schizophrenia, other psychotic 
disorders, and schizotypal (personality) disorder. They are defined by abnormalities in one or more of 
the following five domains: delusions, hallucinations, disorganized thinking (speech), grossly 
disorganized motor behaviour (including catatonia), and negative symptoms. 
 
Schizophrenia itself receives more precise diagnostic criteria (APA, 2013, p. 99): 
A. Two (or more) of the following, each present for a significant portion of time during a 1-month 
period (or less if successfully treated). At least one of these must be (1), (2), or (3): 
1. Delusions. 
2. Hallucinations. 
3. Disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence). 
4. Grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior. 
5. Negative symptoms (i.e., diminished emotional expression or avolition).  
                                                          
1 Note that the DSM has been criticised as a tool for defining severe mental illness. See for relevant discussion 
of the DSM series and psychiatric illness classification generally, Helzer et al., 1977a, 1977b; Schacht, 1985; 
Eysenck, 1986;. Faust and Miner, 1986; Garfield, 1986; Rothblum et al., 1986; Harvey, 1987; Zimmerman, 
1988, 1990; Caplan, 1990; Boyle, 1993; Andreason and Carpenter, 1993; Kirk and Kutchins, 2008. See for a 
philosophical perspective Bolton, 2001. 
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Further criteria stipulate that “[f]or a significant portion of the time since the onset of the 
disturbance, level of functioning in one or more major areas, such as work, interpersonal relations, 
or self-care, is markedly below the level achieved prior to the onset”; that “[c]ontinuous signs of the 
disturbance persist for at least six months”; that “[s]chizoaffective disorder and depressive or bipolar 
disorder with psychotic features have been ruled out”; that “[t]he disturbance is not attributable to 
the physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or another medical 
condition”; and “[i]f there is a history of autism spectrum disorder or a communication disorder of 
childhood onset, the additional diagnosis of schizophrenia is made only if prominent delusions or 
hallucinations, in addition to the other required symptoms of schizophrenia, are also present for at 
least 1 month (or less if successfully treated)” (APA, 2013, p99). 
 
Current research suggests that some people possess a significant disposition to schizophrenia that 
may be “triggered” by certain stressful situations. Research also suggests that this disposition may 
be related to genetic factors. Today the illness is most commonly understood, and researched, on 
the premise that it is a brain disorder. That is to say, schizophrenia is understood to originate in one 
or more of the following: faulty brain structure, chemical imbalance in the brain or abnormal brain 
process. Many explanations for schizophrenia involving the brain have been offered, although none 
has yet identified with certainty the biochemical process behind the illness. In the meantime, 
psychiatrists use psychotropic medication as the first tool of treatment, while sufferers generally 
adopt the language of medication names, of “symptoms” and “side-effects”, and the general 
description of their illness arising from a “chemical imbalance” in their brains. 
 
At this point, we may make a contribution to the understanding of schizophrenia by looking beyond 
a purely bio-chemical approach. Diagnosis and treatment, usually with medication, is both a 
biochemical intervention and a social process.  The history of diagnoses and treatment (such as that 
offered by Michel Foucault in Madness and Civilization, 1988) contributes to a sociological 
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understanding not only of madness, what it is and might be, but also how it is construed and related 
to larger social structures and historical trends. The language adopted to describe and account for 
illness may be subject to sociological analysis (McLaughlin, 2009; see, for example, the use of specific 
terminology to delineate people in the mental health sector Stephens and Belisle, 1993). Various 
attempts have been made to seek a social or sociological cause for schizophrenia, particularly 
focusing on inconsistent communication (the “double bind”), or disturbed interpersonal 
relationships in childhood (Bateson et al., 1956; Sullivan, 1962) , or on the disparity between “true” 
and social identity (Cooper 1970; 1971) (although many such efforts have been contradicted by 
more recent developments in the field (Shorter, 1997, p. 176, 240, 244; Sadock and Sadock, 2007, p. 
475)). When dealing with the conglomeration of institutions affecting the person diagnosed with 
schizophrenia – what is termed in this thesis the “psychiatric apparatus” – people with schizophrenia 
follow certain patterns of interaction and deference, or sometimes resistance, that require a 
sociological perspective. Resistance to Community Treatment Orders and enforced medication 
illustrate a situation of power that sociological thought may explore. The return by people with 
schizophrenia to a state approaching normalcy is very often achieved through a social process of 
action, interaction, meaning and intention. Interaction with friends and family may have a significant 
effect on illness outcomes. Such processes, vital to recovery, are also amenable to sociological 
imagining. Furthermore, interactions with members of the public may involve significant experiences 
ot stigma or efforts towards stigma concealment; processes analysed sociologically so well by Erving 
Goffman (1963) in Stigma. There undoubtedly exists a stigma around major mental illness in 
Australia, particularly in relation to schizophrenia (Burdekin, 1993, Bakshi et. al, 1999; Epstein et al., 
2012. For all these reasons sociology can not only provide an insight into the experience of 
schizophrenia, but it may also in fact prove indispensable to fully understand the illness.  
 
A sociological approach to schizophrenia may take many tacks. One may attempt a sociological 
history of the subject. One may interrogate the development of classifications of mental disorders 
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(Black and Boffeli, 1989); develop a political economy of schizophrenia (Warner, 1985); explore 
differing cultural conceptions of psychiatric disorders (Mercer, 1986); or investigate the relationship 
between schizophrenia, the law and incarceration (Cockerham, 2006; Rogers and Pilgrim, 2007; 
Murray et al. 2006). Whatever perspective we consider, however, most researchers agree that there 
has been a lack of study from the perspective of the person diagnosed with schizophrenia (Scheper-
Hughes and Lock, 1986, p. 137; Estroff, 1989, p. 191; Strauss, 1989, p. 179-181; Cook and Wright, 
1995, p. 106; Markowitz, 1998, p. 344; Williams and Collins, 1999, p. 61; Chenoweth, 2000, p. 93; 
Gove, 2004, p. 372). In light of this lacuna, this thesis seeks, via the qualitative sociological method of 
semi-structured interviews with a limited number of people, to study schizophrenia from the 
perspective of the person diagnosed. Through these interviews, the thesis aspires to explore the 
impact schizophrenia, diagnosis and treatment can have on people diagnosed with schizophrenia; to 
give voice to a group of people who are generally silent.  
 
The researcher was greatly helped in this endeavour by the fact that he himself was diagnosed with 
schizophrenia in 2003, and has lived with the condition, medicated, since then. This position as a 
“consumer researcher” has proved invaluable to the process of the thesis. It has helped 
immeasurably in the creation of trust and mutual recognition with interview subjects. It has allowed 
the researcher to gain a personal insight into descriptions and analysis of symptoms, diagnosis, 
hospitalisation, medication and stigma. It has encouraged empathy to emerge for the more difficult 
symptoms and aspects of schizophrenia. It has also helped provide a degree of respect for the 
individual stories of interviewees (on “insider” and “outsider” knowledge see Merton, 1972). 
 
In drawing out the stories of interviewees, this thesis focuses upon two themes pertaining to the 
perspective of the person diagnosed with schizophrenia: identity and power. In many ways the 
theme of identity comes naturally to a sociological approach to schizophrenia. Sociology has 
classically shown great interest in issues of identity (Leary and Tangney, 2003). Georg Simmel (1958) 
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accounts for society with a picture of interacting subjects and identity emerging in different forms 
and types of social relation. Stuart Hall (1971) examines the play of power and exclusion in the 
construction of identity. Anthony Giddens (1990, 1991) contemplates identity in relation to 
modernity and beyond. Perspectives such as “symbolic interactionism” developed by George Mead 
and Herbert Blumer (used later in this thesis) focus on issues of identity and social interaction; on 
the need to understand the rebuilding and maintenance of identity as an ongoing process.  
 
However, this thesis departs from these recognised investigations of identity by focusing on the 
theme of identity disruption. Schizophrenia is defined first and foremost by the experience of 
disruption (Dinos et al., 2005). Such disruptions are often expected of chronic illnesses generally; 
Michael Bury makes this point in his 1982 article, “Chronic Illness as Biographical Disruption”. 
Moving beyond Bury, however, we can observe that schizophrenia is itself an illness whose impact 
may bring with it a significant interruption to identity. People suffering schizophrenia may suffer 
delusions and hallucinations that disrupt their sense of self. They may believe, for example, that 
their body has been replaced by a non-living substance, or that they are an historical figure, or may 
wish for or attempt suicide (the ultimate negation of identity). They may lose the ability to engage 
sensibly with those nearest to them. Indeed, in light of the disruption schizophrenia can cause I 
suggest the alternative terminology of “biographical crisis” and (as we will see below) “ontological 
insecurity” as ways of conceptualising experiences of identity breakdown in schizophrenia. 
 
To approach the question of self from the point of view of the schizophrenic subject is to challenge 
some of the formative premises of sociological theories of identity. These theories typically posit a 
“functioning” self. Symbolic interactionism, for example, devotes some time to the socialisation of 
infants but, in adults, assumes an effective and operative identity. However, in the sociological study 
of schizophrenia – such a disruptive illness – this becomes a significant problem: here we must 
interrogate how identity malfunctions, and how a broken or disrupted identity is made whole again. 
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Significant time in the interviews and discussion for this thesis is given over to a discussion of themes 
of how identity is “rebuilt” and “maintained”. Indeed, this thesis begins with the question: How do 
people diagnosed with schizophrenia maintain or re-establish their identity in the context of their 
illness, diagnosis and treatment? In light of this problem, this thesis also makes a reflexive 
contribution to symbolic interactionist theory, leading to the suggestion that incomplete identity 
may be labelled and understood as “compromised interaction”. 
 
This thesis makes a further contribution by understanding identity as a phenomenon resulting not 
only from symbolic or discursive processes, but as deeply embodied. Identity must be understood 
not only as a symbolic process affecting the mind as an abstract system, but also as a phenomenon 
that is inherently situated in a material and sensorial world. This embodied dimension of identity 
and its breakdown becomes clear in many of the symptoms a sufferer of schizophrenia may 
experience. Hallucinations or delusions may occur that may be thought of as breakdowns in the 
embodied, sensory self. Work by Laing (1990 [1960]) suggests that people with schizophrenia may 
experience their sense of self as struck by “engulfment”, “implosion” or “petrification”. Again, 
however, many traditional accounts of identity formation and maintenance fail to account for these 
embodied aspects of the self. Symbolic interactionism, for example, focuses on the discursive and 
semiotic level of language and gesture in the development of viable selves. In light of this issue, this 
thesis contributes to the relevant literature in two ways. The first is to explore ways we may expand 
symbolic interactionism to account for embodied experiences. This involves investigating what an 
“embodied interactionism” or “emotional interactionism” may look like. As we will see, embodied 
interactionism allows for an additional, emotive layer of interaction, expressed not only through 
symbolic language, but also the language of the body (“body language”). Significant gestures and 
symbolic interaction are provided with context, colour and content by the emotional state of 
interacting individuals. The second contribution emerges through an analysis of phenomenological 
accounts of identity and being. Although these accounts vary, they tend to all focus, to some extent, 
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on the disruption of being caused by schizophrenia. Such accounts, in particular that given by 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962), also establish that the human being is ontologically invested in the 
world; that he or she is emotionally tied or directed to certain projects and this dedication emerges 
through an embodied, sensory consciousness. When a breakdown of this relation occurs in 
schizophrenia, this is necessarily a sensorial or bodily event. 
  
Laing’s (1990) concept of “ontological insecurity” speaks to the third area of sociological enquiry in 
which this thesis seeks to intervene. Where traditional accounts, such as those provided by Bury 
(noted above), establish that chronic illness may involve a disruption, the actual level of disruption in 
schizophrenia may take on an ontological status. Again, Laing and Merleau-Ponty, among others 
phenomenologists such as Ludwig Binswanger and Eugene Minkoski, suggest that people with 
schizophrenia are generally not experiencing a simple chronic illness, but are in fact engaged in a 
profoundly compromised state of being; an experience of “ontological insecurity”; a disruption of 
the ontology of the self. With that point made, this thesis also confronts the shortcomings of 
phenomenology in accounting for the full experiences of schizophrenia (Cf. Rulf, 2003). While 
phenomenology can offer a detailed description of ontological insecurity or breakdown, 
phenomenologists have not generally focused on processes of rebuilding that a person may engage 
in after an ontological break. Such processes are the key focus of Chapter 7, and are of vital interest 
to this thesis. They are named and explored in the Discussion Chapter, Chapter 9, as forms of 
“ontological renovation”. 
  
The theme of renovation, of rebuilding a disrupted identity, resonates strongly with a further focus 
of this thesis: the concept of “identity work”. The concept is developed as a contribution to the 
literature regarding the reformation of biography in chronic illness and schizophrenia. Identity work 
comes to encompass all the activity undertaken by the diagnosed person to re-establish and 
maintain his or her identity after the period of disruption. Typically, as suggested by the symbolic 
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interactionist perspective, such identity work involves the internalisation of the views of others. In 
particular, people diagnosed with schizophrenia must adopt and internalise the view of the general 
other. Identity work may extend to the activation of friendship networks and family connections. It 
may broadly be considered to also involve the development of “illness narratives” (Bury 2001; Cf. 
Williams 1984)  that try to make sense of disrupted experiences. Such narratives often include the 
adoption of psychiatric language, identified above - medication names, “symptoms”, “side-effects” 
and “chemical imbalance” – to help project order over a disordered experience.  
 
It is perhaps at this point – where people with illness adopt the discourse of the psychiatric 
apparatus – that the second broad theme for this thesis should be introduced: power. Power 
saturates the experience of treated schizophrenia. The patient with schizophrenia enters into a 
power relationship with his or her psychiatrist. Mental health nurses may exert power in clinics or 
psychiatric wards. In extreme cases, people may be committed to and medicated involuntarily in 
clinics or wards. The second half of the research question asks: How do relations of power inform 
this process? 
 
In writing of schizophrenia and power, the shadow of “the asylum” looms large. Perhaps the best 
historical exploration of the asylum as a “total institution” lies in Goffman’s (1961) Asylums. 
Theorists of power and psychiatry – in particular those dealing with the idea that psychiatric practice 
is a form of “social control” (such as Thoma Szasz, 1974, or Allan Horwitz, 1982) – have looked to the 
asylum as the paradigm of psychiatric power. Even Foucault’s concept of the “disciplinary” 
institution (1977) seems best applied to the asylum. Indeed, stories of involuntary commitment to, 
and treatment in, clinics and wards do emerge from some of the research. Likewise, this thesis 
contributes to the Foucauldian literature by proposing the concept of “languages of resistance” that 
an agent dealing with schizophrenia may express. 
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However, in an important sense, the age of the asylum may be over. In the 1970s and 1980s, a 
reform process known as “deinstitutionalisation” occurred in Australia seeking to return people with 
mental illnesses to accommodation in the community after initial treatment. This process occurred 
sometime earlier in the United States (Brown, 1985b). To a large extent, this process of 
deinstitutionalisation was permitted by the development of fairly effective anti-psychotic medication 
that patients could self-administer in a non-institutional environment. This study has been 
undertaken in a context where deinstitutionalisation has taken place. In such a context, the chains of 
the asylum and the threat of psychiatric panopticism have to a large extent faded away. And yet, 
persons interviewed still met with psychiatrists or nurses, still followed treatment regimes, still 
understood their illness through the biomedical “paradigm” (Kuhn, 1996) or psychiatric terminology 
and still often endured significant personal isolation. It seems that some new form of power or 
domination has emerged. This thesis seeks to make a contribution to sociologies of power and 
schizophrenia by examining just what such a form of domination may entail; the term “negotiated 
power networks” is developed and explored to help achieve this task.  
 
These new forms of power also emerge in the language people diagnosed with schizophrenia use to 
describe, make sense of and deal with their condition. Such language absorbs the diagnosed person 
in a web of power and agency. In particular, the use of psychiatric discourse enlists the speaker in a 
Foucauldian relationship of power/knowledge with their psychiatrists. However, just as the use of 
professional discourse illustrates the influence of the psychiatric apparatus, this thesis argues, so too 
do “languages of negotiation” and “languages of negotiation or resistance” emerge, illustrating a 
form of subjective agency that is not well developed in Foucault’s work. Furthermore, the frequent 
use of the term “consumer” as a self-description by people taking psychiatric medicine speaks to the 
influence both of the mental health support movement seeking to avoid the stigma of terms such as 
“schizophrenic” or “mad” (McLaughlin, 2009), and the impact of market-based mechanisms on 
conceptions of mental health treatment. Finally, the use of “Illness narratives” by people diagnosed 
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with schizophrenia can help make sense of a healthy self gone wrong – forging a personal healing of 
the temporal breach of schizophrenia. Such language use also often portrays the diagnosed person 
as the active subject of the narrative, effectively establishing agency through language and moving 
beyond a deterministic account of schizophrenia and the pharmaceutical complex. 
 
We may also certainly say that the new power relationship is shaped by the development of anti-
psychotic medication under the influence of psychopharmaceutical companies. In light of such 
influence, this thesis intervenes in the literature to make the argument that the 
“psychopharmaceutical complex”2 has colonised psychiatric practice. Diagnosis is carried out 
primarily as a prelude to medication, and medication is understood as the first and most important 
element of treating schizophrenia. Certainly Nikolas Rose (1992) emphasises the emergence of 
market-based systems of welfare in advanced liberal democracies and situates the rise of the 
psychopharmaceutical complex as part and parcel of this process. In terms of the influence of the 
psychopharmaceutical complex over patients, this thesis looks again to the knowledge patients carry 
of their medication names and their common conceptualisation of mental illness as a “chemical 
imbalance” in the brain. Along with negotiated power networks and the psychopharmaceutical 
complex comes a biochemical understanding of the self and of illness – the “biochemical self”. These 
aspects of power and schizophrenia are explored in both the Results Chapters, Chapters 6,7 and 8, 
and in the Discussion Chapter, Chapter 9. 
  
 
  
                                                          
2 See page 91 for a definition of this term. 
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CHAPTER 2 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Methodology 
 
 
 
What is the best method to study issues of identity, power and schizophrenia? Whilst a large 
quantitative study might present valuable data on such issues, this thesis proceeds from the 
assumption that a close, qualitative approach offers deeper, more detailed and more expressive 
material. As such, this thesis is based upon data drawn from the interpretive study of twelve people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia. Such a study, by its nature, offers depth rather than breadth of 
insight; highly individualised perspectives, rather than general “truths”. This focus on depth of 
understanding is reinforced by the researcher’s own status as a person diagnosed with 
schizophrenia; a point that will be explored below. Interviews themselves were semi-structured, 
allowing greater flexibility to draw out salient details of interviewees’ accounts, and focused on 
questions of identity disruption, rebuilding and maintenance.   
 
Overview 
  
Many researchers agree that there has been a paucity of studies of schizophrenia from the 
perspective of the person diagnosed (Scheper-Hughes and Lock, 1986, p. 137; Estroff, 1989, p. 191; 
Strauss, 1989, p. 179-181; Cook and Wright, 1995, p. 106; Markowitz, 1998, p. 344; Williams and 
Collins, 1999, p. 61; Chenoweth, 2000, p. 93; Gove, 2004, p. 372). As Estroff notes, [O]ur failure to 
identify and know the experiencing subject, their meanings, and the sense they make of 
schizophrenia represents a debilitating deficit in our understandings and responses via treatment 
(1989, p. 194).  
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This thesis hopes to address this lacuna by undertaking a detailed qualitative analysis of the 
personal, lived experience of people diagnosed with schizophrenia.  
 
Perhaps the most important issue at this stage is to define the topic of the thesis in the form of a 
relatively clear research question. This question, in two parts, may be expressed as follows: 
How do people diagnosed with schizophrenia maintain or re-establish their identity in the context 
of their illness, diagnosis and treatment, and how do relations of power inform this process? 
 
In order to answer this question, the thesis reports on the results of a study involving in-depth, semi-
structured interviews with twelve people who have been diagnosed with schizophrenia. The 
personal information of these people was supplied, after ethics submission, by the Australian 
Schizophrenia Research Bank administered by the Schizophrenia Research Institute. Questions 
addressed to the interview subjects sought to uncover a range of information, including factual 
history, such as the relevant case history of treatments and hospitalisation of participants. They 
sought to elicit information about how participants’ identity (their self-image, self-esteem and self-
construction) were affected by illness, diagnosis and subsequent treatment. Finally, they elicited 
information about how people rebuilt and maintained a sense of identity through specific processes 
such as limited disclosure and activities aimed towards the maintenance of self-image and self-
esteem.  
 
Qualitative Research 
 
We may find an exemplary definition of qualitative research in Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p. 3; c.f. 
Denzin, 2005, p. 10; Minichielo et al, 1995, p. 10):  
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of 
interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world. They 
turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, 
photographs, recordings and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an 
interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things 
in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them. 
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We may note certain features of this definition as significant, as they deal with issues that emerge 
throughout this chapter. The first such feature is the use of the word “situated”. This word refers to 
the belief amongst many qualitative researchers that their research is grounded in a certain moment 
and place – historically, politically, theoretically and academically. It is impossible to entirely remove 
the qualitative research act from its context and achieve an a-historical objectivity.  The second 
feature is use of the phrase “make the world visible”. This phrase alludes to the belief that the 
“world” of research is not self-evident; the visible world is “created” in the act of research3. Finally 
the use of the phrase “transform the world” indicates that research contributes to actively changing 
the world, and part of that world is co-created by researcher and respondent through their research 
interaction (and myriad other interactions). With these characterisations of qualitative research, we 
must turn to the question of why the qualitative approach is suitable for the research task at hand. 
 
Why engage in qualitative research rather than other approaches? For the simple reason that it 
offers the best opportunity for deep, meaningful and subtle engagement with the research question 
Vidich and Lyman, 2000). At the heart of qualitative research is an interpretive act; an act of seeking 
to understand something meaningful about the social world; seeking what Weber described as 
“verstehen”, or “understanding”. Indeed, the attitudes – the “basic subject matter of nature and 
society” – of those diagnosed with schizophrenia are best understood with a sensitive, in-depth 
qualitative approach (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p. 12) that allows the researcher to achieve “rich 
descriptions”, or what Geertz describes as “thick description” (Geertz 1973, p. 5-6, 9-10) of the social 
world – with “careful attention to experience and phenomenology of self” (Estroff, 1989, p. 189; Cf. 
Burgess, 1984) – and which is compatible with the symbolic interactionist approach taken and 
described later in the thesis (Hammersley, 1989; Doubt, 1992). 
                                                          
3 C.f. Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p. 19, for a description of the “triple crisis” facing qualitative research; in 
particular the “crisis of representation” where the researcher is faced with the difficult task of “directly 
[capturing] lived experience”. 
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The conceptual framework of this qualitative research may be said to be broadly interpretive. That is 
to say, the sociological research process is thought of as one of interpretation, where an academic 
artefact arises as the result of the process of grasping the meaning of, or interpreting, some part of 
social life (Neuman, 2000, p. 70-75).  Hamilton describes such an approach as one “without 
pretensions to offer scientific knowledge or to claims of political significance” (2002, p. 27), and 
points to Goffman and Simmel as significant representatives of the interpretive tradition. The 
interpretive framework allows us a fair degree of latitude, both practical and aesthetic, in the 
analysis of interview data, and complements the qualitative, sociological approach. The thesis also 
borrows from a hermeneutic approach the emphasis on the “hermeneutic cycle”, where the 
interpreter must tack back and forth between specific parts of the research data and the project as a 
whole in order to come to a valid interpretation (Ezzy, 1998).  
 
Research Design 
 
The design of this research has involved twelve qualitative case studies – the semi-structured, in-
depth interviewing of twelve people who have been diagnosed with schizophrenia – in order to gain 
a “deep” understanding of the processes of identity disruption, rebuilding and maintenance that 
occur in and around their experience and diagnosis of schizophrenia.  
 
We may begin this part of the discussion with an attempt to define “case study”. Guba and Lincoln 
(1985, p. 360) state that there is little agreement over the definition of the case study. They refer to 
descriptions as simple as a “slice of life”, or a “depth examination of an instance”, to such rich 
statements as Denny’s (1978) “intensive or complete examination of a facet, an issue, or perhaps the 
events of a geographic setting over time”. We may adopt Denny’s definition, and elaborate upon it 
with Stake’s observation that the “case” in “case study” may be a “functioning body”, or a “bounded 
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system” (Flood as reported in Fals Borda, 1998) with “working parts and purposes”. For the research 
at hand, the case study is the “functioning body” of the individual interviewees, focused particularly 
on their experiences of schizophrenia. 
 
The question may be asked: how useful is an in-depth study of limited numbers of people? At the 
first level, the case studies provide an opportunity for a “hermeneutic cycle” to be set up, tacking 
between the limited number of research subjects and the project as a whole. The further response 
must be that the research provides an in-depth insight into the rich individual experience of people 
with schizophrenia (Yin, 1989). This insight helps understand how a small number of people with 
schizophrenia and, by implication, others with the illness deal with identity disruption, rebuilding 
and maintenance in light of their illness. Indeed, the case studies provides both intrinsic interest and 
instrumental interest (Stake, 2005, p. 445); intrinsic insofar as issues involving the identity of people 
who have been diagnosed with schizophrenia are stimulating or interesting on their own from a 
broader sociological or academic point of view, and instrumental insofar as a better grasp of issues 
involved in the formation and maintenance of as sense of identity, as well as power relations, in 
people with mental illness may result from the study.  
 
Research Sample 
 
Research subjects have been drawn from respondents to a letter of request sent to the Australian 
Schizophrenia Research Bank (ASRB). The ASRB is: 
“a national collaborative initiative designed to improve researcher access to data, samples, 
and volunteers to support schizophrenia research. The Bank [collects] clinical, genetic and 
brain image (MRI) data from people with schizophrenia and healthy controls. De-identified 
data/samples and potential research participants, are made available to Australian and 
international researchers” (Nectar, 2014). 
 
After filing an Ethics submission for both the University of Sydney and the ASRB, a letter of invitation 
was sent from the ASRB to all research volunteers in NSW. The respondents then had their contact 
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details sent to the researcher, who arranged a time and a place to interview them. The research 
sample was of necessity small, as only a dozen people diagnosed with schizophrenia responded to 
the letter of invitation; it was beyond the powers of the researcher to choose specific subjects as 
samples. The names4 and ages of respondents at time of interview are noted here: Prescott, 37 
years;  Peter, 47 years; Greg, 44 years; James, 46 years; Nathan, 46 years; Ralph, 47 years; Michael, 
34 years; Danielle, 40 years; Arthur, 62 years; Caitlin, 48 years; Gale, 49 years; and Sally, 61 years. 
 
It is highly likely that only more stable and cogent sufferers responded, although this may have been 
an advantage given the thesis seeks information about people who have managed to re-establish 
some sense of stable identity after an experience of schizophrenia. The sample has been one of 
“convenience” drawn from ASRB. To a significant degree we may say that the respondents “self-
selected”; that is to say, only a small “convenience” (Ezzy, 2005, p. 74) cross-section of people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia and members of the Research Bank decided to join the study. There is 
some precedent for the use of case studies in the mental health field (McGrew et al., 1999). 
Nevertheless, these parameters have, of necessity, limited the significance of research results, which 
makes no pretence to be comprehensive. Nonetheless, the task of giving voice to sufferers, no 
matter how limited, has been worthwhile, and the sample has fulfilled Minichiello et als.’ 
characterisation of “purposive cases”: cases that “represent specific types of a given phenomenon” 
(Minichiello et al, 1995, p. 13-14; Cf. Stenhouse, 1979). 
 
Originally it was intended that both people diagnosed with schizophrenia as well as their carers or 
guardians would be interviewed. This could have provided a deeper insight into relevant issues and 
allowed interview responses by people diagnosed with schizophrenia to be cross-checked. However, 
this proved impractical for two reasons. Firstly, the majority of respondents lived on their own, 
                                                          
4 All names and identifying details have been changed. 
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without a carer or guardian. Secondly, a significant number of interviews saw the respondent come 
without carers into the city and participate in the interview in a safe space.  
 
Data Collection Methods 
 
The key data collection method adopted was that of the lengthy semi-structured interview, where 
the researcher brings an ordered list of questions to the interview, but retains the flexibility of asking 
follow-up or clarifying questions when and as they arise. This method allowed a deep and nuanced 
response to the thesis research question. The interviews sought information about the processes of 
identity disruption, formation and maintenance by people diagnosed with schizophrenia. The 
interviews also typically began with a brief discussion of the researcher’s own status as a person 
diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2003. Interviews lasted approximately 1 hour. 
 
The in-depth interview has a long history in social research (Merton and Kendall, 1946; Payne, 1951; 
Seidman, 1991; Schostak, 2006), and emerged especially as a tool for research in the Chicago School 
of Sociology. Guba and Lincoln (1985, p. 268) refer to interviewing as “conversation with a purpose”. 
Fielding and Thomas define semi-structured interviews in contrast to structured interviews. They 
describe semi-structured interviews as “life history” and a “discursive format”, where the 
interviewer may become actively involved in commenting on responses, putting interpretation to 
respondents and “sharing” their view with the respondent. Rosenblum (1987, p. 389) observes the 
contradictory nature of in-depth interviewing, where on the one hand the interview seeks to 
illustrate the deeply personal, whilst on the other hand also being an “impersonal, asymmetric, 
question-answer session” – both personal and impersonal.  
 
Guba and Lincoln (1985, p. 268) identify various purposes for using interviews, the most relevant of 
which are “obtaining here-and-now constructions of persons, events, activities, organizations, 
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feelings, motivations, claims, concerns, and other entities”, “reconstructions of such entities as 
experienced in the past”, and “verification, emendation, and extensions of information… obtained 
from other sources, human and non-human”. Let us delve a little more deeply into the benefit of 
semi-structured interviewing, or “open questions”. The open question interview has a rich history, 
including advocates of open questions such as sociologists Max Weber and William Thomas, and 
ethnographical anthropologists such as Harold Garfinkel, Aaron Cicourel, Jack Douglas and Charles 
Briggs (See Foddy, 1993, p. 126). All these social scientists have emphasised that the acts of people 
must be understood in terms of the meanings those people attribute to the acts.  
 
Foddy (1993, p. 128) points out further benefits of semi-structured interviews, the most relevant of 
which are that they allow respondents to express themselves in their own words, do not suggest 
answers, avoid format effects and (perhaps most importantly) allow complex motivational influences 
and frames of reference to be identified. Lazarsfeld (1944) likewise argues that open questions are 
useful for clarifying the meaning of respondents' answers, discerning influences on opinions (for 
example, the dimensions of the topic and personal motivations that have influenced respondents), 
and clarifying the nature of the relationship between variables. Research by Belli et al. (2001) 
suggests the benefit of “event history” interviews over question list surveys for the recollection of 
life events. From the position of reality as language, Denzin (1992, p. 90) goes on to argue that 
qualitative research inevitably calls forward stories, narratives and “self texts’, such as biographies 
and autobiographies (Cf. Riessman, 1993; Riessman, 2008). The importance of story in interview 
dialogue is emphasised by Atkinson (2007, p. 224) – “We think in story form, speak in story form, 
and bring meaning to our lives through story. Our life stories connect us to our roots, give us 
direction, validate our own experience, and restore value to our lives”.  
 
The benefits of semi-structured interviews must not be lost in this discussion. Such interviews have 
allowed greater access to the complex and meaningful thoughts, attitudes and experiences of 
19 
 
research subjects through an engagement with meaningful self-stories (Minichiello et al, 1995, p. 85; 
C.f. Askham, 1982). Indeed, the interviewer sought the respondent’s personal stories.  
 
Interviews themselves were initiated with a short period of conversation to help establish rapport 
(Walter, 2006, p. 97). At this point the researcher described his own position as a person diagnosed 
with schizophrenia. This self-description typically helped establish trust and affinity with 
interviewees; a sense, perhaps, that the interviewer had a personal insight into experiences 
interviewees were to re-tell. The interviews were then structured through the model of “funnelling’, 
starting out with questions of a general factual nature, moving towards more specific questions 
about the issues at hand (See Minichiello et al, 1995, p. 84; c.f. Foddy, 1993, p. 61). The interviews 
have also followed the principles of question design outlined by Sudman and Bradburn (1982, p. 13; 
quoted in Foddy, 1993, p. 32) of not formulating specific questions until the research question has 
been thought through, and even going so far as to write the research question down and keeping it 
handy to formulate specific questions. Questions were also written so as to avoid words with unclear 
or multiple meanings; especially such words as “regularly”, “frequently”, “good”, “approve” and 
“dislike” (Foddy, 1993, p. 43)”. When posing questions seeking to uncover material for life history, 
the interviewer used targeted inquiries about specific events and stimuli (Foddy, 1993, p. 58). We 
may extend on the point made here to emphasise that the use of questions regarding sensory 
perceptions may stand out in people’s memories (Mitchell, 2007). At the same time, questions 
regarding embarrassing events (such as accepting one has mental illness) had their own distinct 
structure, using an open format and the respondent’s own words (Foddy, 1993, p. 114; C.f. Blair et 
al, (1977). The design of the semi-structured interview questions also bore the imprint of the 
interviewer as a person diagnosed with schizophrenia. Important elements of his own experience 
suggested possible avenues of questioning. 
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From this point, broader questions about key issues of the thesis were asked. For example, issues of 
social support and illness management that were not considered in the original question brief 
tended to emerge as the interviews progressed and analytic themes developed. Indeed, the 
development of new themes during the process of interviewing posed a challenge to the structured 
elements of the interview; as time wore on, the semi-structured elements of interviews, involving 
emergent themes, tended to predominate. Throughout the process, the interviewer sought to 
account reflexively for his own prejudices, values and social position. 
 
At this point it is apposite to consider some of the methodological issues addressed earlier in this 
chapter; those raised by the postmodern or poststructural turns in qualitative research (Lather, 
1993; Richardson 1991). Denzin (1992, p. 84) observes that self-stories are inherently told in an 
experiential context, especially personal narratives. Fontana and Frey (2005, p. 695-696) argue that 
interviewing is:  
inextricably historically, politically, and contextually bound. This boundedness refutes the whole 
tradition of the interview of gathering objective data to be used neutrally for scientific purpose… As 
many have argued convincingly (Atkinson and Silverman, 1997; Fontana, 2002; Hertz, 1997; Holstein 
and Gubrium, 1995; Scheurich, 1995), interviewing is not merely the neutral exchange of asking 
questions and getting answers. Two (or more) people are involved in this process, and their 
exchanges lead to the creation of a collaborative effort called the interview. The key here is the 
“active” nature of the process (Holstein and Gubrium 1995) that leads to a contextually bound and 
mutually created story – the interview. 
 
The upshot of these issues would seem to be that we must, in this research, consider meaning as a 
co-created process; albeit one in which we may take a reflexive attitude (see Fook, 1999) to the 
political, social and academic context in which the research takes place. 
 
Data Analysis And Synthesis 
 
Data from the semi-structured interview were analysed and synthesised in this (nominal) step in the 
research process. Analysis proceeded by close reading, looking for emergent themes and gradually 
coding these themes. 
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As discussed, the research method was aided by the researcher’s status as a “consumer researcher”; 
a person diagnosed with schizophrenia. This status allowed a particular insight into the answers 
given to questions posed to interviewees. In particular, experiences of symptoms, diagnosis, 
hospitalisation and medication were often shared, to some extent, by the researcher. The impact of 
stigma and difficulties “going public” about the illness were also provided by this status. Beyond this 
personal insight, a number of strategies were followed in data analysis and synthesis. In particular, 
the researcher focused on engaging in what has been described as a “hermeneutic circle” (Gadamer, 
1988; 1989); a movement between specific lines of interviewee’s dialogue and the interview as a 
whole. The researcher became thoroughly familiar with the data prior to and during analysis 
(Fielding and Thomas, 2001, p. 137). Specific lines, sentences and paragraphs were marked as 
meaningful and, as they accumulated, convergences and dissonances were noted (Ezzy, 2002, p. 94). 
Analysis proceeded via free association, making comparisons, the research map, shifting focus, 
shifting sequence, the interrogative list, the substantive checklist, and transposing data (Minichiello 
1995, p. 256). Assertions and thematic expressions were emphasised (Atkins, 1984, p. 256); common 
themes were identified to link issues emerging from the respondent’s expression (Minichiello, 1995, 
p. 248). The process involved the creation of an informal coding system to reorganise data according 
to conceptual themes (Minichiello, 1995, p. 255-257). As noted, certain analytical and theoretical 
observations emerged during the process of interviewing  (Ezzy, 2002, pp. 61-62; Kvale, 2007; c.f. 
White and Drew, 2011, p. 7; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Pelias, 2004) and writing (Richardson and St. 
Pierre, 2005). Throughout the analytic process, the researcher engaged reflexively with his own 
position and tradition, and fused these with the meaning and context of the interviews. Indeed, pre-
conceptions regarding patients with mental illness as well as contextual factors such as academia, 
the nature of the PhD and the formalities of study were acknowledged. 
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A number of problematic issues emerged during the data analysis. Most importantly there 
developed an issue around whether cases of dual diagnosis (typically of a mental illness and a 
substance abuse problem) provided strong data for analysis. In was unclear, for example, whether 
an emotional state spoken of had arisen as a result of the schizophrenic experience, or from the 
substance abuse problem. A similar problem emerged with cases of severe paranoia. Finally, the 
issue of family violence arose; in particular, whether such violence was caused by or exaggerated by 
a psychotic state. In each of these cases, the researcher had to be careful in interpreting interview 
information that may have been informed by the respondent’s particular experience of the world. 
 
Writing Up 
 
Having successfully gathered, analysed and coded the data for this research, the findings were 
written up in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. It was necessary that the writing be at once clear, concise and 
expressive while at the same time doing justice to the “thick description” of the processes of identity 
change and maintenance amongst people diagnosed with schizophrenia.  
 
This was a process where patience was valuable (Bauman, 2000, p. 85) and where clarity and 
simplicity were beneficial (Mills, 1959, p. 239; Richardson 1990). In the complex process of writing 
up, it was also unavoidable that details were omitted; it was best that such decisions to omit were 
made with respect to the central theme of current research (Ezzy, 2002, p. 139). Nevertheless it was 
important to include “a mixture of theoretical analysis and illustrative extracts from the primary 
data” (Ezzy 2002, p. 146-147). The researcher quoted extensively from segments of interview texts 
in the final study to aid the expression of key ideas and themes, interweaving viewpoints and 
perspectives (Guba and Lincoln, 2005, p. 197). 
 
 
23 
 
Issues Of Validity And Reliability 
 
There are writers who emphasise validity and reliability in qualitative social research. For example, 
Minichiello (1995, p. 176-177) argues that in-depth interviewing attempts to “stay close to the 
empirical world” to ensure a “close fit” between the data gathered and the acts and beliefs of 
subjects. According to Taylor and Bogdan (1984), this can be accomplished by calling things by the 
right names or being concerned with the correctness of one’s understanding of the informant’s 
perceptions, view, attitudes and behaviours. Furthermore, the researcher engaged in testing 
perception and understanding against sources of error to draw tentative conclusions, and used 
probing, cross-checking and recursive interviewing to check the validity of data (Kirk and Miller 
1986). However, qualitative research and, especially, in-depth interviewing creates a product 
derived from the mind of both interviewer and interviewee, where there will always be questions 
about the accuracy involved in “capturing” someone’s thoughts (Link, 1943, p. 269). Reliability is 
achieved through testing the strength of data; however it has been observed that while qualitative 
research may provide valid understandings of informants’ intended meaning, its flaw lies in the 
difficulty of replicating research, making it difficult to assess reliability (Sandelowski, 1986). Indeed, 
the nature of interpretive sociology suggests that the result of research will be singular; limited by 
the position and interests of researcher and subject. Other issues of reliability and validity in the 
particular genre of the interview have been raised (eg. Lazarsfield, 1944; Dohrenwend, 1965; 
Schuman and Presser, 1979; Converse and Presser, 1986; Schwarz and Hippler, 1987; Fowler and 
Mangione, 1990). 
 
With these thoughts in mind, we cannot apply the natural science’s model of validity and reliability 
to the study at hand. There are a number of problems with such an approach, as Ezzy (2002, p. 53-
54) points out: 
It is relatively easy to deconstruct the natural sciences model of qualitative research by demonstrating 
the problems associated with applying natural sciences methods to the social world. It is much harder 
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to construct an alternative. If the old model does not make sense any more, what can be used instead 
as a criteria for assessing the rigour, quality and trustworthiness of research?... [T]here are [models of 
research] that focus on the interpretative process… These models emphasise obtaining of high-quality 
description through a sensitivity to the complexity of meanings, feelings and interpretations of 
participants and researchers. This model tends to reject the correspondence model of truth that 
emphasises the role of validity and reliability. In qualitative research, “the key problem is 
understanding how individuals interpret events and experiences, rather than assessing whether or 
not their interpretations correspond to or mirror the researchers’ interpretive construct of 
“objective” reality. 
 
The remainder of this section will be given over to considering Guba and Lincoln’s (1985) proposed 
criteria for acceptable qualitative social research5. Guba and Lincoln (1985, p. 300) attempt to offer a 
qualitative counterpart for each quantitative criteria (being internal validity, external validity, 
reliability and objectivity): 
 Credibility 
 Transferability 
 Dependability  
 Confirmability 
In the present study, credibility was ensured by the depth of analysis – a “thick description” (Geertz 
1973, p. 5-6, 9-10) embracing complexity and subjectivity. The quality of scepticism was also 
important to credibility, with a self-conscious approach to social, political and academic context, and 
a reflexive approach to the researcher’s own position as a mid-30s white heterosexual male, of 
comfortable means, engaging in pure academic research with people who are often marginalised in 
wider society (see Fook, 1999 for a discussion of the importance of reflexivity in social research). 
Finally, the use of  “negative case analysis” (Guba and Lincoln, 1985, p. 309) to ensure subtlety and 
nuance of research findings was engaged. Transferability was ensured by the consideration of similar 
research. Dependability relied on the rigour of repeated semi-structured interviews. Finally, the 
quality of confirmability was sought through cross-reference in the (admittedly small) sample size, 
and through peer review of thesis findings and analysis.  
                                                          
5 See for a discussion of qualitative versus quantitative criteria for rigour Margarete, 1986. See for alternative 
conceptions of acceptable qualitative research Ezzy, 2002; Holstein and Gubrium, 1995; Charmaz, 2005. 
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Limitations 
 
There are a number of limitations to this study that must be acknowledged. Theoretical challenges 
to the project are considered elsewhere in this chapter; this section shall focus on more practical 
issues (recognising that practical and theoretical problems may overlap). 
 
Perhaps the most significant limitation to the project was the relatively small number of people who 
were involved as participants. This small “convenience” sample limited the ability to generalise from 
findings (Hamilston, 1980; Guba and Lincoln, 1985; Ezzy, 2002, p. 74; Walters, 2006, p. 103), 
although the task of the project is to find deep, rather than broad information. Indeed, the 
significance of the thesis rests on the premise that small samples in interview-based qualitative 
research may provide material that is more detailed and comprehensive about particular 
experiences or issues than a broader qualitative or quantitative study (Crouch and McKenzie, 2006). 
 
A second limitation lay in the memories of participants. The data provided by participants was 
essentially retrospective, and may have been slanted, incomplete or narratavised because of this. 
Sufferers may have been in an unstable mental state at times of crucial interest for the project, and 
may have taken and continue to take medication affecting the detail and depth of memories. The 
problem of memory may have been further complicated by the observations that respondents' 
“attitudes, beliefs, opinions, habits, interests often seem to be extraordinarily unstable” (Foddy, 
1993, p. 4). In response to the problem of memory the researcher undertook a number of tasks, 
including probing more deeply where respondents offered inconsistent information or, where that 
inconsistency remained, to disregard data. Efforts were taken to cross-check information at different 
points of the thesis. Foddy’s observations regarding memory (1993, p. 93; c.f. Sudman and Bradburn, 
1982, p. 42-47) were kept in mind, namely that the salience of experiences makes them easier to 
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remember, especially when the memory is unusual, involves high costs or rewards, and continuing 
consequences. Furthermore, the structured part of the interviews were designed with the 
observation that memory may be “transformed in storage” and become arranged around “concepts 
such as pain, incapacity, costs, visits to doctors, hospitalisation, medication or treatment, symptoms 
or more generally around other causal, circumstantial or consequential events” (Foddy, 1993, p. 97; 
referring to Cannell (1977, p. 55)). 
 
Some participants were hesitant about volunteering closely held personal information about a 
condition that involves compromised status and identity. For example, in one case, discomfort with 
questioning caused a respondent to terminate the interview early. The response to such situations 
was to attempt to gain the trust of respondents. This was attempted through emphasising the 
researcher’s own status as a person diagnosed with schizophrenia, as well as a respectful and 
interested personal manner, and through the staggering of general to more personal questions. The 
researcher attempted to avoid the twin traps of under-identification and over-identification with the 
research respondents (Guba and Lincoln, 1985, p. 177). 
 
Respondents may have also succumbed to the “social desirability effect”, “where interviewees slant 
what they reveal about themselves to give one impression or another” (Walter, 2006, p. 103). This 
effect was countered by a close focus on respondent’s comments, especially contradictions or areas 
of greater sensitivity. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
 
The key ethical considerations in this research revolve around the consent and treatment of 
respondents diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
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Schizophrenia is not only a debilitating disease, it is also in almost all situations an unwanted part of 
the sufferer’s identity. Sufferers may feel very uncomfortable discussing their illness, and may take 
specific precautions so that their illness is not revealed in social situations. In light of this situation, a 
number of precautions were taken when dealing with potential interview subjects. Many of these 
are detailed by Minichiello (1995, p. 206) and Christians (2005). 
 
Perhaps the most important ethical precaution is to ensure the fully informed consent of 
respondents, and their full privacy and confidentiality. Informed consent was ensured by including 
for the participants, an accurate account of aims and processes of the project. This account gave a 
candid picture of what questions were to be asked, what issues arose and the goals of the project. 
Potential participants had freedom to give or withhold consent. Furthermore, participants were 
informed in writing that they were free to answer or not answer any question; that they may 
request certain information given not to be used in the research; and that they may terminate the 
research relationship at any time. Such measures became significant in one case, where a 
respondent was asked to give a second interview to elaborate on emerging themes, but decided not 
to do so. 
 
Participants were also informed, and appropriate actions were taken, in order to limit access to 
respondents’ interview transcripts, tapes and analysis to the researcher and his supervisors. 
Information that may have identified individuals – names and recognisable personal characteristics – 
were changed or omitted. Research was also undertaken with a strict intention to “do justice” to the 
data given in interviews; where thick description was an important goal. The quality of trust 
between the researcher and respondents was sought and valued (Cheek, 2005, p. 401; 1985, p. 282). 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the recognition of respondents’ special and/or 
compromised status may be a significant ethical consideration; especially as “Nonrecognition or 
misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, 
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distorted, and reduced mode of being. Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a 
vital human need” (Taylor et al, 1994, p. 26). 
 
This thesis seeks to recognise a group of people who are too often on society’s fringes. Indeed, the 
thesis fundamentally aims to bring the subjective experiences of these people to light, avoiding the 
“reduced mode of being” that people stigmatised by schizophrenia may experience. 
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CHAPTER 3 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Theoretical Perspectives: Stigma, Identity and Social 
Interaction  
 
 
 
How can the tools of sociology help us understand the relationship between illness, identity and 
schizophrenia? Perhaps the best place to begin is with Erving Goffman’s sociology of stigma, which 
seeks to understand how people with discredited or unwanted identities, such as suffering a mental 
illness, must “conceal” their stigma or “pass for normal”, and often divide their social world into 
those who know and don’t know about their condition. Whilst rich in detail and nuance, however, 
Goffman’s work does not provide a general theory of identity. This thesis finds such a theory in 
Symbolic Interactionism, which offers a wider account of the nature of identity, of identity formation 
and of identity maintenance. Indeed, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 can be understood as a critical 
presentation of both the symbolic interactionist perspective as well as some theory from outside 
symbolic interactionism that may complement the perspective. The symbolic interactionist emphasis 
on identity as “process”, meaning generated through interaction, and the importance of absorbing 
the perspective of the general other are all significant and useful insights. These insights provide a 
useful framework for analysising the specific process whereby a sense of identity is disrupted, rebuilt 
and maintained in people diagnosed with schizophrenia. Finally, the area of applied interactionism 
dealing with “reconstructing identities” – in particular, the literature regarding “illness narratives” – 
helps give insight into how people with schizophrenia deal with the disruption of their condition, and 
provides tools to unpack the interviews given by respondents. In what follows, I will look at each of 
these perspectives in detail, taking care to note the ways in which they might illuminate (or indeed 
fail to illuminate) the research study at hand.  
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Goffman and Stigma 
 
This section focuses on the work of Erving Goffman to illustrate a fundamental process affecting 
identity – stigma. Although Goffman’s work on this topic occurred after much of the material 
regarding symbolic interactionism was released (indeed, symbolic interactionism influenced 
Goffman deeply), it will better suit the unfolding terrain of theory in this thesis to consider Goffman 
first. We may start by acknowledging that self-presentation of a stigmatised sense of identity is a 
vital part of identity maintenance. We consider here Erving Goffman’s work (1963) Stigma: Notes on 
the Management of Spoiled Identity6 and, to a lesser extent, his work (1959) The Presentation of Self 
in Everyday Life. The first work explores how people with identities or conditions such as mental 
illness that are considered deviant, or “stigmatised’, manage their interactions with non-stigmatised 
people in order to protect their self and reputation – that is to say, how they engage in a process of 
identity maintenance. The book includes as “stigmatised” conditions homosexuality, criminality, 
mental patienthood, teenage delinquency – obviously mental patienthood is most relevant, 
although it is interesting that Goffman identifies common self-management techniques for people 
with different stigmatised identities (Goffman, 1963, p. 32).  
 
Stigma arises through the reaction of broader society to a condition the stigmatised person may 
have. “By definition… we believe the person with a stigma is not quite human. On this assumption 
we exercise varieties of discrimination, through which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce 
his life chances” (Goffman, 1963, p. 5). Stigma is itself defined pithily: “The term stigma… will be 
used to refer to an attribute that is deeply discrediting” (Goffman, 1963, p. 3). Clearly schizophrenia 
is a stigmatised condition, and the diagnosis of schizophrenia a violent introduction into this 
                                                          
6 Similar techniques and accounts of stigma have also been described elsewhere (see, eg, Page, 1977, Rabkin, 
1980.  1983; Crocker, 1989; Hyler et al., 1991; Monohan, 1992; Socall, and Holtgraves, 1992; Hayward and 
Bright, 1997; Jorm et al., 1997; Link et al., 1997; Rosenfield, 1997; Holmes and River, 1998; Wahl, 1999; Link 
and Phelan, 2001; Crocker and Park, 2003; Kelly and Jorm, 2007; Perkins et al., 2009). 
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stigmatised condition (Cf. for discussion of stigma Crocker et al., 1998; Farina, A. 1998; Farina et al., 
1973; for discussion of severe mental illness and stigma see Corrigan, 1998, 2004; Corrigan et al., 
2000; Corrigan et al., 2002; Corrigan et al. 2006). Indeed, schizophrenia is frequently understood by 
members of the public as referring to dissociative personality disorder (“multiple personalities”) and 
as having a strong relationship to the propensity for violence (Grohol, 2016; House With No Steps, 
2016; SANE 2016). 
 
Early in his text, Goffman quotes R. Barker 7 on the impact a stigmatised identity can have on a 
normal person: 
The awareness of inferiority means that one is unable to keep out of consciousness the formulation of 
some chronic feeling of the worst sort of insecurity, and this means that one suffers anxiety and 
perhaps even something worse, if jealousy is really worse than anxiety. 
  
Goffman also recognises that stigma can “spread” to those in close relationship to the stigmatized: 
[T]he tendency for a stigma to spread from the stigmatized individual to his close connections 
provides a reason why such relations tend either to be avoided or to be terminated (1963, p. 30). 
 
The bulk of Goffman’s text, however, is constituted by an analysis of the management of the 
stigmatized condition through various social techniques, typically limiting wider knowledge of the 
stigmatised person’s condition (1963, p. 21). Thus “[t]he very anticipation of… [social] contacts can 
of course lead normals and the stigmatized to arrange life to avoid them” (1963, p. 12). And further: 
“during mixed contacts, the stigmatized individual is likely to feel that he is “on’, having to be self-
conscious and calculating about the impression he is making, to a degree and in areas of conduct 
which he assumes others are not” (1963, p. 14). Being “self-conscious and calculating” about the 
impression one is making – this form of “management” – is a good example of identity maintenance. 
This approach echoes the concept of “impression management” discussed in Goffman (1959, p. 208) 
as a vital elelment of the self in social interaction. Such management takes place in a number of 
ways. In an essay entitled “Information Control and Personal Identity”, Goffman discusses a number 
                                                          
7 1956, H. Perry, M. Gawel and M. Gibbon (eds.) Clinical Studies in Psychiatry, New York: W. H. Norton and 
Company, p. 45. 
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of techniques, including “passing” and “concealing stigma symbols”.  The overall approach is titled 
“stigma management” (1963, p. 51) and will become relevant to the research of identity 
maintenance in this thesis. 
 
Goffman observes that “[t]he first set of sympathetic others is of course those who share [the] 
stigma” (Goffman, 1986, p. 20). Goffman further comments that people with stigma may seek out 
others sharing the said stigma; perhaps by joining clubs or support groups. Such behaviour is seen in 
the person with schizophrenia seeking out groups of people that share schizophrenia; as we will see, 
a number of research interviewees spend time at an institution for those with mental illness called 
the Leisure Club. However, the stigmatised person cannot control his or her circumstances at all 
times, and must either retreat into isolation or confront dealing with members of the public. Here, 
Goffman emphasises “visibility” of the stigma. In The Presentation of Self, Goffman refers to the 
unwanted visibility of such hidden conditions as “discrepancy” in social presentation, or 
“performance disruption” (p. 212).  It may be noted here that schizophrenia is not a strictly visible 
illness; however, symptoms and drug side-effects such as tremors, flat affect and misreading social 
cues can soon become visible. In this case, the stigmatised person will make a division between “the 
knowing” who know of his or her stigmatised status, and the “unknowing”. Often a stigmatised 
person will handle the risks of his or her stigma by “dividing the world into a large group to whom he 
tells nothing, and a small group to whom he tells all and upon whose help he relies” (Goffman, 1986, 
p. 95). When confronted with the large group of the unknowing, techniques of identity management 
include “passing” for normal by hiding one’s stigmatised condition. Such a technique may be easier 
when the stigma is not clearly visible, as is sometimes the case with schizophrenia. A mental patient 
may attempt the “concealment of stigma symbols” by compensating for such symptoms and drug 
side-effects as flattened affect, tremors, inability to perceive emotional cues and paranoia, as we 
shall see in Chapter 8. Such passing or compensation may be understood as a form of what Goffman 
(1953) calls “impression management” – the dramatised presentation of a socially acceptable self in 
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social interaction. In many situations the stigmatised person may need to participate in society in a 
way that feels inauthentic or difficult in order to present a socially acceptable self (Goffman, 1986, p. 
121). Goffman also describes the work a stigmatized person may do to hide his or her stigma: 
The stigmatized individual can… attempt to correct his condition indirectly by devoting much private 
effort to the mastery of areas of activity ordinarily felt to be closed on incidental and physical grounds 
to one with his shortcoming (1963, p. 10). 
 
Thus a person with schizophrenia may attempt through psychological training to better perceive 
emotional cues. Furthermore: 
The phenomenon of passing has always raised issues regarding the psychic state of the passer… [I]t is 
assumed that he must pay a great psychological price, a very high level of anxiety, in living a life that 
can be collapsed at any moment (1963, p. 87). 
 
Goffman’s discussions of stigma management techniques can offer us an insight into the personal 
state of mental patients, as well as the use of such techniques to hide their diagnosis and maintain 
their “normal” identity. Furthermore, we may borrow from Goffman an emphasis on pathological 
processes of the self that may be deficient in earlier work in symbolic interactionism, as we shall see 
below. Goffman also provides a dramaturgical reading of the self – self as “presentation” or 
“performance” – that may help us understand the ways people with schizophrenia maintain their 
identities through performance with other people. Finally, the various activities a person may 
engage in to hide their pathological state offer a clear example of identity maintenance. 
 
What are the limitations of Goffman’s work? Goffman’s work can be criticised for offering an 
external account of identity formation – the stigmatised identity is imposed from the outside. 
Although stigmatised subjects may practice passing or concealment of stigma symbols, they do not 
necessarily internalise this view of their identity and, if they do, we do not learn from Goffman how 
this might take place. We are left with the external performance, whilst internal experiences and 
compulsion are neglected. Furthermore, Goffman’s work does not explore the macro features of 
society that provide the context for individual relations of stigma. Although this problem is 
addressed to some extent in his work Asylums (1961), the deinstitutionalisation movement (which is 
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addressed below) has reduced the power of asylums, clinics and hospitals to impose binding 
identities on patients. 
 
Symbolic Interactionism  
 
Some of the limitations we find in Goffman’s work are addressed by the model of symbolic 
interaction developed by (inter alia) George Mead and Herbert Blumer.  
 
Symbolic interactionism encompasses a range of approaches that emphasise meaningful interaction 
between social agents as the source of such phenomena as the mind, meaning and, significantly, the 
self. It also offers a wider approach to questions of identity than presented by Goffman; in 
particular, proposing a view of the internal self communicating with an external world and allowing 
for the process of people internalising identity. 
 
Symbolic interactionism draws heavily on the work of George Herbert Mead. This section presents 
his analysis of the creation of self. Before doing so, however, we should acknowledge Doubt’s 
analysis of the relationship between Mead’s theory of the self and the breakdown of self in 
schizophrenia: 
What… is the situation with schizophrenia? What is painful about watching schizophrenics struggle 
with their illness is that we watch how the illness constitutes a serious invasion of the self. What is 
uniquely tragic about schizophrenia is that it directly confronts the character of the human self and so 
the ability of the human self to be itself (Doubt, 1992, p. 310). 
 
We should also recognise that symbolic interactionism may move some way towards engaging with 
the personal narratives of people suffering schizophrenia. At this point we may begin the analysis of 
Mead’s work. This analysis begins with an account of “meaning”. Mead argues that when one person 
attempts to communicate with another – when they attempt to express meaning – that person 
actually considers the impact of the expressed term within him or herself. Thus Mead states: 
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The gesture is that phase of the individual act to which adjustment takes place on the part of other 
individuals in the social process of behavior. The vocal gesture becomes a significant symbol… when it 
has the same effect on the individual making it that it has on the individual to whom it is addressed or 
who explicitly responds to it, and thus involves a reference to the self of the individual making it. 
(1967, p. 46). 
 
It is important to clarify the point being made here. For Mead, the meaning of a term is that which 
gives rise to a response both in the person making the meaningful statement and the person 
receiving the statement during an interaction involving significant symbols. The process is 
intrinsically social. This is also true of the development of the self: “The self… is essentially a social 
structure, and it arises in social experience… it is impossible to conceive of a self arising outside of 
social experience” (Mead, 1967, p. 140) or put differently: “When we reach a self we reach a certain 
sort of conduct, a certain type of social process which involves the interaction of different individuals 
and yet implies individuals engaged in some sort of cooperative activity. In that process a self, as 
such, can arise” (Mead, 1967, p. 165). It is important to note that this social process is just that – a 
process, rather than an end-point in personal development: “The self is not so much a substance as a 
process” (Mead, 1967, p. 178). 
 
Mead offers an account of how the structure of the self is developed and realised through social 
interaction – “[it] develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to [the process of social 
experience and activity] as a whole and to other individuals within that process” (Mead, 1967, p. 
135). The essence of achieving self-hood is for a person to experience his or herself as an object 
through the eyes of another person (C.f. Tice and Wallace, 2003).  The self, as the heart of human 
subjectivity and the result of identity formation, requires external perception in order to develop. 
The person thus becomes an object to itself, seeing itself through “individual members of the same 
social group, or from the generalized standpoint of the social group to which he belongs” (Mead, 
1967, p. 138; Stets and Burke, 2003; although see Tice and Wallace, 2003, p. 94-97 for criticism of 
this position). “The organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of 
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self may be called the ‘generalized othe’. The attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the 
whole community” (Mead, 1967, p. 154). Furthermore: 
[O]nly in so far as he takes the attitudes of the organized social group to which he belongs toward the 
organized, co-operative social activity… in which that group as such is engaged, does he develop a 
complete self (Mead, 1967, p. 155). 
 
This point is vital to the task at hand as it outlines a process against which we may judge the degree 
to which respondents have recovered from the biographical disruption of schizophrenia; indeed, it 
might be the failure to see oneself from the perspective of the other which is itself at risk or lacking 
in the schizophrenic experience, as we see in the Chapter 6. An argument along these lines is made 
by Rosenberg (1984, 1992). Rosenberg draws upon symbolic interactionism, and the work of Mead 
(amongst others), to contend that “insanity” is defined by a failure in the ability to role-take during 
social interaction. More will be said below of Rosenberg’s work. In a similar vein to Rosenberg, the 
following quote makes the point that “taking the attitude of the other” is vital to experiencing 
oneself as a self: 
When the response of the other becomes an essential part in the experience or conduct of the 
individual; when taking the attitude of the other becomes an essential part in his behaviour – then 
the individual appears in his own experience as a self, and until this happens he does not appear as a 
self (Mead, 1967, p. 195).  
 
Taking the attitude of the other inevitably involves the person with the rules and structures of his or 
her community; in some sense, the communal life is prior to the individual self (Mead 1967, p. 162), 
although Mead does recognise that people can change, that each self has “its own peculiar 
individuality” (Mead, 1967, p. 201) and people can effect change in their communities. It is also 
important to note that this “becoming an object to itself” takes place through the medium of 
language: “…the language process is essential for the development of the self” (Mead, 1967, p. 135). 
This point is explored further in Chapter 9. People suffering schizophrenia who speak confused 
language – “word salad” – may fail to achieve a successful self for this reason8. Although none of the 
                                                          
8 On the topic of confused expression by people with schizophrenia, it has been argued that such language can 
in fact be understood using Kenneth Burke’s distinction between “semantic” and “poetic” meaning. Indeed, 
Doubt argues (1994) that such language can typically be seen as a miscomprehension of semantic language; a 
person with schizophrenia may respond to communication with an overly semantic interpretation of poetic 
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respondents interviewed suffered from such confused language, the fact of its existence reinforces 
the threat schizophrenia can pose to the self. Likewise, as Doubt points out, the person diagnosed 
with schizophrenia may not be able to take the role of the other: 
In taking the role of the other, we are controlled by society, but, more importantly, we control our 
relation to society as well as society’s relation to us. Insofar as schizophrenics seem unable to take the 
role of the other, whether due to their illness or to others’ view of them, it becomes difficult for them 
to control their relation to society as well as society’s relation to them (Doubt, 1992, p. 313). 
 
Nevertheless, despite this difficulty, Doubt emphasizes that, to understand the identity of the person 
with schizophrenia, it is necessary to recognize how people with schizophrenia do engage in role-
taking, calling it role-taking success. 
 
Mead also traces the development of the social self in children. He emphasises two aspects of 
development: “play” and “game”. In the play period, the child is presented with a particular set of 
stimuli aligned with a common social role. The child learns to respond to these stimuli correctly, 
building a social self; the child “utilizes his own responses to … stimuli which he makes use of in 
building a self” (Mead, 1967, p. 150).  The game is somewhat more sophisticated. It involves a set of 
rules governing interaction that are agreed upon, usually tacitly, by others in the game. The 
developing child must be able to understand the game and it’s rules from the perspective of the 
other children, and must be willing to take any role in the game taken by any other person. 
 
Interestingly, Mead acknowledges that there may be different parts of the self that emerge in 
different circumstances: 
[A] good deal of the self does not need to get expression. We carry on a whole series of different 
relationships to different people. We are one thing to one man and another thing to another. There 
are parts of the self which exist only for the self in relationship to itself (Mead, 1967, p. 142). 
 
This is a view that dovetails nicely with Goffman’s concept of the dramaturgical self. Mead’s picture 
of different selves being presented to different people helps us to understand the diverse situations 
                                                          
language, or an overly poetic interpretation of semantic language, giving rise to apparently non-sensical 
expression. Cf. Doubt (1996). 
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of respondents in Chapter 6, 7 and 8 (Mead, 1967, p. 142; C.f. Shlenker, 2003, for a perspective on 
social behaviour as a “performance”; Joas, 1987). Indeed, this multiplicity of the self may help 
explain the particular self-experiences of people diagnosed with schizophrenia, although there are 
some limits to Mead’s approach, as explored below. 
 
One of the more complicated elements of Mead’s approach to the self is his definition and 
distinction between the “I” and the “Me”. The “I” is the response of the person to the attitudes of 
others, whilst the “me” is the set of attitudes of others that the person assumes. “The attitudes of 
the others constitute the organised “me’, and then one reacts that as an “I’” (Mead, 1967, p. 175). 
To rephrase, the “me” is the repository of socialisation, the absorber of social attitudes, whilst the 
“I” is the active agent that acts upon the basis of information from the “me”. Here we can see that 
Mead offers a much more nuanced account of the self than we find in Goffman’s theory of stigma: 
the “me” is “the set of attitudes of others” but it is also assumed by the person and is thus never a 
mere imposition while the “I” emerges when the person actively responds to the attitudes of others. 
Mead elaborates: 
The “me” and the “I” lie in the process of thinking and they indicate the give-and-take, which 
characterizes it. There would not be an “I” in the sense in which we use that term if there were not a 
“me”; there would not be a “me” without a response in the form of the “I”. These two as they appear 
in our experience, constitute the personality. We are individuals born into a certain nationality, 
located at a certain spot geographically, with such and such family relations, and such and such 
political relations. All of these represent a certain situation, which constitutes the “me”; but this 
necessarily involves a continued action of the organism toward the “me” in the process within which 
that lies. The self is not something that exists first and then enters into relationship with others, but it 
is, so to speak, an eddy in the social current and so still a part of the current (Mead, 1967, p. 182). 
 
Furthermore, “The “I” reacts to the self which arises through the taking of the attitude of others. 
Through taking those attitudes we have introduced the “me” and we react to it as an “I”” (Mead, 
1967, p. 174). It is possible to use the “I”/”me” distinction as a means to account for emotional 
experience in the self – that is to say, we may see the “I” as the emotional or affective side of the 
self, and the “me” as the cognitive side. However, such a contention is not strongly thematised by 
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Mead and it is arguable that we need to move beyond Mead to find a more comprehensive way of 
understanding emotional or affective self-experiences, including in schizophrenia. 
 
The last sentence in the quote above is also interesting. Mead compares the self to an “eddy” swept 
along by the superior force of the “social current”.  Perhaps we may regard the diagnostic process 
and hospitalisation as an eddy in the social current of the diagnosed person’s life. However, this 
comparison is somewhat deterministic; a limitation that is considered below, but one which is 
recognised by Mead in his analysis of the relation between self and society (Mead, 1967, p. 192). 
 
Mead offers a strong theoretical and philosophical position from which we can attempt the analysis 
of rebuilding a sense of identity after the diagnosis of schizophrenia. Using Mead’s insights we can 
suggest that rebuilding identity is an intrinsically symbolic process, involving symbolic interchange of 
gestures and a deep engagement with the external views of individual people or the “generalised 
other”.   
 
However, there are a number of aspects of his work that are under-theorised, or to which Mead 
does not advert, that limit the usefulness of his thesis as a basis for the study at hand. Mead offers a 
picture of identity forming in an essentially healthy and normal manner. He does not discuss the 
emergence of “pathological” self-states such as schizophrenia, nor the possibility that deviant groups 
or subcultures may emerge within society. Mead is unclear on the relationship between self and 
society; that is to say, he does not state to what extent self affects society and society affects self 
and, through this, identity formation. Mead’s position may also encounter difficulties in making 
sense of all experiences of schizophrenia; for example, Mead’s generally ideational position may 
falter when faced with emotional or embodied experiences of schizophrenia (accepting the criticism 
made here of using the “I”/”me” distinction as a way to include the emotional or affective in Mead’s 
schema). This point is analysed further in Chapter 9. As has been noted, Mead’s picture of macro-
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society, and his discussion of the synthesis between micro-analysis and macro-analysis, is also 
incomplete; to some extent, this issue is dealt with under the section on Diagnosis, Power and 
Identity below. Linked to this issue, and an issue in itself, is how questions of power and hierarchical 
social structure affects the self-creation procedure. Certainly the issue of the psychiatrist’s position 
in the psychiatric apparatus plays a significant role in the understanding and acceptance of 
schizophrenia, and is considered, among other issues of power, below.  
 
Many of these issues are considered in the later work of Herbert Blumer on symbolic interaction.  
In his most well-known work, Symbolic Interaction: Perspective and Method (1986), Herbert Blumer 
offers a re-statement of the principles of Mead’s symbolic interactionism in terms of the larger social 
world and sociological methodology which is of help here (Blumer, 1986, p. 21). Blumer draws on 
Mead to emphasise the way meaning and the social origins of the self in a symbolic interactionist 
account are constituted by symbolic social processes (1986, p. 4, 12). He argues that symbolic 
interactionism rests on three premises: 
The first premise is that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things 
have for them… The second premise is that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out 
of, the social interaction that one has with one’s fellows. The third premise is that these meanings are 
handled in, and modified through, an interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the 
things he encounters (1986, p. 2). 
 
Blumer also emphasises the located interaction of humans, “The actor selects, checks, suspends, 
regroups and transforms… meanings in the light of the situation in which he is placed and the 
direction of his action” (1986, p. 5). In everyday interaction, this situation may involve other people, 
of whom the actor takes account: 
human beings in interacting with one another have to take account of what each other is doing or is 
about to do; they are forced to direct their own conduct or handle their situations in terms of what 
they take into account (1986, p. 8). 
 
It is important to note here the social interactions necessary in the production of meaningful “self-
objects.”  Identity formation arises out of symbolic interaction – “The human being is seen as 
“social” in a… profound sense” (1986, p. 14). The next relevant aspect of Blumer’s approach is his 
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portrayal of the broader society from a symbolic interactionist perspective. In beginning this 
portrayal, Blumer offers a sophisticated portrait of the work he inherited from Mead, and, within 
this work, the lack of a convincing macro-picture of society (1986, p. 61). Blumer sets out to map 
such a theoretical scheme of human society (Lyman and Vidich, 1988). He uses the phrase “joint 
action” to refer to collective acts of symbolic interactions, including social actors in various social 
positions (1986, p. 71). 
The life of any human society consists necessarily of an ongoing process of fitting together the 
activities of its members. It is this complex of ongoing activity that establishes and portrays structure 
or organization (1986, p. 7). 
 
According to his analysis, from joint action emerges social structure: “A society is seen as people 
meeting the varieties of situations that are thrust on them by their conditions of life” (1986, p. 72).  
 
The central benefit of Blumer’s account is his ability to move from Mead’s philosophical expression 
of symbolic interactionism into a valid sociological perspective, one which we may apply to interview 
texts in this thesis (Plummer 1990; 1991), contributing to the concept of identity formation. Blumer 
also offers a better picture of the relationship between self and society than Mead; as noted, he 
attempts to theorise the role of society in relation to the self. This aspect of Blumer’s work can help 
provide a social context for understanding the processes of diagnosis, rebuilding a sense of identity 
and identity maintenance.  
 
There still remain a number of issues to be treated. Blumer fails, like Mead, to provide an analysis of 
the emergence of pathological selves, subcultures and deviant groups. At this point we may stop to 
observe that Rosenberg (1984, 1992) does draw on a symbolic interactionist perspective to account 
for the definition of pathological (“insane”) selves as defined by a failure to take roles in social 
interaction. For Rosenberg, schizophrenia would be defined by a failure to role-take in thoughts, 
emotions and behavior (Cf. Hooley, 2010, for a discussion of social abilities that can be impaired in 
schizophrenia). In light of Rosenberg’s work, we must acknowledge that symbolic interactionism may 
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be developed to provide an analysis of dysfunctional selves. However, Rosenberg’s work does not 
account for the full range of behaviours outlined by symbolic interactionism that may be 
compromised by serious mental illness. I will attempt to do precisely this in Chapter 9.  
 
Tied to the problem of pathological selves, although Blumer discusses the role of society in self-
formation, he fails to provide a thorough picture of the impact of power and hierarchy in the 
processes being studied. Nor does his work focus on the social context of meanings relevant to a 
symbolic interaction; he fails to account for how the institutions and structures of social context take 
on a causative and ontological life of their own. Such is admitted by Dennis and Martin (2005, p. 210) 
who describe symbolic interactionism’s approach to conceptualising sociology at the macro level: 
[S]ymbolic interactionism rests on a principled refusal to deal in the supposedly universal, objective 
and metaphysical categories and concepts which have produced little more than confusion in 
philosophy and sociology. 
 
It is the purpose of this thesis to provide an analysis of how power suffuses the relationship between 
the patient and the psychiatric apparatus; this task is approached below.  
 
So far, we have considered symbolic interactionism from the relatively theoretical perspectives of 
Mead and Blumer. It is worthwhile at this point to consider a perspective on mental illness that has 
absorbed the interactionist focus of symbolic interaction, namely Thomas Scheff’s Being Mentally Ill:  
A Sociological Theory (1984). This text does seek to offer an interactionist account of dysfunctional 
selves. Here, Scheff proposes that the existence of mental illnesses, like schizophrenia, arises out of 
processes of deviancy and labelling. More specifically, Scheff argues that the career of the so-called 
mentally ill arises out of a process of “residual rule-breaking” (p 53) and subsequent labelling by the 
psychiatric apparatus and society generally (Cf. also Lemert, 1962, who argues that paranoid 
psychosis is reinforced through exclusionary dynamics in social institutions). Scheff observes that 
“insane” behaviours are in fact learnt and absorbed by children from an early age, and that the 
mental patient exhibits these behaviours as a result of interaction with psychiatrists, mental health 
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professionals and other authority figures. Scheff’s argument is interesting and mildly persuasive. He 
certainly possesses insight into the sociological nature of mental illness, that is how the social 
impacts upon the definition and classification of behaviours as mentally ill and the power played by 
sources of authority. However, his argument suffers from several flaws. The suggestion that mental 
illness is an expression of behaviour learnt as a child, rather than derivative of some biochemical 
process, is weak. One may criticise the text on the grounds that there appears to be (growing) 
evidence that mental illnesses such as schizophrenia are caused at some level by neurochemical 
brain processes (Gove 1980, 1984). Furthermore, his position is essentially externalist. It offers a 
theory of mental illness from the outside, from the point of view of socially imposed norms and 
expectations, and does not engage with the subjective experience of the mentally ill person. As such, 
the argument that symbolic interactionism does not offer a sufficient analysis of pathological selves 
still stands. 
 
Having dealt with Scheff’s theory of labelling, there also exists a relevant literature of writers using 
symbolic interactionist principles to address expressions of chronic illness, overcoming the key 
problem that pure symbolic interactionist accounts do not refer sufficiently to deviant or 
pathological identity states. This literature provides us with concepts for understanding the 
experience of schizophrenia as a chronic illness, and one where identity is particularly under threat. 
In particular, this material provides the tools to understand narratives regarding illness developed by 
people diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
 
Reconstructing Identities  
 
One of the most significant aspects of the interactionist literature lies in accounts of how people 
diagnosed with chronic illness “reconstruct” their disrupted biographies (McCall and Wittner, 1990; 
Skultans, 2000). In later chapters, the writer will use this account to help understand the disruption 
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and rebuilding of identity that can occur in cases of schizophrenia.  Certainly the intensity and 
success of such reconstruction will differ with regards to the intensity of the schizophrenic episode 
and the success of medication. Nevertheless, it is important to examine how people who have 
suffered biographical disruption may come to reconstruct their relationship with themselves and 
others, their goals and their personal values. Indeed, this reconstructive process is a vital part of the 
rebuilding and maintaining a sense of identity that forms the key research interest of this thesis, and 
is engaged with later in Chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9.  
 
The phenomenon of reconstruction has been addressed by a range of writers from a number of 
perspectives (Gergen and Gergen, 1983 and 1986; Williams, 1984; Strauss and Corbin, 1987; Corbin 
and Strauss, 1991; Frank, 1997; Bury, 2001; Faircloth et al. 2004; Harris, 2009; Locock et al, 2009). 
These approaches are broadly similar; certain themes re-occur. They include the themes of the 
importance of narrative in the reconstructive process; the need to re-examine and re-fashion 
personal narratives of the person with illness; the loss of and grieving for abilities and desires 
frustrated by illness; the importance of performance before others; the desire to re-establish a 
“normal” life; and, finally, the acceptance that certain elements of the self have been permanently 
lost or compromised by chronic illness (Greenfield et al., 1989). Frank (1998) accounts for illness as a 
form of “care of the self” in the Foucualdian sense; more of which will be said below. Simon 
Williams, in a 1984 article “The Genesis of Chronic Illness: Narrative Reconstruction”, (1984) argues 
that in the light of biographical disruption, a patient’s attempt to make sense of the “putative 
causes” (1984, p. 177) can be read as a form of reconstruction. This process can help rebuild a 
healthy relationship between “body, self and society”, as well as giving order to an illness that might 
be fragmentary or chaotic in effect. Michael Bury captures the essence of the process well in his 
2001 article “Illness Narratives: Fact or Fiction?”: 
Under conditions of adversity, individuals often feel a pressing need to re-examine and re-fashion 
their personal narratives in an attempt to maintain a sense of identity… Thus universal, cultural and 
individual levels of human existence are tied together with narrative threads (2001, p. 264). 
 
45 
 
Indeed, it is to Bury we look later for the first account of reconstruction through narrative. 
 
In his 2001 article Bury proposes that people who have experienced biographical disruption may use 
one of three narrative forms to help understand the nature of their chronic illness (including causes 
and repercussions) and reconstruct their sense of self. These narratives are named “contingent”, 
“moral”, and “core”. The contingent narrative is one that “address[es] beliefs about the origins of 
the disease, the proximate causes of an illness episode, and the immediate effects of illness on 
everyday life” (2001, p. 263). The moral narrative is one that “provide[s] accounts of (and help to 
constitute) changes between the person, the illness and social identity, which help to (re)establish 
the moral status of the individual or help maintain social distance” (2001, p. 263). The core narrative 
is one that “reveal[s] connections between the lay person’s experiences and deeper cultural levels of 
meaning attached to suffering and illness” (2001, p. 263). These three, inter-connected narratives 
forms may help the disrupted person understand and come to terms with his or her chronic illness; 
they will be deployed later in this thesis. There is no reason we cannot apply the framework of these 
three narratives to the accounts given by participants in the study. Indeed, the moral narrative, with 
its focus on social identity as the status of the individual, seems well suited as a conceptual tool with 
which to explore how people form and maintain identity in the light of the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. It is also worth noting that Bury draws on Robinson (1990; Cf. Robinson 1988) to 
argue that these narratives may have a “stable”, “progressive” or “regressive” quality9. These 
qualities are fairly self-explanatory: a stable narrative is one where the speaker remains on a steady 
trajectory regarding their illness and life goals; a progressive narrative is one where the speaker has 
made or is making positive progress with their illness and towards their life goals; a regressive 
narrative is one where the illness is worsening and the speaker is moving away from life goals. See 
Frank (1997) for a similar distinction between “restitution”, “chaos” and “quest” narratives. 
 
                                                          
9 See Frank, 1997, for a similar distinction between “restitution”, “chaos” and “quest” narratives. 
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One key concept that emerges through the literature on reconstruction after biographical disruption 
is “biographical work”. Felde (2011) writes from an “ethnomethodology-informed, social 
constructionist perspective” (2011, p. 105) that biographical work “constructs a subject who is 
continually working building situationally-appropriate identities from episode to episode” (2011, p. 
103). He describes the “rhythms of life” (2011, p. 104) around which identities are constructed and 
re-constructed. Sanders et al. (2008) argue for the importance of the “biographical context of illness 
experience” (2008, p. 990) and “the construction of narratives” (1987, p. 991). Strauss and Corbin 
(1987) write of “biographical accommodations” (1987, p. 251) as "action aimed at achieving a sense 
of control and balance over that life, as well as giving it continuity and meaning despite the illness 
and the changes it brings” (1987, p. 251). This reintegration contains a process of “letting go, closure 
and grieving for what was lost”, with a corresponding movement to “a new self, a better self, even a 
transcendent self” (1987, p. 271). Strauss and Corbin suggest that only the biographically disrupted 
person can reconstruct their life, although others may help with “identity boosters, mitigating 
performance failures, and so forth” (1987, p. 264). They also identify four categories of “biographical 
work”.  Strauss and Corbin say of these categories that “[a]lthough analytically distinct, each occurs 
simultaneously and feeds directly into the others” (1987, p. 265). The categories are: contextualising 
(incorporating the illness trajectory into the biography); coming to terms (arriving at some degree of 
understanding and acceptance of the biographical consequences of actual or potential failed 
performances); identity reconstitution (reintegration of the identity into a new concept of wholeness 
around the limitations in performance); and biographical recasting (giving new directions to the 
biography). These categories of action all interest us as they impact upon rebuilding and maintaining 
a sense of identity amongst people diagnosed with schizophrenia. As seen in Chapter 9, 
“biographical work” – as well as the other processes affecting identity described here – provides a 
basis to suggest a new concept of “identity work”. Identity work may at this stage be thought of 
broadly as the activities a person with identity-threatening illness engages in to re-buiild and 
maintain their sense of identity. 
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In their 1991 article “Comeback: The Process of Overcoming Disability,” Corbin and Strauss develop 
the concept of “comeback”. Comeback occurs when recovery10 manages:  
to reconnect the body and the person of the past with the body and the person of the present 
through possible performances, while accepting that certain performances may no longer be possible 
and that other performances have a changed nature (1991, p. 239). 
 
These performances that “may no longer be possible” also lose the significance they gave to the ill 
person’s biography. Nevertheless, comeback involves overcoming disability11 through “medical’, 
“rehabilitative” and “biographical” work. Our interest is in biographical work, although the three are 
inter-related. Biographical work involves “biographical accommodation’, through which the ill 
person and those close to them “take action to retain and/or regain some degree of control over 
biographies rendered discontinuous by chronic illness” (1991, p. 251). The self which emerges from 
this process is involved in a continual reconstruction of events and actions. Recalling Kathy Charmaz 
(1997), discussed in Chapter 3, Corbin and Strauss also emphasise that the ill person may have a 
changed relationship with time, involving a planning and “juggling” with time to include “trajectory 
management’, as well as daily tasks. Locock et al, in their 2009 article “Biographical Disruption, 
Abruption and Repair in the context of Motor Neurone Disease”, emphasise the importance and 
frequency of “reconstruction” in the case of chronic illness. Although they do not use the specific 
term “biographical work”, they nevertheless discuss the narrative actions taken by those with motor 
neurone disease to help re-establish a sense of self and full identity, often replacing new activities 
for old activities they are no longer able to complete. Kernis and Goldman (2003) emphasise a 
number of factors that can affect the construction and stability of self-esteem; these include social 
comparison, feedback, and actions by the diagnosed individual. They also argue that people with 
                                                          
10 There exists a vast empirical literature concerning the process of recovery from mental illness (see, for 
example, Corring, 2002; Deegan, 2005; Jenkins and Carpenter-Song, 2005; Davidson et al., 2009), particularly 
emphasising the need for work from the perspective of the person with mental illness (Coursey et al. 1995). 
This literature is informed by a broad range of theoretical and methodological approaches, but because it does 
not intersect directly with the theoretical questions of interest to this thesis I do not have sufficient space to 
engage with it here. 
11 NB: Corbin and Strauss speak of physical disability, not psychiatric disability. 
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unstable self-esteem will be more likely to experience depressive episodes, be affected by negative 
events, be protective of their self-esteem and have more impoverished self-concepts. Devos and 
Banaji (2003) argue that there is a strong connection between identity development and 
membership in social groups; in particular, small “ingroups” such as small communities or families. 
There are certainly a number of approaches to chronic illness in the symbolic interactionist 
literature. For the sake of clarity, this thesis focuses, in particular, upon the work of Bury on illness 
narratives, and the concept of biographical work, considered below. 
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CHAPTER 4 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Theoretical Perspectives: Illness, Schizophrenia, 
Identity and Embodiment  
 
 
 
Having focused on broader sociological theories relevant to the issues of this thesis, it remains to be 
seen how more specific sociologies of illness allow us to theorise the relationship between identity 
and schizophrenia. The sociology of illness provides a number of insights into both mental illness and 
chronic illness more generally, and it allows us to draw more specific theoretical outlines within 
which to study the responses of interviewees. In particular, the concepts of “illness trajectory” and 
“biographical disruption” provide a framework within which to study interviewees’ experiences of 
schizophrenia and provide us with tools to help unpack the complex relationship between illness, 
identity and schizophrenia. The concept of “biographical disruption” speaks to the challenge to self-
hood experienced by many people during the crisis and aftermath of a schizophrenic episode, that is 
throughout the phases of pro-drome, diagnosis, hospitalisation and treatment. Indeed, the idea of 
biographical crisis is of particular relevance with respect to schizophrenia, as it is often by its very 
nature an illness where the biography of personal identity is at stake, and the self is compromised. 
Biographical disruption, or crisis, also emerges in sociological studies of the impact of diagnosis and 
hospitalisation. As useful as these concepts from the sociology of illness are, however, they do not 
always capture the embodied, emotional breakdown that characterises many of the symptoms of 
schizophrenia. In this regard, the school of philosophy known as phenomenology provides a number 
of useful concepts. In particular, the work of Merleau-Ponty provides conceptual tools to pull apart 
and examine the lived, embodied experience of many people with schizophrenia. 
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Illness Trajectory 
 
Anselm Strauss et al. (1984) offer a close, detailed account of chronic illness and identity, which 
focuses in particular on the concept of “illness trajectories”. The trajectories of chronic illness can 
vary, depending upon seriousness of illness, successful medication, familial and communal support, 
and so on. Strauss et al. differentiate between the “course of illness” and “illness trajectories": 
[The concept of course of illness] offers no problem to anyone, since we have all experienced an 
illness that did not merely appear but developed gradually over time, getting worse and then 
stabilizing or perhaps relatively clearing up. Course of illness is also a professional term, since to 
knowledgeable medical, nursing and technical staffs each kind of illness has its more or less 
characteristic phases, with symptoms to match. In contrast, illness trajectory is a term coined by the 
authors that refers not only to the physiological unfolding of a sick person’s disease, but also to the 
total organization of work done over that course, plus the impact on those involved with that work 
and its organization (1984, p. 64; emphasis included). 
 
The concept of the illness trajectory is a useful one. It allows us to guide the analysis of research data 
within a broad framework, each disparate aspect of the illness of schizophrenia related to the other 
through the over-arching frame of illness trajectory, while also allowing for an analysis of the illness’ 
impact on the subjective experience of the patient and recognising the work done to respond to the 
illness. This thesis also makes use of what may be thought of as a “typical” illness trajectory for a 
person diagnosed with schizophrenia. This would include a pro-dromal phase where symptoms first 
emerge; diagnosis by a general practitioner or psychiatrist; stabilisation in a hospital or clinic; 
medication; and, in most cases, release to live with family or otherwise in the community. Illness 
trajectory may vary from person to person diagnosed with schizophrenia, in intensity and duration 
of various phases. 
 
Illness trajectories can interact with identity in complex ways (Pettie and Triolo, 1999). At one level, 
the chronically ill person must adapt his or her self-concept to the reality of his or her illness and the 
difference in routines it brings – what Strauss et al. call “coming to terms”. Ill people with chronic 
illness will often undergo a process where  
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the experience reflected in the common complaint made by blind and physically handicapped men 
and women: people assume that they cannot act, work, or be like ordinary mortals… Nonsick persons, 
especially strangers, tend to overgeneralise the sick person’s visible symptoms (1989, p. 81). 
 
Such a process would seem to hold, not only for people with chronic illness, but also for people with 
visible symptoms or medication side-effects of schizophrenia, and is examined below in the section 
dealing with diagnosis and stigma. 
 
The work of Jeffrey Ball et al. (2005) complements Strauss et al.’s theory of illness trajectory. Ball et 
al. consider a “theory of crisis for individuals with severe persistent mental illness”. Their theory 
identifies four steps (2005, p. 12): 
1. Underlying vulnerability  
2. The crisis: Being overwhelmed and lacking control 
3. Immediate responses 
4. Crisis resolution and prevention 
These four steps map neatly onto the typical illness trajectory we have identified for people with 
schizophrenia: underlying vulnerability represents the pro-dromal phase; the crisis represents 
diagnosis; immediate responses represent stabilisation in a hospital or clinic with medication; and, 
crisis resolution and prevention represent release to live with family or otherwise in the community. 
Ball et al. describe a number of factors that may impact upon identity throughout this trajectory: 
agitation, anger and aggression; being low; feeling anxious; and euphoria.  
 
Finally, the illness trajectory of people with psychotic illness is also treated in David Roe’s (1997) PhD 
thesis Exploring the Relationship between Individuals’ Experience of Self and the Course of their 
Disorder. Roe’s work involves a substantial study of a group of 43 people who were hospitalised for 
severe mental illness with psychotic features, examining the relationship between self-esteem, 
engulfment and course of people’s disorder. This study shows “only limited support for the 
hypothesis that levels of patients’ engulfment and self-esteem shortly after discharge could predict 
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outcome at one-year follow-up” (1997, p. 60-61). Roe concludes that more information is required, 
and turns to a qualitative study involving semi-structured interviews of the research subjects, 
focusing on the relationship between self and course of the disorder. His central argument is that: 
There seems to be an interactive relationship between the experience of self and the course of 
disorder, which includes ongoing complex mutual influences. Psychosis and its aftermath pose a 
major challenge to individuals' self-concept and core identity and often generate a diminished sense 
of self and resignation (1997, p. 101-102). 
 
The use of the terms “interactive” and “mutual influences” are important insofar as they recognise 
that the patient may have some agency or ability to negotiate his or her position with a psychiatrist, 
in a clinic or hospital (Seale et al., 2006). The theme of the patient’s agency is one taken up below, as 
well as in Chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9. Roe’s work also suggests that the length and intensity of phases of 
psychotic illness may diverge for different sufferers of psychotic illness. This thesis will proceed upon 
the assumption that significant divergence in symptoms and drug side-effects may be found 
amongst different people diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
 
The literature regarding illness trajectory does not provide a strong analysis of relations of power 
and social structure in relation to illness. Whilst it is true that Strauss et al. discuss the work of 
patients and kin when hospitalised – included in “the total organization of work done over that 
course, plus the impact on those involved with that work and its organization” (Strauss et al, 1984, p. 
64; emphasis included) – much more could be said of contemporary power structures such as the 
doctor/patient relationship and the influence of the pharmaceutical industry. This thesis will explore 
such power structures; in particular, it will interrogate the diagnostic psychiatrist/patient 
relationship and will consider such structures of power as those involved in social control of people 
with schizophrenia, deinstitutionalisation and psychopharmacology. 
 
We have seen that chronic illness such as schizophrenia may be analysed with the concept of illness 
trajectory. An important element in such a trajectory is the subjective experience of the illness by 
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the person who is ill. The following sections discuss the literature pertaining to the impact of chronic 
illness upon identity, and then, more specifically, the impact of schizophrenia upon identity. 
 
The Impact of Chronic Illness on Identity  
 
Michael Bury offers an analysis of the impact of chronic illness upon the biography, identity and self 
of people with chronic illness. In the course of this analysis, Bury (1982) develops the concept of 
“biographical disruption” as a way of describing the challenges to self-hood felt by many with 
chronic illness. Bury writes of biographical disruption: 
My contention is that illness, and especially chronic illness, is precisely that kind of experience where 
the structures of everyday life and the forms of knowledge which underpin them are disrupted. 
Chronic illness involves a recognition of the worlds of pain and suffering, possibly even of death, 
which are normally only seen as distant possibilities or the plight of others. In addition, it brings 
individuals, their families, and wider social networks face to face with the character of their 
relationships in stark form, disrupting normal rules of reciprocity and mutual support… Further, the 
expectations and plans that individuals hold for the future have to be re-examined (1982, p. 169). 
 
The concept of biographical disruption offers insight into processes of dislocated identity 
experienced by those with chronic illness and is, in this thesis, translated beyond the realm of 
chronic illness to specifically address the breakdown of self in schizophrenia. However, the concept 
of biographical disruption may need to be extended to account for the severity of breakdown of the 
self in a number of experiences of schizophrenia. Indeed, in some cases of schizophrenia, the 
breakdown of identity moves beyond mere disruption of an ongoing life history into a profound 
collapse of self-hood. The concept of “biographical crisis” will be addressed in more detail in the 
Chapter 9.  
 
Bury identifies three types of disruption in response to the “unfolding” of a chronic illness: 
First there is the disruption of taken-for-granted assumptions and behaviours; the breaching of 
common-sense boundaries… Second there are more profound disruptions in explanatory systems 
normally used by people, such that a fundamental re-thinking of the person’s biography and self-
concept is involved. Third, there is a response to disruption involving the mobilisation of resources 
(1982, p. 169-170, emphasis added). 
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The highlighted disruption concerning the “person’s biography and self-concept” is of most interest 
to this thesis, allowing as it does a theorisation of processes of rebuilding and maintaining a sense of 
identity in response to the chronic illness of schizophrenia. Bury (1982: 172-173) also noted the 
problem that many people experiencing biographical disruption have difficulty separating their 
sense of self from the disease. For many the disease had imposed on them to the point that they 
were their condition – they were arthritic, they were cancer carriers, and so forth; “a strict 
separation of disease and self… is precarious” (1982, p. 173; Cf. Yanos et al., 2010). We can assume 
that this kind of identification with the illness would be even stronger in the case of mental illnesses 
such as schizophrenia, where the self itself is often compromised. Indeed, Pilgrim (2007, p. 540) 
argues that physical illness is something which is deemed to “happen to” a person, whilst mental 
illness “implicates the whole self”. In light of such severity, this thesis offers the concept of 
“biographical crisis” as a way of conceptualising the more comprehensive crisis experienced by at 
least some people with schizophrenia. In Chapters 6, 7 and 8, we will see how such identification 
emerges in the accounts of illness offered by some of the research subjects interviewed. 
 
We may expand upon the concept of biographical disruption through a reading of Michael Kelly and 
David Field’s paper “Medical Sociology, Chronic Illness and the Body” (1996). They argue that there 
is a strong connection between compromised identity and the compromise of bodily aspects of the 
self in chronic illness, especially during the sometimes drastic bodily changes of chronic illness (Cf. 
Charmaz, 2000; Larsen et al, 2006). They argue that there was, at the time of writing, an under-
theorisation of “bodily experiences in everyday life” (1996, p. 243) in contemporary sociology – a 
gap in the literature this thesis seeks to address. Such theorisation of bodily experiences, in the 
context of schizophrenia, is not always well captured in the symbolic interactionist approach, 
focusing as it does on cognitive and communicative processes. However, as outlined in Chapter 9, 
this thesis seeks precisely to extend symbolic interactionism to account for emotional and embodied 
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experiences of schizophrenia which we might define, for want of better expressions, in terms of 
“emotional interactionism” and “embodied interactionism’. 
 
We may further interrogate the literature concerning the impact of chronic illness. In her 1983 
article “Loss of Self: A Fundamental Form of Suffering in the Chronically Ill”, Kathy Charmaz offers an 
analysis of “loss of self” in the chronically ill. Charmaz argues that the visibility of suffering can cause 
discomfort to friends and acquaintances; the illness “rips away the previously known public, sociable 
presentation of self” (1983, p. 179). This phenomenon would seem to apply particularly well to 
people exhibiting visible symptoms of schizophrenia such as delusional thoughts, hallucinations, 
confused speech, catatonia, and other similar symptoms. In such cases, subjects with schizophrenia 
may resort to “passing” or “concealing” of stigmatic signs as discussed by Goffman (1963). Such 
processes are discussed below in the section on diagnosis and stigma, and emerge clearly in Chapter 
8. Moreover, the breakdown in the “public, sociable presentation of self” may further compromise 
relations with family and friends that would otherwise have been useful in the rebuilding of identity 
after a biographical crisis. 
 
Beyond these issues, Charmaz also argues that chronic illnesses can be thought of in terms of 
“interruptions”, “intrusions” or “immersion”. Immersion typically leads to a “recasting” of life (1997, 
p. 79), and a turning inward (1997, p. 99). It seems fair to say that the experience of schizophrenia 
tends to be immersive given that such experience can inhabit the entirety of the person’s identity; it 
constitutes more than an interruption or intrusion. This theme certainly emerges in Chapter 6, 7 and 
8, especially with the turning inward of social isolation12. Finally, but not of least importance, 
Charmaz points to “developing a dialectical self” (1997, p. 70), where there is an ongoing reflexive 
relation between the “sick self” and the “monitoring self”. Interestingly, Charmaz compares this 
dialectic to the relationship between the “I” and “me” in the work of Mead. The comparison 
                                                          
12 For an early discussion of social isolation as a social factor concomitant with schizophrenia, see Jaco, 1954. 
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suggests that a division may exist within the identity of some who are ill; a division between the self 
absorbing social experiences of illness and the self acting upon that experience. The comparison also 
supports the usefulness of the “I” and “me” concepts. As we will see, Mead’s work on symbolic 
interactionism forms a fundamental element in this thesis’ approach to theorising and analysing the 
experience of people diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
 
We have seen that chronic illness can have a significant impact upon the identity of the person with 
the illness. In some cases, biographical disruption may occur. The self of the person with chronic 
illness may become immersed in the illness. However, we have also already seen that the illness of 
schizophrenia may bring with it an even more significant breakdown of the self – a kind of 
biographical crisis. The following section examines this line of thought, discussing the impact 
schizophrenia specifically can have on identity. 
 
The Impact of Schizophrenia on Identity 
 
It has been observed that schizophrenia has perennially been an object of interest for psychiatry 
(Woods, 2011), if not in broader culture. It comes as no surprise then that there exist a number of 
strong accounts of the impact of schizophrenia on identity. 
 
Ronald Laing’s seminal work The Divided Self (1990) offers a complex portrait of the effect of 
schizophrenia on the self. In his text, Laing attempts to offer an “interior” account of schizophrenia – 
a view “from the inside”’. For Laing, schizophrenia (particularly in the pro-dromal stage) typically 
leads to a division of the self (1990, p. 39). Laing deloys the concept of “ontological security” to 
illustrate what breaks down in the divided self. “Ontological security” may be thought of as a sense 
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of wholeness or fullness in a person’s being13. The person is not divided; he or she is not lacking a 
vital element of self-esteem or self-fulfilment. In contrast to this, “ontological insecurity” arises 
where there is some lack or division within a person’s identity. This can be a sense that one is not 
whole, that one’s mind or self is fragmented, that one is lacking a crucial element of self-hood or 
self-fulfilment. The person suffering identity breakdown in schizophrenia is a classic example of 
someone lacking ontological security, and the concept is used in this thesis to explore the experience 
of biographical disruption and biographical crisis.  
 
Laing divides ontological insecurity of the person with schizophrenia into three, overlapping 
categories that will prove useful for the analysis of research in this thesis. The first is “engulfment” – 
experienced as a loss of identity, or the threat thereof: “to be enclosed, swallowed up, drowned, 
eaten up, smothered, stifled” (1990, p. 45). The second is “implosion”, which occurs when one 
experiences the external world as impinging dangerously on the inner world: “the full terror of 
experience of the world as liable at any moment to crash in and obliterate all identity as a gas will 
rush in and obliterate a vacuum” (1990, p. 45). The third is “petrification” or “depersonalisation”. To 
feel petrified or depersonalised is to fear that one’s identity will become nullified or exterminated: 
“…the possibility of turning, or being turned, from a live person into a dead thing, into a stone, into a 
robot, an automaton, without personal autonomy of action, an it without subjectivity” (1990, p. 46). 
To experience one of these situations sounds horrific, and may go some way toward explaining the 
intense fear and misunderstanding associated with schizophrenia by some members of the public. 
These three situations also resonate with the reported experiences of self-hood by research subjects 
as detailed in Chapter 6,7 and 8. This thesis will take these situations as evidence of a disruption or 
breakdown of identity, and lend weight to the development of the concept of biographical crisis. 
 
                                                          
13 See Doubt, 1996, for a discussion of the relationship between Laing’s concept of ontological insecurity and 
Hegel’s concept of the Unhappy Consciousness. 
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Lysaker and Lysaker also contribute to an understanding of the impact of schizophrenia upon the 
self. In their 2008 book, Schizophrenia and the Fate of the Self, they outline the impact of 
schizophrenia on identity through the concept of “self as dialogue’. This concept posits that people 
hold “self-positions” and express these through dialogue (2008, p. 43-62). Such dialogue can 
contribute to “life histories” that help the subject make sense of his or her life experience, and 
illness experience. The text that seeks to outline how these self-positions, and the dialogue that 
expresses them, can be compromised by schizophrenia. Such compromise typically emerges in a 
“diminished sense of self” (2008, p. 35), expressed in apparently disordered or interrupted dialogue 
and can lead to a case where subjects “find themselves engulfed and overwhelmed by their illness” 
(2008, p. 76). One can discern a clear proximity here with Laing’s concept of ontological insecurity.  
 
Lysaker and Lysaker outline three forms of “self-experience” that may emerge in schizophrenia as 
they have conceptualised it. First they identify the monological self, where: 
a significant decrease in the interanimating play of self-positions due to the inflexible dominance of 
one or two self-positions. In such cases a rigidly unchanging hierarchy emerges in which self-world 
interactions are consistently ordered in a singular manner, and intra- and interpersonal dialogue is 
replaced by a monologue (2008, p. 81). 
 
The barren self, where subjects express themselves: 
in ways that lack even the singular focus… of monological self-presentations. Instead, it is as if they 
are ciphers through which disjointed remarks and actions flow… [they are] empty, disjointed (2008, p. 
85). 
 
The cacophonous self, where: 
certain people suffering schizophrenia find themselves in a swirl of self-positions that seem to 
proceed without any order at all (2008, p. 86). 
 
These forms of self-experience are noted in Chapter 6. Lysaker and Lysakers' argument is supported 
by a number of case studies. This intensity of “self-experience” sharply distinguishes identity 
phenomena in schizophrenia from that experienced in chronic illness or non-psychotic mental 
illness, where one’s very sense of self is not in crisis. Again, the Lysakers’ findings support the 
development of the biographical crisis concept. 
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Davidson and Strauss (1992) offer an even-handed account of the effect of severe mental illness on 
the person suffering the illness. They describe a “distortion in sense of self” as an essential 
characteristic of schizophrenia (1992, 132). Davidson and Strauss also advert to the process of 
recovering from biographical disruption in severe mental illness. They suggest that: 
[T]he process of rediscovering and reconstructing an enduring sense of self as an active and 
responsible agent provides an important, and perhaps crucial, source of improvement. This process of 
becoming aware of a more functional sense of self and building upon it in the midst of persisting 
psychotic symptoms and dysfunction is alluded to over and over again by persons suffering from 
these disorders (1992, 131). 
 
The focus on an active agent recovering from the disruption of illness will become important in 
Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9, the Discussion Chapter, where the concept of “identity work” is suggested to 
describe such activities.  
 
We may find further insight into the effect of schizophrenia upon the subject in an issue of the 
Schizophrenia Bulletin (1989, p. 15(2)) dedicated to the topic. The issue of the Bulletin is introduced 
in a foreword by John Strauss and Sue Estroff (1989), where the authors exhort theorists and 
researchers to delve more deeply into the qualitative, subjective experience of schizophreniform 
disorders to gain a better insight and to help with the treatment and healing of these disorders. In 
another article by Sue Estroff (1989), “Self, Identity, and Subjective Experiences of Schizophrenia: In 
Search of the Subject”, Estroff echoes the point made above that “Schizophrenia is an I am illness – 
one that may overtake and redefine the identity of the person” (1989, p. 189; emphasis included). 
She argues that social science may have valuable input into understanding this redefinition – a 
position endorsed by this thesis. This redefinition is again one that will generally not occur in chronic 
illness or non-psychotic mental illness, largely because they do not carry the stigma or the nature of 
comprehensively subsuming identity present in schizophrenia.   
 
Finally, we may refer to Doubt, who also considers the fate of the self in schizophrenia. In his 1992 
article titled “Mead’s Theory of Self and Schizophrenia” (Doubt 1992) he argues that: 
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What is painful about watching schizophrenics struggle with their illness is that we watch how the 
illness constitutes a serious invasion of the self. What is uniquely tragic about schizophrenia is that it 
directly confronts the character of the human self and so the ability of the human self to be itself 
(1992, p. 310). 
 
 
Whilst this literature paints a frankly horrifying picture of identity in schizophrenia, we must be 
careful not to assume that all cases will involve the kind of failures or breakdowns described in this 
literature. The experience of people diagnosed with schizophrenia may actually range from less to 
more intense symptoms; those with fewer symptoms may not experience the horror of engulfment, 
implosion or petrification. This thesis seeks to be open to such divergence. It is also unclear if the 
categories presented, such as the petrified self or the monological self apply to the whole spectrum 
of schizoid disorders. It appears that the categories may not apply to schizoaffective disorder or 
schizoid personality disorder, for example, where a grave threat to the self is not present. 
 
This chapter has charted the literature concerning the impact of schizophrenia upon identity. A 
picture of a highly compromised self, in many cases, has emerged. However, processes affecting the 
identity of the person with schizophrenia are not limited to the illness itself; the social context in the 
form of diagnosis may also impact the self. The following section accordingly examines the impact of 
diagnosis upon the identity of the person with schizophrenia. 
 
Diagnosis and Identity  
 
Diagnosis is typically seen in the literature as a turning point in the patient’s experience of identity 
disruption. Bury (1982) notes that the onset of chronic illness may be insidious. It is thus difficult to 
identify a significant moment where the entire biographical disruption takes place. However, such 
disruption often emerges during the process of diagnosis, at which point the person diagnosed with 
schizophrenia may be experiencing biographical crisis. Pilgrim (2007, p. 540) emphasises the 
importance of diagnosis, both in physical and mental disease.  
61 
 
 
Treating the subject of diagnosis directly, Yvonne Hayne (2001) presents To be Diagnosed: The 
Experience of Persons with Chronic Mental Illness, a work highly relevant to exploring how identity 
breaks down during diagnosis of chronic mental illness. Hayne delves into the experience of 
diagnosis of a chronic mental illness amongst a relatively small number of people. She makes clear 
the significance of diagnosis at a number of levels: 
[A]s the pain, grief and loss fluctuate in intensity from day to day perhaps, the “prediagnosis self” 
becomes less and less recognizable. The individual must struggle to rebalance, to take stock of altered 
functions, to regroup. This is the only way to move forward and to move forward includes the 
challenges of finding a level of wellness within the illness and within the knowledge of the illness 
brought by diagnosis (2001, p. 17). 
 
Hayne focuses our attention on such factors as having a previously un-diagnosed illness whose 
diagnosis provides confirmation, the creative experience of certain mental illnesses like bipolar 
disorder, personal resolution and defiant attitude at the outset, and the experience of being utterly 
“broken” by the diagnosis of chronic mental illness.  
 
Hayne draws out from all her stories an emphasis on how diagnosis altered the being of the people 
being diagnosed – changes “of being and of character” (2001, p. 166) – and the related structural 
significance of diagnosis. Hayne distinguishes identity effects in diagnosis from those that occur in 
biological (non-neurological) illness; that is to say, Hayne emphasises that diagnosis of chronic 
mental illness goes to the heart of identity, while simple biological illness does not commonly have a 
profound effect on identity. Such an opinion is certainly apparent in Chapter 6, 7 and 8 of this thesis. 
Likewise Hayne draws out the theme of “broken-ness” in diagnosis and post-diagnostic experience – 
“broken-ness of history of relationship, of space, of future, of self-narrative, of spirit” (2001, p. 167). 
The experience of being broken chimes well with themes of biographical disruption and biographical 
crisis, as well as ontological insecurity that emerge in Chapter 6, 7 and 8. 
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Complementing the picture of diagnosis as a significant turning point in the illness trajectory, 
Charmaz emphasises the role of the doctor/patient relationship during diagnosis. Charmaz (1983) 
sees this relationship as an important indicator of the prognosis of the self in chronic illness. 
Interaction with a diagnostician may lead to a heightened self-concern. This may lead to scrutinising 
encounters with others for hints of discreditation and negative reflections of self; greater 
dependence on others; a need for social contact aligned with a lessening capability of maintaining 
relationships; and the “language of loss” expressing a heightened self-concern (1983, p. 190-191). 
Charmaz’s insights into diagnosis as a turning point will prove useful to this thesis. In particular, the 
emphasis on heightened self-concern and the number of ways the self is enmeshed within social 
relationships are valuable. Indeed, many of these processes emerged in the interviews with research 
respondents presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.  
 
As we have seen, the experience and diagnosis of schizophrenia can have a severe impact on 
identity. Such impact may lead to biographical crisis; it may involve ontological insecurity and it 
certainly upsets the sense of self of the person with schizophrenia. This thesis now turns to some of 
the social structures and processes aside from diagnosis that affect the identity of the person with 
schizophrenia. 
 
Schizophrenic Symptoms, Embodiment and Phenomenology  
 
Schizophrenia is an illness that affects the way the sufferer experiences the world around them. 
Many people with schizophrenia experience hallucinations and delusions. These experiences are 
significant and often traumatic for the person undergoing them, and are worth analysing. 
 
We may inquire into these experiences by engaging in phenomenological analysis. More specifically, 
we may take account of thinkers who have used phenomenology to gain an insight into the personal 
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experience of schizophrenia. The theorists Ludwig Binswanger, Eugene Minkowsi and Louis Sass 
have used phenomenological techniques in this way, and their insights are considered here. The 
work of French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty is also considered. Although he does not 
directly address the schizophrenic experience, his concept of an embodied being – in crisis or broken 
down by schizophrenia – offers further insight into the experience of schizophrenia. Before 
considering these thinkers, however, it is worth briefly giving an overview of the work of Edmund 
Husserl and Martin Heidegger, from whom these thinkers, in many ways, extrapolated their own 
philosophical positions. 
 
Husserl sought to give thought about human beings a rigorous and scientific foundation (Husserl 
1988). In order to achieve this goal, Husserl aimed to undercover the universal structures of human 
consciousness. With an understanding of such structures, Husserl believed that a firm foundation 
could be found (Spitzer and Uehlein, 1992). Pursuing this project, Husserl performed what he 
described as the “Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction”. This reduction involved a process 
whereby Husserl sought to “bracket” the contents of conscious experience, engage with his own 
consciousness, and arrive at the underlying structures that made such experience possible. Through 
this process, Husserl held, one arrives at a “transcendental ego” – an inner subjective consciousness 
of all that one perceives. This transcendental ego is interesting because it not only explains the world 
(as the external experience of the transcendental ego) but also because it is not itself “of” that world 
- the nature of the transcendental ego transcends is wholly different from the world itself. In taking 
this position, Husserl echoes the work of René Descartes, who also searched for a secure foundation 
for human knowledge in the direct experience of consciousness (hence Husserl titles his work 
Cartesian Meditations). Another important aspect of Husserl’s position is the claim that all 
consciousness is “intentional”. That is to say, all consciousness is “directed” at an external object; all 
consciousness is “of or about something” (Romdenh-Romluc, 2011, p. 9; C.f. Wiggins et al, 1992).  
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Heidegger sought to uncover the nature of “being” (Heidegger, 1962). In particular, he was 
interested in the nature of the human being – a being that could inquire into the nature of its own 
being. To this end he sought, like Husserl, to find and illuminate the fundamental structures of 
consciousness. However, Heidegger moves significantly beyond Husserl. Rather than finding a 
transcendental ego, Heidegger finds and describes a “Being” that is already, and always, implicated 
in the world. This being is always engaged in projects in the world; its fundamental structures lie in 
temporality, spatiality, “thrown-ness” (the situation of being in the world) and its relationship to 
other beings. Heidegger describes this being as “Dasein”, roughly translated as “being-there”. Dasein 
is intrinsically connected to the external world, both as a pre-reflective consciousness and as a 
conscious actor, and is thus described as “being-in-the-world”. Where Husserl finds a consciousness 
separate and independent of the world, Heidegger finds a being fundamentally engaged with the 
world; a being that bridges the gap between subject (self) and object (world).     
 
Binswanger draws heavily on both Husserl and Heidegger. From Husserl he inherits the focus on 
subjective consciousness as a basis for knowledge and an emphasis on the “life-world”. From 
Heidegger he borrows the term Dasein and the concept of a being-in-the-world. The influence of 
Heidegger is important; with the concept of being-in-the-world, Binswanger is able to transcend 
dualities of subject/object and internal/external. With Dasein, Binswanger also develops a 
conceptualisation of the human being that he is able to mingle with influences from Freud and 
psychoanalysis. The result is a process Binswanger describes as “Daseinanalysis”. Daseinanalysis is 
not so much a therapeutic tool (though it has later been used as such) as much as a methodological 
instrument that may be used to explore the psyche of people with mental illness. Binswanger uses 
the technique, notably in his text Schizophrenie (1957), to gain access to the experience of a number 
of people diagnosed with schizophrenia. Through Daseinanalysis, Binswanger is able to gain access 
to what he regards as the “schizophrenic existential pattern” (Binswanger, 1963, p. 252) – that is, 
the transformations of the Dasein over time in people diagnosed with schizophrenia.  Binswanger 
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identifies four such stages of transformation, or development, in the schizophrenic existential 
pattern. The first is: 
the notion of a breakdown in the consistency of natural experience, its inconsistency. Inconsistency 
implies precisely that inability to “let things be” in the immediate encounter with them, the inability, 
in other words, to reside serenely among things…  What makes the lives of our patients such a 
torment is that they are not able to come to terms with the inconsistency and disorder of their 
experience but, rather, constantly seek for a way out so that order can be re-established (1963, p. 
252).    
 
This notion of “breakdown in the consistency of natural experience” certainly seems to capture the 
sensory disruption schizophrenia may cause, especially in the case of hallucinations. The second 
stage lies in: 
the splitting off of experiential consistency into alternatives, into a rigid either-or… We thus come… to 
what we have come to recognise in all our patients as the formation of Extravagant ideals. The Dasein 
now stakes everything on “maintaining” this stance, on – in other words – pursuing this ideal 
“through thick and thin” (1963, p. 254; emphasis included).  
 
Here, with the concept of “splitting into alternatives” we find a clear description of the fierce 
certainty with which a patient with schizophrenia may assert delusional belief. Furthermore,   
Compared to the severe existential pull exerted by both of these alternatives, the inconsistency of 
experience was relatively harmless. For now the Dasein is torn by the struggle between both aspects 
of the alternative into which it is split. Now it becomes a matter of either being able to pursue the 
Extravagant ideal or of giving it up entirely (1963, p. 254).  
 
The third stage involves: 
the concept of covering. By this we mean the sisyphyslike effort to conceal that side of the alternative 
that is unbearable to the Dasein so that the Extravagant ideal might thereby be buttressed” (1963, p. 
258). 
 
Perhaps at this stage we may relate the concept of “covering” to Goffman’s concept of concealing 
stigma, discussed in the next chapter. The final stage comprises: 
the existence’s being worn away (as though by friction), the culmination of the antinomic tension 
involved in no longer being able to find a way out or in, a culmination that is a resignation or a 
renunciation of the whole antinomic problem as such, and that takes the form of an existential 
retreat… We come now to the retreat from existence in the completely unfree mode of insanity, a 
mode in which the Dasein of its own free will renounces neither life nor social life. What rather is 
renounced is life as independent, autonomous selfhood. The Dasein thus surrenders itself over to 
existential powers alien to itself. What we have seen is a particularly radical capitulation of the 
Dasein… Now…. The Dasein removes itself from the autonomy of its own life context. We are forced 
to say of such a person that he is a victim, a plaything, or a prisoner in the hands of alien powers 
(1963, p. 258-259; emphasis included). 
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This final stage bears comparison to what Laing describes as the person with schizophrenia being 
engulfed or petrified, and clearly represents a change, if not breakdown, in everyday modes of self-
hood. Importantly, however, and unlike Laing, Binswanger does not regard this process and its end-
point as a breakdown or failure of the Dasein. Rather he understands it as a different form of Dasein; 
one which the doctor or Daseinanalyst can access with patient and sensitive interrogation. As we will 
see, the concept of a self that is merely in a different mode of being, rather than fundamentally 
compromised or broken down, is not shared by Minkowski, Merleau-Ponty or Sass. We now turn to 
the work of Eugene Minkowski. 
 
Eugene Minkowski engaged in a phenomenological project to help uncover the “essential 
phenomena” (Spiegelberg 1972, p. 234) arising in schizophrenia. Unlike Binswanger and Merleau-
Ponty (considered below), Minkowski did not set about his task through a close engagement with 
the thought of Husserl and Heidegger. Indeed, Minkowski’s main acknowledged debt is to the 
philosopher Henri Bergson, who emphasised immediate experience and intuition as the basis of a 
firm philosophy. Nevertheless, Minkowski’s task is broadly phenomenological in manner; he seeks 
through close discussion, observation and analysis of a large number of case studies to reach the 
central, underlying experiences of people with schizophrenia. Like Sass, as we will see, Minkowski 
contrasts this task with a quantitative approach to the symptoms of schizophrenia, holding that a 
close, qualitative phenomenological approach to the data is called for. In pursuing this task over 
time, MInkowski comes to uncover what he described as the “trouble generateur”, the deep and 
central factors constituting the heart of the experience of schizophrenia (Urfer, 2001, p. 281-282; 
C.f. Sass, 2001, p. 256). Urfer on Minkowski14 argues that: 
Phenomena at the level of trouble generateur poses a certain unique spatio-temporal configuration 
that is distinctive in each specific psychiatric disorder… It is the formal disturbance that is essential, 
that shapes the symptoms and provides what we would now call the validity criteria of nosological 
entities. The trouble generateur, as a formal-structural complex, may be considered to be analogous 
to the physiological substrate of symptoms in medical diseases (2001, p. 282). 
 
                                                          
14 There are unfortunately very few translations of Minkowski’s work from the original French. 
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This description of the “trouble generateur”, technical as it may seem, does attest to the particular 
form of disruption a person with schizophrenia may experience. Minkowsi further characterises the 
loss of vital contact with reality that lies at the heart of the experience of schizophrenia. This, he 
describes as “élan personnel”: 
There is a weakening of the dynamic, flexible, malleable aspects of [the] relationship [between the 
subject and the ambient world], with a corresponding predominance of the fixed, static, and rational 
elements of the spatial order. This can also be described as a lack of attunement to the inner and to 
the ambient world and a characteristic arrest of existential temporality (Urfer, 2001, p. 293; emphasis 
included). 
 
We may relate this concept to Binswanger’s final stage of the phenomenology of schizophrenia, 
where resignation, renunciation and retreat characterise the phenomenological relationship with 
the world. Minkowski describes how this compromised relationship with the world leads to a form 
of autistic behaviour (or “comportement”). Minkowski distinguishes between “rich autism” 
(“autisme riche”) and “poor autism” (“autisme pauvre”). The first consists of a retreat from the 
external world into a rich, internal life of fantasy and dreaming, and typically proceeds into 
compensatory behaviour via excessive fantasy life, sulking or constant regrets (Urfer, 2001, p. 293). 
The second consists of a breakdown of the élan personnel, with a break from the world and a poor, 
empty internal life, and typically proceeds into sterile, “intellectuoid” attitude (Urfer, 2001, p. 293). 
Such a conception will chime well, as we will see, with certain experiences of disruption by research 
subjects. The result of the conception for Minkowski is a self that is fundamentally at odds with and 
disconnected from the world. 
 
We now move to the work of Merleau-Ponty, in particular his Phenomenology of Perception (1962). 
Merleau-Ponty’s main interest is to develop Husserl’s position. He, too, searches for the 
fundamental structures of consciousness in order to secure a science of the human and the world. In 
doing so, Merleau-Ponty responds to what he describes as “Empiricism” and “Intellectualism”. 
Empiricism considers the world to be an external objective phenomenon, which can be experienced 
by the human subject; and considers that the human subject (particularly human consciousness) is 
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essentially consistent with material causation. Intellectualism, sometimes referred to by others as 
“idealism”, holds that the world can only be known through conscious perception (the world is not 
an external objectivity) and that consciousness is an essentially different type of thing than, and 
outside the world it perceives.  
 
In response to these positions, and drawing on Husserl and various cases provided by then-
contemporary psychology, Merleau-Ponty argues not only that the world is not an external 
objectivity, but that consciousness is not separate to the world. To sustain this position, Merleau-
Ponty argues that the human being and the perceived world are one and the same thing. To whit, 
Merleau-Ponty argues that human perception of the world is both constitutive of the world 
perceived as well as the consciousness of the human. More specifically, Merleau-Ponty argues that 
human consciousness is located within the perceiving body, and that the body is irrevocably tied to 
the perception of the world. This situation can be described as being a “body-in-the-world”. The 
world and perception of the world are “mutually dependent parts of one whole” (Romdenh-Romluc 
2011, p. 26). Merleau-Ponty writes “[t]he world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject 
which is nothing but a project of the world, and the world is inseparable from the world, but from a 
world which the subject itself projects” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 430). Embodiment of perception is 
thus the pre-condition of a world to exist. In emphasising the body and embodiment in this way, 
Merleau-Ponty moves significantly beyond Husserl.  
 
On the topic of the body, Merleau-Ponty also considers the issue that the perception of one’s own 
body differs in part from the perception of external objects. Perception, or consciousness, of the 
body is described as “proprioception”; it involves a spatial sense of the location of one’s limbs, 
perceptions of internal organs, the sense of hunger or tiredness, and balance, amongst other bodily 
qualities. Merleau-Ponty argues, however, that one’s proprioceptive consciousness emerges through 
69 
 
intentionality; that is to say, one becomes aware of one’s body through bodily actions directed 
towards the world; hence the body-in-the-world (see for a discussion of intentionality Searle, 1999).  
 
Merleau-Ponty further develops his position with regard to issues of actions, emotions, and the 
nature of thought. The common theme in this development is, again, embodiment. Merleau-Ponty 
argues that actions are embodied movements towards the world; intentional engagement of the 
body-in-the-world with the world as perceived. When not clearly intentional, acts can very often be 
determined by motor skills or habits ingrained in the body. Furthermore, what Merleau-Ponty 
describes as “motor intentionality” involves a direct, unmediated contact between the subject and 
the world (Romdenh-Romluc, 2011, p. 157). When one acts, one is not conscious of the act – one is 
conscious in the act. Emotions are understood as having motor intentionality and, again, direct 
unmediated contact with the world-as-perceived. Thought, argues Merleau-Ponty, is also tied closely 
to physical expression and the intentional existence of the body-in-the world.  
 
Finally, we may briefly consider the problem of “other beings”. Other beings (other people) can be 
understood as a problem insofar as they share with the original subject a body-in-the-world 
structure, but the perception of such structure is not available to the original subject. Merleau-Ponty 
must face the possibility that body-in-the-world may lead to solipsism. To counter-act such a 
possibility, Merleau-Ponty argues that the original subject perceives other subjects as beings with 
potential action and a shared being-in-the-worldness, what is sometimes described as 
“intersubjectivity”. Indeed, intersubjectivity is something of an ontological pre-requisite for 
development of a healthy perceptual apparatus; for a functioning being-in-the-world. Indeed, the 
focus on relations with specific and general others in symbolic interactionism – explored in the 
following chapter – bears testament to the importance of intersubjectivity in the rebuilding of the 
self, and it is a theme which emerges strongly in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.  
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Having given an account of the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, we may consider the insight his 
position gives into the embodied symptoms of schizophrenia. Essentially, certain symptoms of 
schizophrenia constitute a breakdown of the body-in-the-world. The most common breakdown that 
we may relate to Merleau-Ponty’s work lies in hallucinations about the world. Such phenomena 
constitute a vital breakdown in the subject’s perceptions; the being of the sufferer is perceiving a 
world that is not actually “there”. His or her perceptive apparatus is flawed. Indeed, hallucinations 
present more than mere misapprehension; they constitute an ontological collapse of the body-in-
the-world – Laing’s phrase “ontological insecurity” is wholly pertinent here.  This type of breakdown 
can be ascribed to many common hallucinations, including “hearing voices”, “seeing” things that are 
not there, tactile “feelings” such as the sense that one has bugs under one’s skin, and so on. 
Importantly, the breakdown of body-in-the-world often takes a sensorial dimension; the body as 
perceiver of proprioceptional sensations is not working as Merleau-Ponty describes it. Such 
breakdown would include bodily sensations such as (again) bugs under one’s skin, as well as what 
Laing described (earlier) as “petrification”, where one believes or experiences the body as inert 
matter rather than the intentional location of being-in-the-worldness. Similar delusions of bodily 
breakdown again may be thought of as a failure of the Merleau-Ponty scheme of body/world. This 
raises the question of how to distinguish between delusions and hallucinations for the body-in-the-
world. Certainly the hallucination – perception of something which is not “there” – is a clear breach 
of the being-in-the-world. Delusions – an inaccurate opinion about the world – on the other hand, 
may not constitute as obvious a break, since it involves a failure of belief, not embodied 
consciousness. However, delusions usually involve the mis-attribution of qualities to aspects or 
people in the world – believing that people can read one’s thoughts, for example – and as such 
provide a clear, though perhaps lesser, breach of the perceiving body-in-the-world. Confused or 
disorganised thoughts, as well as confused expression (such as “word salad”) constitute a 
breakdown of the embodied nature of thought and expression whilst misapprehensions such as the 
Capgras delusion (where one believe a close friend or family member has been replaced by an 
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identical-looking impostor) constitute a breakdown in the body’s emotional apparatus and the 
“normal” engagement with the intersubjective world of other perceiving beings. 
 
Finally, we may examine the work of Louis Sass. Sass, often in partnership with Josef Parnas, engages 
in a general phenomenological project to help uncover the underlying structures of the experience 
of schizophrenia (Ver Ecke and Grady, 1999). Like Minkowski, Sass does not engage heavily with the 
seminal thinkers of phenomenology such as Husserl or Heidegger. Sass takes phenomenology as an 
overall perspective: 
[T]he purpose of phenomenology is to describe and define the nature and varieties of human 
experience rather than give an account of the causal mechanisms of efficacious processes that bring it 
about (Sass and Parnas, 2007, p. 63). 
 
Sass and Parnas elaborate: 
[W]e use “phenomenology” in the standard philosophical and continental sense; that is, to refer to 
the study of lived experience and how things manifest themselves to us within and through such 
experience… In psychiatric phenomenology, it is, of course, the subjective dimension of mental 
disorders that is of relevance… To grasp the mind of another person is to grasp the distinctive form of 
coherence of that person’s consciousness; this requires that one move beyond mere static 
understanding of mental states toward an understanding of the unity of that person’s subjectivity and 
its development over time (2007, pp. 64-65). 
 
Using phenomenology in this way, Sass arrives at the conclusion that the experience of 
schizophrenia is dominated by mental phenomena affecting the sense of self in the person 
diagnosed with schizophrenia: 
According to the view to be presented here, the core abnormality in schizophrenia is a particular kind 
of disturbance of consciousness and, especially, of the sense of self or ipseity that is normally implicit 
in each act of awareness (2007, p. 68). 
 
Again, we find the theme of “disturbance” of the phenomenological subject in schizophrenia; 
elsewhere conceived as disruption or breakdown. The first such abnormality is termed “hyper-
reflexivity”. Hyper-reflexivity is described as “[A] kind of exaggerated self-consciousness, that is, a 
tendency to direct focal, objectifying attention toward processes and phenomena that would 
normally be “inhabited” or experienced as part of oneself” (2007, p. 68). The second abnormality is 
termed “diminished self-affection”. Diminished self-affection is described as “[A] decline in the 
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(passively or automatically) experienced sense of existing as a living and unified subject of 
awareness” (2007, p. 68). 
 
Sass argues that the first phenomena, hyper-reflexivity, causes the person with schizophrenia to 
objectify internal experiences that make up part of the self (Sass, 2003, p. 153). Sass further argues 
that hyper-reflexivity can be used to help explain the so-called “negative symptoms” of 
schizophrenia, such as poverty of speech, affective flattening, avolition and apathy. Such symptoms 
emerge in Chapter 6.  
 
Sass’s argument regarding hyper-reflexivity begins with the contention that these symptoms, 
traditionally understood as a lack or deficit of some mental process, actually also involve positive 
phenomena, resulting in a need for a richer descriptive project: 
A close phenomenological analysis suggests, in fact, that the characteristically schizophrenic 
abnormalities of experience defy any simple quantitative description and demand a richer and more 
qualitative set of concepts (2003, p. 155). 
 
Sass continues to argue that hyper-reflexivity can cause a kind of mental stalling, or breakdown, in 
what would otherwise be automatic mental processes, leading to negative symptoms (these 
thoughts are present in a less articulated form in Sass (1987)). Likewise, diminished self-affection 
upsets the central (self)consciousness that Sass identifies as a fundamental element in the healthy 
psyche. The result of these two processes, often intertwined, is a “profoundly altered form of 
experiencing that is characteristic of schizophrenia” (Sass and Parnas, 2007, p. 81); a form of 
experiencing where the self is deeply compromised. 
 
Before concluding this chapter, it is important to give an account of the 1996 work of Simon J. 
Williams, “The Vicissitudes of Embodiment Across the Chronic Illness Trajectory”. This article 
touches on a number of themes relevant to this chapter – including embodiment, chronic illness, 
biographical disruption and the illness trajectory – and, significantly, forms a “jumping-off point” for 
a discussion of phenomenology in Chapter 9. In this article Williams argues that: 
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[T]he typical course of the chronic illness trajectory involves a shift from an initial state of 
embodiment, one in which the body is largely taken-for-granted in the normal course of everyday life, 
to an oscillation between states of dys-embodiment (i.e. embodiment in a dysfunctional state) and 
attempts at re-embodiment; the latter involving considerable biographical work on the part of the 
individual (1996, p. 23). 
 
Williams treats the person as embodied in the phenomenological sense of being-in-the-world. 
Chronic illness throws this embodied nature into light through its impact on the person’s bodily 
experience and disruption of his or her biography; an impact where the person becomes “dys-
embodied, alienated and betrayed by [his or her body]” (1996, p. 26). Williams emphasises that this 
process is often not linear; that progress is both made and un-made over time, and that the failure 
of the body during chronic illness may be connected to a “loss of confidence in the self” (1996, p. 
28). Re-embodiment “concerns the positive practical and symbolic actions which people take in 
order to restore meaning and counter the effects of symptoms and treatment” (1996, p 31). These 
actions include finding “meaning” in their illness, often through the “process of narrativisation”, as 
well as more practical measures aimed at adjustment and coping. Such actions achieve a “negotiated 
settlement” between mind and body that may shift or change over the chronic illness trajectory. 
 
What are we to make of these disparate phenomenologies? All claim to bring us closer to the 
schizophrenic experience; the essential structure of the disturbed consciousness. And yet the writers 
have produced a diversity of fundamental signs. Perhaps we can attribute this to the diversity of 
experiences captured over time by the moniker “schizophrenia”. Perhaps the writers were biased by 
the case studies they chose to analyse. In any case, we can draw a common theme: a common 
emphasis on the compromise, a disruption of the self, be that self the transcendent ego of Husserl or 
the body-in-the-world of Merleau-Ponty. These perspectives become important in the interpretation 
of breakdown of the self, as well as sensorial or bodily symptoms, of research subjects. 
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CHAPTER 5  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Theoretical Perspectives: Schizophrenia, Power and 
Social Structure 
 
 
 
Having dealt with identity, illness and schizophrenia, it remains to be seen how these issues relate to 
broader questions of power and social structure. How may we theorise the relations of power that 
surround and enmesh the person diagnosed with schizophrenia? Perhaps the most logical place to 
start is with the historical accounts of power in asylums and hospitals that we find in the work of 
Michel Foucault (1977, 1988) and Erving Goffman (1961). These accounts form part of the canon of 
twentieth century social theory and have influenced the way in which we understand the operation 
of social power in general. As interesting and important as these accounts are, however, they have 
to a large extent been superseded by processes of deinstitutionalisation and developments in 
psychopharmacology discussed later in the chapter. The same may be said about the thesis that 
psychiatry is essentially a discipline of social control. To help move beyond these frameworks and 
develop a more adequate account of psychiatric power in the contemporary moment, the chapter 
focuses on the work of Michel Foucault and Nikolas Rose. Whilst a significant part of Foucault’s work 
deals with the asylum as disciplinary institution, there are aspects of his writings that can help us 
theorise a deinstitutionalised environment for mental health care. In particular, Foucault’s analysis 
of the relationship between “truth” and “power”, along with his understanding of the productive 
nature of power shed some light on the relationships of power a person diagnosed with 
schizophrenia may encounter when meeting with mental health workers or when visiting a 
psychiatrist. Rose’s discussion of service provision in neoliberal states is also relevant, as are his 
explorations of the development of neurological science and, even, the emergence of a 
neurochemical self. Finally, accounts of the deinstitutionalisation of the mentally ill and of the 
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growing power of psychopharmaceutical companies round out our theorisation of relations of power 
and structure that surround the person diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
 
Power, Asylums and Hospitalisation  
 
Hospitalisation has, in the past, formed a significant part of the experience of schizophrenia. 
Sufferers were often detained for significant periods, if not for life. As such, the analysis here of 
power and social structure affecting people diagnosed with schizophrenia begins with an account of 
power, asylums and hospitalisation. As a general comment, we may say that conditions in such 
asylums, as well as hospitals and wards, often tended towards the inhumane. The asylum would 
often become the life of the sufferer; he or she would become institutionalised. The contributions of 
the “anti-psychiatrists” such as Szasz (1974; 1997; Cf. Vatz and Weinberg, 1983; Bentall, 2004; 
Fulford, 2004), as well as depictions in popular culture such as the film One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s 
Nest, have pointed out the more callous aspects of the asylum/hospitalisation system (see Gabbard 
and Gabbard, 1992). However, contemporary psychiatric practice has tended towards radically 
reducing the time spent hospitalised and, under the policy of deinstitutionalisation, emphasised 
treatment in the community. 
 
The definitive historical account of the impact of hospitalisation upon people with mental illness is 
given by Goffman in Asylums (1961). In this text, Goffman describes mental asylums (as they were at 
the time of writing) as “total institutions” (although, cf. McEwen 1980). A total institution is one 
where: 
Their encompassing or total character is symbolized by the barrier to social intercourse with the 
outside and to departure that is often built right into the physical plant, such as locked doors, high 
walls, barbed wire, cliffs, water, forests or moors (1961, p. 4). 
 
To further elaborate, the total institution is one where all “aspects of life” (1961, p. 6) are controlled, 
scheduled and regulated by a central authority. Communication and mobility between “inmates” 
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and “staff” is generally strictly controlled with “forced deference patterns” (1961, p. 22). The 
psychiatric subject typically becomes institutionalised, adopting the rhythms and structures of 
asylum life, as well as the relations of power within the asylum, as their own. “He begins some 
radical shifts in his moral career, a career composed of the progressive changes that occur in the 
beliefs that he has concerning himself and significant others” (1961, p. 14). A “privilege” system 
develops for “good behaviour”. “Obedience tests” and “will-breaking contests” by staff are common, 
as is inmate demoralisation (1961, p. 11) and processes described as “mortification of the self” 
where the inmate is stripped of personal belongings and other items of interest to his or herself 
(1961, p. 28). Goffman describes a number of “tacks” an inmate can follow in response to the 
environment of the total institution:  
 “situational withdrawal” (where the inmate withdraws into the limited realm of their personal 
environment);  
 the “intransigent line” (where the inmate challenges the institution);  
 “colonization” (where the inmate attempts to make as comfortable a living as possible in the 
institution); and, 
 “conversion” (where the inmate adopts the official view of him or herself and attempts to play the 
role of the “perfect inmate”) (1961, p. 61-63). 
 
Interestingly, Goffman describes “confession” (1961, p. 32) as a process often performed between 
patients and those in power at the asylum; interesting because it chimes with Foucault’s discussion 
of confession as an exercise of power between the psychiatrist and patient, considered below. 
 
It is important to note that many of the more pernicious traits of the total institution have been 
lessened or removed in the contemporary Australian mental health system characterised by 
deinstitutionalisation. Even the term “asylum” has been replaced by “hospital”, “ward” or “clinic”. In 
such a climate, the power exerted by the mental health apparatus is more spread out, more 
networked, less invasive (see Rudge and Morse, 2004). The term “negotiated power networks” is 
suggested later in Chapter 9 to account for the exertion of these relatively new kinds of power. With 
that said, hospitalisation, at least for a short while, still does occur in many cases of schizophrenia, 
and in some cases, lengthy stays in hospitals, wards or clinics do occur and affect ill people’s 
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subjectivity (Townsend, 1976). As such, the experience of power and hospitalisation is still worth 
examining further.  
 
On the issue of power exercised in and through hospitals, Harding et al. (1997) argue that 
hospitalisation may cause “institutionalisation” of patients, even in a more contemporary situation 
where hospitalisation is shortened. Patients adopt a “good patient” role, including “to be dull, 
harmless, and inconspicuous; to evade responsibility, minimize stress, ignore others, to retain the 
right to behave unpredictably and have a certain ‘diplomatic immunity’ with staff” (1997, p. 58). In a 
more historical than contemporary account, Strauss et al. complement their discussion of illness 
trajectory (considered above) with a discussion of the impact that relationships and work within 
hospitals may have on the well-being of patients. Patients are often knowledgeable about the 
interplay between regimen technologies and their own unique body reactions; they frequently 
“become very skilled in managing those reactions” (Strauss et al. 1989, p. 128). Strauss et al. 
recognise “patient work” as largely unrecognised, often invisible, work done by patients during their 
own care. Such work is described as “trajectory work, in the service of managing and shaping aspects 
of their trajectories” (Strauss et al, 1989, p. 134). Staff expectations of patients may become 
important – staff may “cajole, tease, scold, empathize, but insist on obedience… Alternatively the 
staff may attempt to negotiate”, or ultimately engage in building a negative reputation around the 
subject (Strauss et al, 1989, p. 130). These processes would seem vital to experiences of power 
within the social structure of the hospital.  
 
However, the mental health sector in NSW is today a deinstitutionalised one, and many people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia will generally not spend enough time in a hospital or clinic to become 
fully institutionalised. Rather, they are more likely to live with family, or alone, in houses or 
apartments. This research finds that many such people live alone, regularly seeing a psychiatrist or 
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mental health social worker, sometimes with tenuous links to family members. More on 
deinstitutionalisation is said below. 
 
Strauss et al. also treat issues of hospitalisation, emphasising that through institutionalisation at the 
time of writing, patients may be taught vital skills, but that “the teaching perspective often focused 
too narrowly on the medical, technological, and procedural aspects of illness management, omitting 
or underplaying important sociopsychological and biographical aspects of chronic illness trajectory 
management” (Strauss et al, 1989, p. 140). Sociopsychological aspects of chronic illness trajectory 
such as negotiating the doctor/patient relationship, navigating the influence of psychopharmacology 
(Seale et al., 2006) and managing both life and illness issues would seem significant here. Finally, 
Strauss et al. observe that “chronic illness trajectories flow from home residence into and through 
hospitals, and out again back to the home”. This flow to the home picks up upon the theme of 
deinstitutionalisation met in Chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
 
Roe makes a further contribution to our understanding of self and the social structure of the hospital 
or clinic, whilst recognising that hospitalisation is not as ubiquitous as it was in the past. In his thesis 
regarding the relationship between self and the illness trajectory of people suffering psychosis, Roe 
argues that patients may feel passive, or confronted, in mental institutions (1997, p. 106). This 
observation differs from most people with chronic illness who may find themselves in regular 
hospitals where the stigma of mental hospitalisation may not apply, or may have been released and 
deinstitutionalised. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 suggest that deinstitutionalisation, in part facilitated by 
developments in psychopharmacology, has de-emphasised the significance of the hospital 
experience and has created a new sense of passive social isolation amongst research respondents. 
 
Beyond these writings, there lies space for future thought – for writing about how relations of power 
and social structure impact identity in people diagnosed with schizophrenia outside the hospital or 
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clinic. Issues of influence and negotiation, consensus and scheduling, agency and structure are all 
areas for examination in the context of the person diagnosed with schizophrenia. These important 
issues surrounding power, identity and schizophrenia are addressed below through the 
consideration of the work of Michel Foucault and Nikolas Rose, whilst the significance of social 
structure is addressed through an examination of the roles of social control, psychopharmacology 
and deinstitutionalisation. 
 
The Social Control Thesis 
 
There lies a strain of thought that sees psychiatry and the treatment of psychiatric patients, 
especially their carceral treatment, as a form of social control (Szasz, 1974; Horwitz, 1982; Cohen, 
1985; Conrad, 1992). This is generally not a contemporary thesis, although it may have current 
counterparts. This perspective complements Goffman and Symbolic Interactionism by delving into 
the macro-social and institutional elements of the response to mental illness. According to the 
“social control” thesis, psychiatric patients are regarded as a threat to reason and ordered 
behaviour, and as such are controlled, through hospitalisation or drug regimens.  
 
A cornerstone of the social control thesis is a recognition of the power of the psychiatrist. The 
psychiatrist is a medically trained and recognised figure who is typically the person who interrogates 
those designated with possible mental illness, identifies that illness as a known diagnosis, authorises 
treatment and, often, incarceration in a mental institution, and presides over continuous 
incarceration (Szasz, 1974; Cohen, 1985; Horwitz, 1982). Emily Wilson (2003, p. 66) argues that the 
relationship between psychiatrist and patient is one of power (Wilson, 2003, p. 66). Similarly, Willard 
Gaylin (1978, p. 2) argues that the psychiatric definition of normalcy acts as a coercive tool “beyond 
electrodes and surgical scalpels” (c.f. Tishelman and Sachs, 1998, p. 53). Furthermore, Healy (2002, 
p. 30) refers to Marcuse’s critique of the mental health establishment; Marcuse’s critique followed 
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the lines that the mental health establishment was “psychologizing alienation’, and profiting from 
this. However, Marcuse’s argument was one made in the 60s and 70s, and may have been 
superseded in a contemporary context. Nevertheless, all members of the Australian Schizophrenia 
Research Bank – the source of interviewees for this study – have been diagnosed by a psychiatrist, 
and so the criticism of power in the psychiatric apparatus is relevant to the analysis of power and 
influence in this thesis. 
 
The social control critique points to the use of restrictive incarceration in mental institutions, often 
accompanied by such treatments as insulin coma, electro-shock therapy, lobotomy and restriction of 
movements and personal freedoms, as evidence of the repressive force of psychiatry (Miller and 
Rose, 1985, p. 3; although lobotomy and insulin coma have all but disappeared in contemporary 
clinics). The social control thesis typically sees psychiatry as a discipline which acts alongside criminal 
justice, the welfare state and policing to control people whose behaviour is disturbing to the wider 
society (Hayne, 2001, p. 27; Szasz, 1974; Cohen, 1985; Talley and Coleman, 1992; Crowley-Cyr 2005). 
Indeed, some have argued that the labelling of mental illness serves the explicit purpose of 
controlling the behavior of non-conforming members of society (Sarbin and Mancuso, 1980). In a 
similar vein, Moncrieff (2010) argues that psychiatric diagnosis functions in fact as a political device 
to justify the social control of behaviour that threatens the social order. Behavioural and experiential 
phenomena, from insanity to sadness, become the often exclusive interest of psychiatry – 
pathologising aspects of the human condition (Miller, 1986, p. 15). Indeed, the discipline has been 
understood in the past as a branch or arm of the state (Cohen and Scull, 1983) and was often 
disguised as humanitarian policy (Scull, 1983; cf. Prilleltensky, 1990).  
 
Allan Horwitz (1982) offers a thorough, though perhaps dated, account of the social control of 
mental illness. Essentially Horwitz envisions psychiatry as an apparatus for social regulation through 
“therapeutic control”. More specifically, psychiatry normalises certain behaviours and thoughts. 
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Those designated abnormal enter the psychiatric system, where they are diagnosed, labelled, 
incarcerated and monitored; their disorder ordered and given meaning (Horwitz, 1982, p. 121-122). 
Horwitz also interrogates the intersection between the diagnosis of mental illness and such social 
characteristics as class, ethnicity, culture and gender; as well as communal and individualistic 
societies. This intersection reveals different attitudes towards, and likeliness of commitment, to 
mental institutions, suggesting both that the recognition of mental illness is socially contingent and 
that treatments vary with social situation. Horwitz emphasises psychotherapeutic treatments such 
as psychoanalysis, and dismisses psychopharmacology as a nascent form of social control (see 
Brown, 1985b, for a discussion of the uptake of psychoactive drugs in the US). Nevertheless, we may 
perhaps extend Horwitz’s analysis to see the prescription and encouragement to take drugs with a 
behavioural and psychotropic effect as an expanded form of social control. The emphasis on power 
and social control again complements the interests of this thesis, and is analysed further in Chapter 
9. 
 
The common criticism of the social control thesis is that it does not take account of advances in 
contemporary psychopharmacology which may have replaced many offensive mental treatment 
practices, and fails to recognise the deinstitutionalisation of previously carceral mental institutions. 
Both of these changes would seem to weaken the structure of power relations – or create more 
subtle power relationships – between psychiatrists and the mentally ill. These issues are considered 
below, and inform the research carried out for this thesis. The position is also overly deterministic, 
not recognising agency exercised by patients. Nevertheless, we must remain aware of the elements 
of social control that exist in relation to particularly difficult or disturbed (or disturbing) patients, as 
seen at certain points in the upcoming Results Chapters. 
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Michel Foucault 
 
The work of historian Michel Foucault focuses on many of the same themes of psychiatry, power and 
institutionalisation but in many ways, Foucault offers a more subtle analysis of power and identity 
than those proposing the social control thesis. Foucault’s work on power and identity is complex, 
and deserves close scrutiny. 
 
Early in his career, Foucault turned his attention to the treatment of the mentally ill, resulting in the 
text Madness and Civilization (1988). This work had two purposes. The first was to offer a detailed 
and critical historical account of the incarceration of the mentally ill in the 18th century in France, 
where incarceration was understood as a new and promising development in the treatment of the 
mentally ill. Largely on the basis of this history, Foucault has been described as a member of the 
anti-psychiatry movement (although Foucault (2001, p. 243) responded strongly against this 
characterisation). The second purpose was to draw a broader picture of the relationship between 
madness and rationality at the cultural level. Foucault argues that the designation and incarceration 
of the “mad” was a necessary correlative of the emergence of concepts of “rationality” or “reason” 
in the wider culture. Reason, in it’s own way, created madness and labelled it as “mental illness” as a 
means of control. Certainly Foucault’s conception of the cultural inter-relation between madness 
and rationality is an interesting suggestion, though probably not one that bears strongly on identity 
formation in individual people diagnosed with schizophrenic. In any case, this aspect of Foucault’s 
work does not account for the rise of psycho-pharmaceuticals and deinstitutionalisation, and so do 
not bear directly on the issues at hand in this thesis. 
 
Foucault’s academic project, through many works, is complex and multifaceted. One of his over-
riding concerns has been to explore the forms of power that had not been adequately theorised at 
times of writing; and which implicitly produce the subject – “[s]ubjects are discursively produced by 
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particular historical power relations” (Cooklin, 2004, p. 11). Foucault’s interest is in decentred 
networks of power that exist through human sciences such as psychology, criminology, sociology, 
political economy, social work and, of course, psychiatry (Foucault, 2001; 2006; Gordon 1980); 
human sciences that effectively produce the modern subject. It is Foucault’s task to write a history of 
power without a “transcendental subject”.  This analysis of power is more detailed and goes further 
into the institutional, professional and academic sources of identity than the symbolic interactionist 
and social control theses considered so far. 
 
Foucault’s analysis of power is extended in his text Discipline and Punish (1977) to common forms of 
institutions – namely, for our purposes, hospitals and asylums. In these institutions, particular forms 
of “discipline” occur. These include a “disciplinary” surveillance where members at the centre of 
power relations ensure self-censure by those at the edges of power called “panopticism”. Further 
techniques include apparati of power such as timed interactions, testing and analysis of those at the 
edges. In his conclusion to this book, Foucault argues that a “disciplinary society” has emerged; thus 
we may see discipline as a form of social control. This is a question we will explore further in Chapter 
9, that is, whether a form discipline is exerted by patients who do not abide in the institutions of 
clinics or hospitals, where panopticism takes place. 
 
Furthermore, Foucault has emphasised the circulation of power exercised through a network-like 
organisation, never localised, never “in anybody’s hands” nor appropriated as wealth (Foucault, 
1980, p. 98; 1982). Clearly the form of psychiatry that diagnoses and medicates schizophrenia, 
creating a “medical patient” identity involves the exercise of such power between psychiatrist and 
patient. Indeed, we may read deinstitutionalisation (considered further below) as part of a de-
centred network of power.  
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The second point we may make about Foucault’s project is his insistence that schemes of knowledge 
in the human sciences, emerging in “discourses”, are inextricably linked, in multiple and strategic 
fashions, with the effects of power. Foucault states that “the exercise, production, and accumulation 
of knowledge cannot be dissociated from the power mechanisms with which they maintain complex 
relations that must be analysed” (2001:291). The discipline of psychiatry and its interactions with 
people with schizophrenia is no exception to the principle of power/knowledge. The discipline of 
psychiatry can be understood as the entire apparatus of psychiatric offices, procedures, training, 
professional representation, structure of interview, diagnosis, and control of post-diagnostic 
institutionalisations; all reinforcing the significance of psychiatric power/knowledge and, in doing so, 
forming the identity of the mental patient. In this context, it is also apposite to briefly consider 
Foucault’s concept of truth. In a move that has often led to the accusation of postmodernity or 
poststructuralism in Foucault’s project, Foucault rejects the idea of referentiality as a basis of truth, 
and instead interrogates the way truth is bound up in forms of power/knowledge “as a system of 
ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of 
statements” (Foucault, 1980, p. 133). “Truth” is linked in a circular relation with systems of power 
which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it.” 
(Foucault 1980, p. 133). Thus the truth of a diagnosis of schizophrenia, which may have significant 
impact on the subject’s identity, is intimately tied up with the “production, regulation, distribution, 
circulation and operation of statements” about the patient’s behaviour, brain or mind.  
 
The third point we may highlight about Foucault’s project is his assertion that the exercise of 
power/knowledge is not strictly negative; it can be productive of certain states of being (Foucault, 
1980, p. 119; C.f. Foucault, 1997, p. 87). For example, the exercise of panoptic power in the prison 
may encourage prisoners to reform their own behaviour; the exercise of governmental power may 
release the dynamic potential of a populace. This emphasis on the productive nature of power has 
interesting ramifications in the theorisation of the diagnosis of schizophrenia and the production of 
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post-diagnostic identities. The interaction with the psychiatric apparatus is “productive” in the sense 
that it produces a patient, or person in the “sick role’, who subsequently can enter mental health 
facilities to interact with recuperative mental health structures and, of course, use 
psychopharmaceutical agents. 
 
We have seen the concepts of power/knowledge, truth and discourse and have related them to 
practices of psychiatric diagnosis and identity. Central to the functioning of these concepts is the 
“structure of diagnosis” – the recurrent patterns of interaction, interview, questioning and 
identification of a possible diagnosis. There is a clear structure of diagnosis whereby one person 
reveals the “inner truth” of their psyche (internal identity) through speech, and this truth is 
transformed into a diagnosis of schizophrenia, eventually leading to hospitalisation, treatment and 
post-diagnostic identity formation and maintenance.  
 
Again, we may look to Foucault’s work to understand the structure of diagnosis. Clearly we may 
draw on the threads of analysis here posed to discuss the structure of the psychiatric diagnosis: 
The [medico-clinical] examination of the fixing, at once ritual and “scientific’, of individual 
differences… clearly indicates the appearance of a new modality of power in which each individual 
receives as his status his own individuality… the examination is at the centre of the procedures that 
constitute the individual as effect and object of power, as effect and object of knowledge. With it are 
ritualised those disciplines that may be characterised in a word by saying that they are a modality of 
power for which individual difference is relevant. (Foucault, 1977, p. 192). 
 
More specifically we may refer to Foucault’s discussion of “confession” as a fundamental structure in 
Western societies used to produce power around subjects (and produce subjects through power). 
Confession is described as “one of the West’s most highly valued techniques for producing truth”, a 
technique that has emerged not only in religion, but also in justice, medicine, education, family and 
love relations; “one confesses one’s crime, one’s sins, one’s thoughts and desires, one’s illnesses and 
troubles; one goes about telling, with the greatest precision, whatever is most difficult to tell” 
(Foucault, 1998, p. 59). Foucault explicitly recognises that psychoanalysis grew out of confessional 
procedures (Foucault, 1980, p. 191). Although the practice of contemporary psychiatry may no 
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longer be seen as psychoanalytic, instead as pharmaceutical-focused, it is clear that the current 
structure of psychiatric diagnosis resonates with Foucault’s concept of confession, and such 
confession can form the basis of identity formation.  
 
Foucault’s work offers a number of lenses through which we may examine power and the formation 
of identity in people diagnosed with schizophrenia. The structure and power of the psychiatric 
discourse, embedded in psychiatric institutions – the psychiatric apparatus – offers a clear backdrop 
against which the person is inducted into the role of patient. Insofar as Foucault analyses this 
apparatus and discourse, he is moving beyond the symbolic interactionist position and is offering a 
more subtle analysis of power than in the social control thesis. The discourse of psychiatry, 
psychopharmacology and relations between the psychiatric body all emerge as the conduit through 
which the network of power is exercised not merely over but also through the patient’s identity. In 
many ways this power may also be conceived as productive, insofar as it produces a subject who is 
ready for hospitalisation and treatment.  
 
There is an important criticism of Foucault’s oeuvre we should consider. That is, Foucault’s work 
generally has difficulty theoretically accommodating the expression of agency by subjects of power 
(Cooklin, 2004; Kachra, 2006). In the structure/agency relationship, he seems firmly connected to 
structure through discourse and institutions. The subject, with its agency, has disappeared. Such a 
criticism relates strongly to Cooklin’s comment that “there is nothing nondiscursive” (2004, p. 16; c.f. 
2004, p. 62) left in Foucault’s theorisation of power/knowledge and society. One implication of this 
emphasis on discourse and blindness towards agency is that Foucault does not provide a basis from 
which the “subject” may be “liberated” or “freed” from a relation of power. Each such move towards 
liberation is really a movement into a different formation of power. There is no potential of “freeing 
subjugated discourses”. On the other hand, Lemke (2011) offers a reading of Foucault that 
emphasises “critique as ethos” (Lemke, 2011, p. 38) as an emergent feature in Foucault’s later work; 
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here the self is engaged in “permanent critique” (Lemke, 2011, p. 39) of its socio-political and ethical 
situation. In particular, Lemke refers to “desubjectivation” as a move that “represents an integral 
part and a visible sign of the ethical self-formation that is characterised by a peculiar symmetry of 
means and ends” (Lemke, 2011, p. 37). Such a move helps make sense of the fact that while Foucault 
dedicated himself to a number of political causes during his life; he did not advocate political 
“solutions” to problems of power in his writing, aside from critique (this issue is discussed in Kachra, 
2006, p. 13-14). This difficulty around the concept of agency is further considered in Chapter 9. 
 
One solution to the agency problem is to emphasise the concept of “resistance” that Foucault 
develops in his work The Will to Knowledge: History of Sexuality Volume 1 (1998). Foucault argues 
that all exercises of power naturally involve the existence of resistance to that power. He writes that 
the exercise of power: 
depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or 
handle in power relations. These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network 
(1998, p. 95). 
 
This concept of resistance may be useful in understanding the diagnosis and rebuilding of post-
diagnostic identities. It can help us understand such phenomena as non-insightful behaviour, “acting 
up” in psychiatric care facilities, or eluding complete confession to one’s psychiatrist, that is to say, 
what appear to be exercises of agency against power. However, Foucault goes on to argue that 
resistance is no great program for revolt – it is dispersed and capillary: 
[T]here is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the 
revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case… [B]y definition, 
they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations (1998; 95-96). 
 
The second point made here, that resistance can “only exist in the strategic field of power relations’, 
is important. This point establishes that, although resistance may appear to be an exercise of agency, 
it is really still wholly implicated in the relations of power that Foucault analyses. The subject is not a 
free, self-determining agent. The problem of agency still remains. 
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There is another possible solution to the problem of agency. In his texts The Use of Pleasure: The 
History of Sexuality Volume 2 (1992) and The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality Volume 3 
(1990) (C.f., Cooklin, 2004, p. 100), Foucault explores elements of male sexuality in Greek society in 
the fourth century BC and ancient Roman society in the second century AD. In particular he depicts 
an “aesthetic” and “ethics” of the self. In these texts Foucault is interested in how a historically 
singular experience of sexuality is constituted by “the forms within which individuals are able, are 
obliged, to recognize themselves as subjects of this sexuality” (1992, p. 6). His central task is: 
to analyze the practices by which individuals were led to focus their attention on themselves, to 
decipher, recognize, and acknowledge themselves as subjects of desire, bringing into play between 
themselves and themselves a certain relationship that allows them to discover, in desire, the truth of 
their being, be it natural or fallen. In short, with this genealogy the idea was to investigate how 
individuals were led to practice, on themselves and on others, a hermeneutics of desire, a 
hermeneutics of which their sexual behavior was doubtless the occasion, but certainly not the 
exclusive domain (1992, p. 5). 
 
The moral dimension in this analysis was paramount: “[H]ow, why, and in what forms was sexuality 
constituted as a moral domain?” (1992, p. 10). The aesthetic of self-transformation was also 
important; Foucault writes of: “[T]hose intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set 
themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their 
singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets 
certain stylistic criteria” (1992, p. 13). This aesthetic involves privileged Greek male subjects and 
Roman male subjects actively shaping their own bodies and sexual life through self-control, balance 
and self-command. Foucault describes a moral practice in Ancient Greece that: “requires [the 
subject] to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself” (1992, p. 28). In 
Greece, such action required monitoring and acting upon love, diet, household economy and 
governing the family, relationships, and erotic life with boys and women. In Rome, such action 
required dream analysis, the “cultivation of the self”, an ethic of relating to others, exercising and 
taking care of the body, changes in martial roles, and sexual relationships with boys. The cultivation 
of the self: 
can be briefly characterized by the fact that… the art of existence – the techni tou biou in its different 
forms – is dominated by the principle that says one must “take care of oneself”. It is this principle of 
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the care of the self that establishes its necessity, presides over its development, and organizes its 
practice (1990, p. 43). 
 
Interestingly, in Greek culture, the care of the self is in close correlation with medical thought and 
practice (1990, p. 54). In the contemporary context, “care of the self” has been invoked as a tool in 
the analysis of illness narratives (Frank, 1998). 
 
The significance of this form of activity for the problem of agency (and for Foucault’s broader project 
of erasing the subject) is that it involves an active subject exerting power over himself – the self has 
become partially detached from relations of power and can exercise certain forms of power 
independently of these relations. However, although this development in Foucault’s work may 
provide a gap through which agency may appear, we must still establish whether the temperance of 
personal male sexuality in ancient Greece and Rome relates directly to the actions of people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia. This theme is explored in Chapter 9.  
 
We may also criticise Foucault in relation to the current project. Although his analysis of power, 
particularly in Discipline and Punish is subtle and convincing, it was written at a time before 
deinstitutionalisation had emerged as a significant phenomenon in the treatment of mental illness. 
We may regard Foucault’s emphasis on decentred power as a precursor to deinstitutionalisation, but 
Foucault’s analysis is largely limited to the institutional level of the hospital or clinic. New forms of 
power seem to be circulating. These are explored further in Chapter 9. Foucault’s analysis was also 
developed at a time before psycho-pharmaceuticals that are effective for psychosis were in common 
use. We now live in an environment where psycho-pharmaceuticals have dominated (some may say 
colonised) treatment and understanding of schizophrenia, and a clinical landscape reformed by the 
movement towards deinstitutionalisation.  
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Nikolas Rose 
 
Nikolas Rose uses some of the conceptual tools provided by Foucault in order to trace relationships 
between “governmentality”, health and identity. Governmentality may be understood as a concept 
seeking to “draw attention to a certain way of thinking and acting embodied in all those attempts to 
know and govern the wealth, health and happiness of populations” (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 174).  
In his article (1996b) “Governing “Advanced” Liberal Democracies”, Rose traces the “strategies, 
technologies, programmes [and] techniques” (Barry et al, 1996, p. 4) that have emerged as 
governmentality under “advanced liberal” democracies for the governance of citizens (Cf. Carpenter, 
2000). The term advanced liberal democracies may be used interchangeably with “neoliberal” 
democracies or democracies in a state of “advanced” or “late” capitalism. Rose argues:  
Paradoxically, neo-liberalism, alongside its critique of the deadening consequences of the “intrusion 
of the state” into the life of the individual, has none the less provoked the invention and/or 
deployment of a whole array or organizational forms and technical methods in order to extend the 
field within which a certain kind of economic freedom might be practised in the form of personal 
autonomy, enterprise and choice (1996b: 10). 
 
Rose argues that liberal democracies typically followed strategies of government involving new 
practices that sought to “shape and regulate individuality”; most relevantly through discipline in the 
“lunatic asylum” where people will come to “govern themselves, master themselves, care for 
themselves” (Rose, 1996b: 45; Cf. Sawyer, 2005). Such a picture clearly evokes Foucault’s discussion 
of the “cultivation” or “care of the self”.  
 
Rose’s discussion of government in advanced liberal democracies begins with the claim that:  
In the name of social and personal wellbeing, a complex apparatus of heath and therapeutics has 
been assembled, concerned with the management of the individual and social body as a vital national 
resource, and the management of “problems of living", made up of techniques of advice and 
guidance, medics, clinics, guides and counsellors (1996b: 37). 
 
Clearly people diagnosed with schizophrenia will come into contact with such advice and guidance, 
medics, clinics, guides and counsellors. Rose continues:  
Advanced liberal rule depends upon expertise in a different way, and connects experts differently into 
the technologies of rule. It seeks to degovernmentalize the State and to de-statize practices of 
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government, to detach the substantive authority of expertise from the apparatuses of political rule, 
relocating experts within a market governed by the rationalities of competition, accountability and 
consumer demand… Individuals are to be governed through their freedom, but neither as isolated 
atoms of classical political economy, nor as citizens of society, but as members of heterogeneous 
communities of allegiance, as “community” emerges as a new way of conceptualizing and 
administering moral relations amongst persons  (1996b: 41). 
 
There are two aspects of this quote that are relevant to the discussion at hand. The first concerns 
the “relocating” of experts within a market.  
In place of collective provision and social solidarity the new rationality of government proposes 
notions of security provided through the private purchase of insurance schemes, health care 
purchased by individuals and provided by the health industry, housing offered through the private 
sector and efficiency secured through the discipline of competition within the market (Rose and 
Miller, 1992, p. 200).  
 
(It is an interesting aside that Rose and Miller use the term “discipline” here, loaded as it is in 
Foucauldian discourse as the name of power exercised in prisons, hospitals, schools and so forth.) 
Such relocation and the emergence of a market in mental health occurred to some extent in the 
Australian mental health sector with the emergence of a for-profit “psychopharmaceutical complex” 
(Healy, 2002, p. 368; Kovel, 1987, p. 346; C.f. Richmond and Savy, 2005 for use of the similar term 
“psychiatric industrial complex”). This term describes the relationship between 
psychopharmacology, psychiatry, researchers, government, the legal system and consumers. The 
term deliberately echoes the expression “military industrial complex” to describe the complex ways 
elements of systems affecting mental illness interact and how they have come to be beholden to 
financial and industrial concerns (Healy, 2002, p. 2). .  
 
However, whilst the psychopharmaceutical complex exercises considerable market power in  
Australia, Australia still provides a mixed public/private system of health services; the socialisation of 
health, including Medicare rebates for psychiatrists, subsidised psychiatric hospital wards and the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, remains a bulwark against completely market-oriented health 
services. We may take a small detour at this point to briefly characterise mental health services in 
NSW and Australia. Contemporary mental health services in NSW are largely government funded, 
and available freely to the public, although a substantial system of private health insurance, and 
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private pscyhiatrists and clinics, complements the public system. Present-day public mental health 
services focus on high-intensity mental health services in clinics, with the majority of subsequent 
service use focused on community care (Ash et. Al, 2012). This structure has its genesis in the 
movement towards deinstitutionalisation, discussed later in this Chapter. Whilst considerable 
amounts of money are currently spent by Federal and State/Territory governments in the public 
mental health system, at the time of writing the system is in a state of flux and considerable reform 
is being suggested by peak bodies (National Mental Health Commission, 2014; Mental Health 
Australia, 2015).  
 
As we have seen, mental health services in Australia, even if in need of reform, retain a strong public 
character. However, this emphasis on public service provision may be undercut, to some extent, by 
the language that is commonly used around severe mental health. Specifically, the ongoing use of 
the term “consumer” that has been suggested by some mental health support groups, instead of 
more stigmatised terms such as “mentally ill person” or “schizophrenic”, is tied closely to a market 
conception of mental health treatment. In a mental health service market, presumably those 
without market power (MacLAughlin 2009) – people with less money or less mobility, as many 
people diagnosed with schizophrenia are – suffer (Cf. Holdsworth et al, 2004). Furthermore, the 
cost-based arguments made for for deinstitutionalisation reflect the influence of market-based 
governmentality.  
 
The second aspect of the Rose quote is the emergence of “community” as the “new way of 
conceptualizing” the subjects of governance (for a discussion of the rise of “community” as the 
subject of advanced liberal governance see Rose, 1996c). In the Australian context, such community 
is built up in a deinstitutionalised environment, not only by a relatively independent psychiatric 
apparatus, its service workers, and its patients, but also by semi-independent and independent 
support organisations and groups set up to facilitate interaction amongst people with schizophrenia. 
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Experts and treatment organisations are “de-statized” – “a form of government through shaping the 
powers and wills of autonomous entities: enterprises, organizations, communities, professionals, 
individuals” (1996b, 56; Cf. Rose 2006; Rose and Miller 1992). Rose and Abi-Rached write in Neuro: 
The New Brain Sciences and the Management of the Mind:  
A new configuration of sites for the practice of psychiatry was taking shape, together with their 
populations – halfway houses; residential homes; specialized units for children, alcoholics, anorexics, 
or drug users; and clinics of many different sorts (2013, p. 123). 
 
The voice of the patient… 
presaged the emergence of psychiatric users into the mainstream of debates about psychiatry and 
mental health, with narratives of illness and recovery, pressure groups, and support networks playing 
an increasing role in psychiatric politics (2013, p. 123). 
 
Professionals can exercise their expertise “at a distance” from the central state (Rose and Miller 
1992, p. 184). Indeed, Rose writes that “[e]xperts have the capacity to generate what we term 
enclosures: relatively bounded locales or types of judgment within which their power and authority 
is concentrated, intensified and defended” (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 188). Clearly the psychiatric 
apparatus is such an enclosure.  
 
The advanced liberal agenda discussed by Rose also includes an attack on entitlement-focused 
conceptions of welfare, preferring in its stead market mechanisms, as well as quasi-autonomous and 
autonomous organisations to provide for the welfare of individuals (see Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 
198-199; cf. Muetzelfeldt, 1999). The use of such mechanisms and organisations clearly moves 
beyond the traditional distinction drawn in some political philosophy between the state and civil 
society; the state and non-state. Such distinctions are blurred (Rose, 1992): 
[The] political vocabulary structured by oppositions between state and civil society, public and 
private, government and market, coercion and consent, sovereignty and autonomy and the like, does 
not adequately characterize the diverse ways in which rule is exercised in advanced liberal 
democracies… Personal autonomy is not the antithesis of political power, but a key term in its 
exercise, the more so because most individuals are not merely the subject of power but play a part in 
its operations (1992, p. 174).  
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This focus on the blurring of coercion and consent becomes important in Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9, 
where the negotiated relationships between people diagnosed with schizophrenia and the 
psychiatric apparatus are discussed.  
 
At the individual level in advanced democracies, people are encouraged to “reconceptualise 
themselves in terms of their own will to be healthy, to enjoy a maximized normality” (1996b: 52). 
Later, Rose refers to people becoming “experts of themselves” (1996b: 59) – encouraged “to adopt 
an educated and knowledgeable relation of self-care in respect of their bodies, their minds, their 
forms of conduct and that of the members of their own families” (1996b: 59). Such a description 
again recalls Foucault’s concept of “cultivation” or “care of the self”. The reconceptualisation 
involved here would clearly appear to be problematic for many people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, where, typically, the person finds him or herself trapped in a psychological cage with 
their sense of self compromised and with little ability to live a normal life, let alone “enjoy a 
maximised normality”. Indeed, as seen in Chapter 6, many of the respondents in this study suffered 
a breakdown or disruption of personal identity that would preclude adopting an “educated and 
knowledgeable relation of self-care in respect of their bodies, their minds, their forms of conduct”. 
Furthermore, in a number of cases, the relationship with family members had become strained, 
again reducing the ability to “adopt [a]… relation of self-care in respect of… the members of their 
own families”.  
 
Rose makes a further contribution to the understanding of power, identity and schizophrenia with 
his concept of the “neurochemical self” (Rose, 2003; 2007, p. 187-223; c.f. Rose and Abi-Rached, 
2013). In the context of a discussion about biology, identity and power, and drawing on Foucault’s 
work in The Birth of the Clinic (2003; Abi-Rached and Rose 2010 ), Rose explores the proposition that 
advances in neurobiological sciences and medicine have heralded the emergence of a new way of 
thinking about the self – a “neurochemical self”:  
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I suggest that a neurochemical sense of ourselves is increasingly being layered onto other, older 
senses of the self, and invoked in particular settings and encounters with significant consequences. 
Individuals themselves and their authorities… are beginning to recode variations in moods, emotions, 
desires, and thoughts in terms of the functioning of their brain chemicals, and to act upon themselves 
in the light of this belief (2007, p. 222-223; C.f. Rose, 2003). 
 
Put differently: 
In our biologized culture, not merely the sicknesses of human beings, but also their personalities, 
capacities, passions, and the forces that mobilize them – their “identities” themselves – appear to be 
explicable, potentially at least, in biological terms (2007, p. 225). 
 
In the context of mental illness “[c]linical observations on the effective treatment of patients with 
biological remedies – notably the results of giving chlorpromazine to psychotic patients – together 
with the psychopharmaceutical discoveries of the 1950s” have led to a new conception of the brain 
and functional/structural changes accompanying mental illness (Rose, 2007, p. 189; Cf. Lewis and 
Volk, 2009). Rose also links the development of such psychopharmaceutical discoveries to the 
market for mental health products and the shaping of the psychiatric apparatus:   
Today [mental disorders] are vital opportunities for the creation of private property and national 
economic growth. Indeed the profit to be made from promising effective treatment has become a 
prime motive in generating what counts for our knowledge of mental disorders (2007, p. 209). 
 
The concept of the neurochemical self may have appeal for the friends and family of people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, as well as sufferers themselves, insofar as a biological or genetic 
explanation of schizophrenia may reduce the sense of guilt felt, and divest responsibility, for the 
formation of this mental illness (Rose, 2007, p. 218). Rose also argues that a genetic explanation for 
the illness may serve to reduce stigma (Rose, 2007, p. 216). However, the concept of a 
neurochemical self may present a reductionist and limited approach to the understanding of 
schizophrenia and the process by which a sense of self is rebuilt and stabilised after a diagnosis. To 
some extent, such a critique is addressed by Rose and Abi-Rached when they argue both that the 
neurochemical self involves a significant degree of social shaping and plasticity, and that the 
neurochemical perspective does not replace philosophical, psychological, historical and sociological 
conceptions of self-hood, but complements them:  
[T]he emerging neuroscientific understandings of selfhood are unlikely to efface modern human 
beings’ understanding of themselves as persons equipped with deep interior worlds of mental states 
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that have a causal relation to our actions. Rather, they are likely to add a neurobiological dimension 
to our self-understanding and our practices of self-management (2013, p. 223).  
 
The neurochemical self is thus one amongst many ways of understanding self-hood. 
 
The Psychopharmaceutical Industry 
 
This chapter now turns to the influence of the psychopharmaceutical industry and then of 
deinstitutionalisation15.  The pharmaceutical industry for psychotropic medication in Western 
nations is both large and prominent, and exerts a strong political influence over psychiatry and the 
diagnostic process experienced by patients (Healy, 1993). The treatment of people with 
schizophrenia with psycho-pharmaceuticals bears great relevance to this thesis as it may help 
sufferers to understand their illness as originating in a neurochemical process, and insofar as 
successful medication can create the space for a certain reconstruction of identity. Pharmaceutical 
companies researching and selling psychiatric medication are described in this thesis as 
psychopharmaceutical companies, and the practice of these companies is described as 
psychopharmacology. Psychopharmaceutical companies may be defined as for-profit organisations 
that engage in applied research to develop new psychotropic medications for mental illnesses. Their 
focus is thus on the chemical intervention into states of mental illness. Psychopharmaceutical 
companies developing medical intervention for schizophrenia emerged in the United States in the 
1950s, with later development of typical and atypical antipsychotic medication largely taking place 
after 1980. The psychopharmaceutical industry has effected what may be described as a partial 
colonisation of the psychiatric domain:  
When it comes to the larger question of the choices that psychiatry makes, the extent to which the 
psychiatric mind has been colonized by the pharmaceutical industry is an increasing issue… The 
“hard” science’s input has come almost exclusively from pharmacology, and psychiatric thinking has 
accordingly become pharmacocentric (Healy, 2002, p. 387). 
 
                                                          
15 Note, the term “psycopharmacuetical industry” is used to specify one branch of pharmaceutical practice; 
many organisations in this industry also develop products of a non-psychoactive nature. 
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As we have noted, psychopharmacology focuses on developing, marketing and the sale of 
psychotropic medication. Rose writes on the topic of “bioeconomics” that:  
[c]onducted at a molecular level, biology and medicine require long periods of investment, the 
purchase of expensive equipment, the maintenance of well-staffed laboratories, a multiplication of 
clinical trials, financial commitments for measures required to meet regulatory hurdles – in short, 
allocation of funds on a large scale over many years before achieving a return. Increasingly such 
investment comes from venture capital provided to private corporations, who also seek to raise funds 
on the stock market, and it is subject to all the exigencies of capitalization, such as the obligations of 
profit and the demands of shareholder value (2007, p. 31). 
 
One of the significant consequences of this focus on the biological in research is that psychiatric 
illness comes to be understood as an essentially biochemical phenomenon, one where mental illness 
emerges as the result of the action of biochemical processes and structures within the brain; one 
where such illness can only be addressed through biochemical intervention. From this focus we 
come to a position where the mind itself (as well as epiphenomena variously described as the “self’, 
the “psyche’, the “personality’, and so forth), is understood as essentially biochemical in nature and 
structure. As Healy puts it, with neuroscientific advances “a bridge had been built between 
behaviour and neurochemistry.” (Healy, 2002, p. 106). The “new biomedical self” (Healy, 2002, p. 7) 
has arrived, and is explored in Chapter 9. There is clearly a connection here to Rose’s discussion of 
the “neurochemical self”, considered above.  
 
The relationship between the neurochemical self and the interactive self of symbolic interactionism 
is complex. One approach is deterministic, the other recognises agency. On the one hand, we seem 
to have a conflict between a materialist and an interactionist conception of self-hood. On the other 
hand, we may also recognise that the very content of the neurochemical self – what constitutes a 
biomedical self – is communicated and made sense of in the context of symbolic interactions. In 
other words, the person experiencing biomedical self-hood understands the meaning of the self-
hood in symbolic interactions with mental health workers and psychiatrists, all in the context of a 
society dependent on psychopharmaceuticals. Beyond these comments, perhaps it is enough to say 
that the essential disruption(s) of schizophrenia have a biological source, but the experience of 
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schizophrenia is one heavily influenced by social context, and it is this influence that interests us in 
this thesis. 
 
Psychopharmacology requires specific or defined mental conditions that can be reliably identified so 
that precise medications can be given. To this end, the American Psychiatry Association prepared for 
the compilation of the DSM-III (the third Diagnostic Statistical Manual), a manual which describes 
each mental illness in specific terms that may be repeated by different doctors with high reliability, 
constituting psychiatry as a “biomedical/scientific discipline” (Gove, 2004, p. 365. C.f. Wilson, 1993 
and Horwitz, 2002). With this in mind, it is important to link such formalisation to broader social 
structures such as a “transnational biomedical infrastructure that links knowledge, regulation, and 
the market – and which does so in different ways depending on divergent economic, institutional 
and professional contexts” (Lakoff, 2005, pp. 156-157). Medical insurance schemes, professional 
training practices, research and government regulation all have an interlinked role to play (Lakoff, 
2005, p. 163), and all can have an impact on the person diagnosed with schizophrenia16.  
 
The end result of these processes is that commercial psychopharmacology has, to a degree, 
colonised psychiatry. The market, operating in advanced liberalism as a tool of governance, is 
exerting influence over the psychiatric apparatus. As a result, we may be justified in using the term 
“psychopharmaceutical complex” This process has become so prevalent that American psychiatric 
practice has become or is becoming the norm in the treatment of aberrant behaviour throughout 
                                                          
16 There is a larger picture to all these impacts of psychopharmacology. The financial concerns of 
psychopharmaceutical practice have come to dominate elements of professional research and practice. Healy 
speaks to this subject, describing how even patient groups have been “transformed” by the “science” of 
psychopharmacology (Healy 2002, p. 217). And furthermore Healy emphasises relationships between medical 
communication and public relations agencies, where agencies often wrote drafts of articles in relevant journals 
and produced slides for speakers (Healy 2002, p. 311. C.f. Rennie 1999 and Huston and Moher 1996). We must 
not be blind to the fact these processes are essentially political. The following anecdote of a psychiatric 
symposium interrupted by protestors makes the point: “…During a symposium on clozapine [an effective 
antipsychotic with relatively severe side-effects] being held at an American Psychiatric Association meeting, 
demonstrators burst in and demanded that the drug be made available at a price that was affordable by 
patients who were not wealthy. The public pressure was intense. Government programs and some insurers 
refused to pay for the drug. But the company was unyielding. (Meltzer 1999).” (Healy 2002, p. 244).  
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the world (Watters, 2010). Lakoff (2005, p. 64) emphasises “internal” connections being drawn 
between “illness phenomenology, neurobiology and pharmaceutical indications”, that coexist with 
“external” connections between “globalization, money, publications, graduate training, the power of 
the American Psychiatric Association, [and] the prestige of the American Journal of Psychiatry – all 
push the American line” (Lakoff, 2005, p. 64). Indeed, just as psychopharmacology has colonised 
American psychiatric practice, so too is American psychiatric practice colonising global practices.  
 
So, we have a picture of the psychopharmaceutical industry colonising psychiatric practice. But what 
is the significance of these developments for the issues at hand in this thesis? Perhaps the most 
important issue is that people with schizophrenia are likely to their illness as originating in a 
neurochemical process, thus preventing feelings of guilt that they could have caused the disease 
themselves. The reconstruction of identity will proceed upon the assumption that they are 
undergoing a process dominated by the biochemical structure and function of the brain. To some 
extent, this assumption is reflected in the interviews analysed. Furthermore, people with the 
diagnosis will benefit in comparing their illness to other persistent physical illnesses. They may 
conceptualise themselves as “patients”. Indeed, taking anti-psychotic and related psychiatric 
medication may become part of the diagnosed person’s new identity; they may think of themselves 
as a medicated person. Finally, the successful medication of a schizophrenic complaint may create 
social space for an individual for identity reconstruction or rebuilding, and maintenance.  
 
Deinstitutionalisation 
 
The second significant social phenomenon affecting power and identity of people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia is deinstitutionalisation. The movement towards, and processes of, 
deinstitutionalisation in Australia echo those of the US and UK, although they generally occurred a 
few decades later (Pasamanick et al., 1967; Borus and Hatow, 1978; Freedman and Moran, 1984; 
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Morrissey, 1984; Sawyer, 2005). Laffey argues that leading to deinstitutionalisation, mental hospitals 
in Australia in the first half of the 20th century: 
were overcrowded, treatment was desultory and piecemeal, and staff-patient relations were punitive 
and adversarial. Rates of long-term incarceration were high, filling hospitals with large numbers of 
“institutionalised” patients and absorbing staff time in the care of chronic cases (2003, p. 20). 
 
Laffey also attributes the early elements of deinstitutionalisation in Australia to a concern with social 
psychiatry and the identity of patients – the “peculiar concerns of psychiatric patienthood” (2003, p. 
22). However, he also argues that the activists from National U, a widely read student newspaper 
advocated psychiatric reform (Laffey, 2003, p. 27) and plots the results of the Australian psychiatric 
community absorbing the critiques of “liberation movements” which included “antipsychiatry, 
feminism and abortion, homosexuality, and pornography” (Laffey, 2003, p. 28). Unfortunately, there 
is not space here to present a thorough history of deinstitutionalisation in NSW17. Suffice to say, the 
positive impact of anti-psychotic drugs, both typical and atypical, left many patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia in a position where they did not need to be constantly institutionalised (Gronfein, 
1985). It is also likely that governments of the time perceived economic value in moving from a 
centralised, institutional system of care for patients towards a de-centralised, deinstitutional system 
of care where patients would see their psychiatrists relatively frequently and might be visited by 
mental health workers (Freedman and Moran, 1984; McClary et al., 1989; Harvey and Fielding, 
2000). There may also be a relationship between broader cultural movements towards self-care and 
the movement for deinstitutionalisation (see generally Chamberlin, 1978 and Zigarus, 2004). 
 
Despite these arguments in favour of deinstitutionalisation, it has also been argued that the 
backdrop to the movement of deinstitutionalisation and these processes was a general hostility 
                                                          
17 Unfortunately a complete and detailed history of deinstitutionalisation in NSW has not been yet written.  
“Overall… the lack of data on community mental health services around Australia is astonishing… [A] full 
understanding of the position facing sufferers of mental illness also needs to include data on employment, 
housing options and welfare arrangements. In summary, a comprehensive, evidence-based, evaluation of the 
desinstitutionalisation of mental health services in Australia is not possible at this time.” (Richmond and Savy 
2005, p. 216. C.f.. Doessel 2009, p. 176). Also note that the history of deinstitutionalisation in Victoria has been 
written (Gerrand 2005a and 2005b), and the process in Victoria has been, in many ways, more successful than 
in New South Wales. See for historical context of deinstitutionalisation in Australia Stoller and Arscott, 1955). 
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towards mentally ill people (Jaffey, 2003, p. 20; Cf, Chesters, 2005; Bigby and Fyffe, 2010; Minkoff, 
1997. See Brown, 1985b, for an excellent discussion of deinstitutionalisation and its repercussions in 
the US. The complex structures of three-level, democratic, responsible government in Australia has 
often meant that instituting effective and integrated mental health policy can be difficult to achieve 
(See Grose, 1986 for a discussion of decommissioning a hospital). This results in lack of cross-sector 
coordination and lack of clear policy responsibility, limiting hope for suitable housing for people with 
psychiatric illness. Webster comments on the failure to provide resources for communal housing 
projects and notes that patients were frequently “discharged prematurely with inadequate follow up 
and support” (Webster, 1987). He further comments (1987) that “[g]overnment provision for 
[mental patients’] housing and accommodation is virtually zero. They frequently end up as rootless 
wanderers.” The lack of adequate funding was noted in the Burdekin Report (1993, p. 137), the 
national follow-up to the Richmond Report (1983), and the unforeseen costs of the 
deinstitutionalisation process have been noted (Wright, 1999; Smark, 2008). Such a view was echoed 
in comments by Webster in a 1987 interview, where social support systems such as inpatient 
facilities, outpatient treatment services, crisis teams, mobile teams, community mental health clinic 
staff, continuity of care, discharge planning, integration of hospital and community services, case 
management and psychosocial rehabilitation were found to be “abysmally inadequate” (Burdekin, 
1993, p. 298; Cf. Singh, 2007). 
 
The result of this policy failure is often social isolation (Nilsson and Lögdberg, 2008), homelessness 
for people who cannot sustain a fixed abode, or “trans-institutionalisation” (Brown, 1985b; Kirk and 
Therrien, 1975; Bostock and Gleeson, 2004; Topor et al., 2015), where they may end up in jails, 
hospitals, hostels, crisis accommodation or other institutions (Battams, and Baum, 2010), and where 
they cannot sustain necessary, regular medication (Holmes et al, 2005). Social rejection and a loss of 
self-esteem can result (Wright et al., 2000). Often great stress is placed on families who find 
themselves with a mentally ill family member who requires specialist skills that the families may not 
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possess. Very often, a gendered division of labour emerges, where mothers, sisters and daughters 
take on greater share of caring duties (Parks, 2003; Glenn, 2010; Levitsky, 2014). In any case, it 
seems that there is a continued dominance of “medical, charity and managerialist discourses around 
people with disability rather than those of rights and inclusion” (Chenoweth, 2000). Such dominance 
would certainly have a significant effect on someone who was homeless or semi-housed whilst 
experiencing schizophrenia. There is also evidence that, despite desinstitutionalisation, people with 
schizophrenia still feel deeply identified by and enmeshed in their illness; in Laing’s terms, their 
identity is still subject to ontological insecurity. Hannan (1990) argues that the chronically mentally ill 
do not feel a sense of “ordinariness” in their deepest level of self-identification and, in fact, identify 
with the illness, echoing earlier comments from Goffman about stigma. Despite these failures, 
however, there is still strong evidence that many patients in community centres have developed 
new senses of role and identity, independence, coping ability and capacity for forward planning 
(Newton, 2000; 2001). 
 
What is the significance of the deinstitutionalisation process, both successful and unsuccessful, for 
the issues in the thesis at hand? Perhaps shorter stay in psychiatric hospitals has prevented people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia from forming an embedded “mental patient” or “sick role” identity 
(Newtown, 2001). Access to community activities and care may help the mentally ill feel less isolated 
and more secure in their identity. Alternatively, perhaps the lack of community or familial care has 
caused diagnosed people to feel lost or helpless. As we show in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, many of the 
interviewees led isolated lives. It is the task of this thesis to incorporate the understanding of the 
psychopharmaceutical complex and deinstitutionalisation with an analysis of both identity processes 
and power. Together, this analysis should throw light on the sociological processes involved in, and 
surrounding, the disruption, rebuilding and maintenance of identity in people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. Indeed, the use of sociological theory throughout this thesis attests to the need to 
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move beyond simply biochemical accounts of schizophrenia and examine the social context of the 
illness. 
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CHAPTER 6 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Results: Schizophrenia and Identity Disruption 
 
 
 
The content of the twelve interviews undertaken for this thesis varied widely. Some spoke of 
optimism and hope for the future; others spoke of lost dreams; of crippling loneliness and ongoing 
symptoms. How to make sense of this material? Perhaps the most important step taken in this 
direction has been to divide the analysed results of the interviews into three Chapters – one dealing 
with identity disruption in schizophrenia, diagnosis, hospitalisation and relapse; one dealing with the 
various factors or behaviours that aided or abetted rebuilding a sense of identity; and one dealing 
with identity maintenance. Even within this structure, however, significant diversity of responses 
emerged. The data presented in these chapters tries to do justice to this diversity. However, at the 
same time, the researcher has tried to emphasise common themes, and to focus on issues relevant 
to identity disruption, rebuilding and maintenance; as well as issues of schizophrenia, identity and 
power.  
 
This chapter presents material relevant to schizophrenia and identity disruption. It begins with an 
account of the disruption caused by the illness itself; by the sheer intensity and variety of symptoms 
of schizophrenia. Social isolation is a common emergent theme, as is misunderstanding of the 
condition by friends or relatives. It is found that in many, perhaps most cases, the experience of 
schizophrenia is so disruptive that it could take on the quality of an existential or ontological crisis. 
Similarly the shared experience of diagnosis often carried a significant challenge to the self-concept 
or identity of the sufferer caught up within the psychiatric apparatus. Hospitalisation emerged too as 
disruptive, but also, in some cases, as the location of stabilisation and even as a form of refuge. 
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Finally, relapse occurred in some cases as a reminder of the severity and significance of the illness; 
often a prompt to keep on taking medication. 
 
Introducing the Respondents 
 
Twelve people diagnosed with schizophrenia were interviewed for this study. Their ages and location 
varied, as did their symptoms – in both type and severity. This section gives an introduction to the 
respondents.  
 
Prescott was a well-spoken 37 yr-old who was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1999 and lived with 
his family in a small town outside of Canberra. Peter was a 47-yr-old unemployed man who lived in 
rural NSW and who was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1988. Greg was a slow-spoken man of 44 
years who was diagnosed in 2002, lived in western Sydney and who related feelings of paranoia and, 
in particular, persecution by neighbours. James was a seemingly happy individual of 46 years who 
was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1988, and spent significant time with members of a church. 
Nathan was a 46-year-old unemployed man living with his mother as primary carer in western 
Sydney and diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2002. Ralph was a loquacious man of 47 years who was 
diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1991, lived in the south of NSW and who appeared to have come to 
an acceptance of his illness and life position. Michael was a well-dressed 34-yr-old man living in 
Sydney’s inner-west who was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2002. Danielle was a forty year old 
woman employed in the mental health field and living in the inner city who was diagnosed in 1992. 
Arthur was a solitary man of 62 years who lived a lonely life in Sydney’s inner west with his 
companion, a small dog, and was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1971. Caitlin was a woman 
diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2001 living alone in Sydney’s south-west. Gale was an unemployed 
woman of 49 years who was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1991 and lived in Sydney’s south-west. 
Finally, Sally was a woman of 61 years who was diagnosed in 1994 and lived in western Sydney. 
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The Impact of Schizophrenia 
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis has suggested that people with schizophrenia generally experience some 
kind of instability or breakdown in their sense of identity. This may constitute a phenomenological 
breakdown. This suggestion is borne out to some extent. However, a number of different themes 
relating to identity and schizophrenia also emerge. 
 
We begin with circumstances where the research subject’s identity or personality was changed by 
their illness. As Bury suggests, schizophrenia is a chronic illness and, as such, often brings 
“biographical disruption”. Prescott, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia some 13 years before the 
time of interview, makes the observation that his personality changed both with, and after 
schizophrenia: 
Prescott: I think that’s, that’s interesting that the illness has affected my personality, I  
think it’s true.  It has, so I am a new person.  I was a person until I was in my 
late adolescence and then I was a different person during psychosis and I’ve 
come out the other end, a combination of the two.  
 
This can clearly be seen as a form of biographical disruption. Indeed, Prescott describes a complete 
change in his identity or personhood. The illness has rebuilt his personality. This echoes themes of 
ontological insecurity described in the Theory Chapters, as well as descriptions of schizophrenia as 
an “I am” illness, rather than an “I have” illness. Interestingly, such a change occurred as a process, 
as predicted by symbolic interactionism. With that said, symbolic interactionism has some trouble 
accounting for specific symptoms that people such as Prescott experienced (described below), other 
than as a compromised interaction. More will be said of this issue in Chapter 9. Another significant 
point to make is that this change seemed to come as a result of the illness itself, not by the social 
situation that Prescott found himself in. Prescott links his “biographical disruption” to delusions and 
convictions: 
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Prescott: It took years, it took years, to get me to have to have understanding and 
acceptance of my condition. 
RS:  Why did it take you so long? 
Prescott: Because of the nature of the condition.  Because, um… um um because it was 
hard to have insight at the very beginning because of my convictions and my 
delusions, my convictions and my delusions were so prominent in my 
perspective of life. 
 
Although symbolic interactionism may have some difficulty in making sense of such convictions and 
delusions, we may turn to phenomenology for a better description. In particular, we find that 
Prescott’s symptoms suggest Binswanger’s “breakdown in the consistency of natural experience”, or 
a breakdown of the body-in-the-world from Merleau-Ponty’s point of view. Unlike many people 
afflicted with schizophrenia, Prescott also has the insight to see that his illness has caused him to 
lose life opportunities, in a sense shrinking the possibilities of identity development, but also 
opening opportunities for successful medication and treatment. Insight has a particular psychiatric 
definition: it involves “the patient's awareness of mental disorder, awareness of the social 
consequences of disorder, awareness of the need for treatment, awareness of symptoms and 
attribution of symptoms to disorder” (Mintz et al, 2003, p. 75) and is often seen by psychiatrists as a 
significant step in overcoming psychosis. Prescott further talks of lost opportunities due to his illness: 
Prescott:  I definitely have missed out on life’s opportunities. 
RS:  Can you tell me a bit about that. 
Prescott: Yeah OK, um, I mean getting ill the first time and having time off uni, getting 
ill the second time and lost a girlfriend, um, we broke up.  Being responsible, 
earning money, doing normal things, like getting married and having a 
family, having a mortgage, you know, having a social circle of friends, you 
just lose all that.  Not to have that is a big part of your life.  That’s certainly 
something that I’ve lost. 
 
These lost opportunities would certainly interfere with his ability to develop a more viable self 
through the process of social interaction with others, particularly inhibiting his ability to internalise 
the views of the general other. As we will see in the next Chapter, such a process of view 
internalisation, predicted by symbolic interactionism, will prove a vital element of rebuilding a sense 
of identity. 
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Peter, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia 24 years before the time of interview, emphasises that 
schizophrenia changed his personality by making him paranoid, so much so that he would close all 
the doors to his house to prevent neighbours from listening to him: 
Peter: Um, well you tend to have um, quite a paranoid personality when you got 
schizophrenia, but the illness has, say from when I was young, it’s changed 
my personality to the extent that I’m exceptionally careful and um whatever 
um, for instance, ah you know I made sure I closed the door so that the 
neighbours couldn’t hear and this sort of thing.  You tend to ... ah ... be a bit 
paranoid but at the same time ah you’re aware of what’s happening around 
you. 
 
As an illustration of Peter’s ongoing symptoms, Peter closed his house doors during the interview to 
prevent neighbours from “listening in”. As Peter points out, this paranoia has changed his 
personality, and perhaps echoes Minkowski’s “loss of vital contact with reality”. It also suggests the 
concept of biographical disruption; indeed, the disruption may be so severe as to pass beyond the 
purview of the concept of biographical disruption. Perhaps we require a more developed 
conceptualisation of disruption in people diagnosed with schizophrenia. We must also again be 
aware that the paranoia Peter felt and feels probably comes as a product of his disease, not his 
social context. There was in all probability no real conspiracy of neighbours listening in. This is also a 
paranoia that Peter has carried with him since first developing schizophrenia, through diagnosis and 
treatment. Amongst the respondents Peter was far from alone in continuing to experience identity-
threatening symptoms through diagnosis and treatment. Again, symbolic interactionism may prove 
somewhat limited in accounting for a dysfunctional self as expressed through paranoia, and we may 
have to develop a concept of “compromised” gesture or interaction, as well as looking to the 
contribution of phenomenology, in describing symptoms such as these. This point becomes more 
salient in Chapter 9. 
 
Peter described the impact of the illness as a belief that people would “pop him off”. 
Peter: Yeah, yeah, I was on the north coast of New South Wales and uh, I thought 
that um, the drug dealers were trying to pop me off and ah, and ah, I 
thought that ah if I went to sleep they were going to pop me off in my sleep, 
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cause I seem to get the impression that that’s how they do it, they wait till 
you sleep and then pop you off and so I seem to remember ah, being chased 
from town to town in my car and people were saying things like ah, “wait till 
he’s asleep and then pop him off” and all this sort of thing. 
 
 
Greg, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia 10 years before the time of interview, related similar 
feelings of paranoia and persecution by a neighbour. Again, symbolic interactionism may prove of 
limited use in accounting precisely for such symptoms:  
Greg: I was diagnosed in 2002, um, ...pause..., ah, it came with a psychotic episode 
where I thought I was being pursued by ah people associated with my 
parents’ neighbours, um… when I first um, I had this neighbour who used to 
yell out a lot of stuff, shout out, and I started shouting back because I 
thought it was unfair that he was doing that.   
 
 
James, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia 24 years before the time of interview, talks about 
relating to people through “indirect information”, believing he had dreams from other people’s 
point of view. Such experience clearly suggests a breakdown in Merleau-Ponty’s picture of the 
individual as body-in-the-world and, perhaps, an experience more intense than mere biographical 
disruption. This form of pathology is also interesting in that it confirms the symbolic interactionist 
thesis that a competent self develops out of relations with, and from the viewpoint, of the other. 
James cannot adopt the general view of the other due to his condition. What is perhaps more 
interesting is that this process of self-formation from the point of view of the other appears to be 
occurring in an entirely transparent and conscious way: 
James:  [T]here’s times where I would relate to people not on the basis of how they 
were relating to me but on the basis of information that was wrong that I 
thought was real because of the schizophrenia.  So I, like I had instances 
where I had dreams from other people’s points of view before things 
happened and so then when I was in the situation I thought I knew what 
their point of view was, because of the dream but um, actually I didn’t, so I 
wasn’t necessarily relating to people based on how they were relating to me, 
I was relating on indirect information. 
 
Later in the same interview James reiterates that schizophrenia made him a “different person”, 
confirming themes in the literature review that schizophrenia can have severe consequences for the 
ill person’s identity. We may make the point here that it is the schizophrenia that is making James a 
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“different person”, not directly a process of symbolic interactionism. This observation confirms the 
point made earlier and in Chapter 3 that symbolic interactionism often fails to account for 
dysfunctional or deviant selves. Again, short of renovating symbolic interactionism (as we attempt to 
do in Chapter 9) we may turn to phenomenology to account for the dysfunctional self. James’ voices 
present a breakdown of the body-in-the-world, where his awareness or perception of the world was 
in question. 
James: …the schizophrenia made me a different person because I was not always 
responding to my environment appropriately because of voices in my head or 
information that I had that wasn’t real, thinking I could read someone’s mind 
or something but also um once the diagnosis of schizophrenia came um it 
made me aware that not everything that I had I got through my head, 
through my mind was accurate and so yeah, I was a different person, cause I 
was a person who could no longer completely trust everything in their own 
mind. 
 
This experience of schizophrenia prevents James from working and living a productive life. He is 
suffering a phenomenological and existential threat that may move beyond mere biographical 
disruption. He identifies the fact of not being able to contribute to society or look after himself; 
prime measures of identity in the larger community. James’s comment about death draws on a 
darker theme in the literature on schizophrenia, namely that a significant number of people with 
schizophrenia attempt suicide. Such action would represent the ultimate antithesis of rebuilding a 
sense of identity – final identity negation: 
James: Um, [pause] it just means that I’m unable to be productive in the way that 
society values, I can’t, I don’t have a family, I can’t look after myself properly, 
I’m not contributing to society in the way that a lot of people would see 
somebody contributing to society.  Um and um [pause] sometimes it’s like, it 
would just be so easy to just to die. 
 
This quote also draws attention to the deep desire of people with schizophrenia to be “productive”, 
an understandable desire in a society where the work ethic predominates and employment is seen  
as a key correlate of successful identity production.  
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Nathan, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia 10 years before the time of interview, speaks of his 
symptoms as the emergence of an inner child, a process that threatened his sense of what had and 
hadn’t happened in his life: 
Nathan:  the schizophrenia I have and I’m not sure if this is the same that’s 
determined in the literature but it consists of at various stages um almost 
like my inner child comes out um wanting answers for things that have 
happened in the past, some of which actually didn’t happen at all.   
 
The concept of an inner child “wanting answers” was a singular one amongst persons interviewed. 
This distinct experience of identity disruption helps make clear the variety and individual nature of 
symptoms experienced by different people with schizophrenia. Perhaps we can make a comparison 
here with Lysaker and Lysaker’s (2008) concept of a cacophonous self, where multiple identities 
seem to emerge from the single person. On the other hand, we may be able to compare Nathan’s 
experience of schizophrenia as a sense of vertigo to Laing’s concepts of “engulfment”, “implosion” 
and “petrification” or “depersonalisation”. Interestingly, the idea that his inner child was “wanting 
answers for things that may have happened in the past” may suggest a psychodynamic element to 
the illness, a return-to-childhood that is possibly amenable to psychoanalytic treatment. The 
phenomenological dimension of his emotional experiences also emerges as significant, affirming our 
use of phenomenological theory. Nathan’s fluctuating panic, anxiety and anger are both emotional 
responses that are not strongly thematised in a symbolic interactionist position that emphasizes 
cognitive processes: 
Nathan: It’s like vertigo, I get this vertigo feeling where I start to think “Oh no, I’m 
gonna fall over, I’m gonna collapse, I’m gonna hit the ground” um I get panic 
attacks, I get anxiety, I get periods of, you know, anger, just absolute intense 
anger that I feel towards society, that I feel towards those doctors and then I 
think, “oh maybe I was delusional” and then later on I think, “yeah I was 
delusional” and what scares me is about my own internal anger level, how 
that goes from 0 to 100 in a millisecond 
 
Another emergent theme in the data is that of deteriorating thinking caused by the illness, perhaps 
echoing Minkowski’s phenomenological concept of “poor autism” or Sass’s account of negative 
symptoms. The concept of deteriorating thinking also confirms the symbolic interactionist insight 
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that thought is generally a product of successful, meaningful interaction. Insofar as this is true, we 
may qualify the argument that symbolic interactionism fails to account for dysfunctional selves.  
 
Ralph, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia 21 years before the time of interview, had a  sense of 
acceptance of his situation that emerged in a lengthy series of narratives he unfolded in response to 
research questions, confirming the importance of narrative for many people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. Such descriptions, or “narratives” play a vital role for many interviewees, providing a 
way of making sense of, and “owning” their illness, and healing the temporal breach of psychosis. 
For example, Ralph described the descent into schizophrenia through speaking about job 
opportunities and troubles taking care of himself. 
Ralph:  And I studied in Adelaide for 2 years, studied politics and philosophy, um and 
at the end of the 2 years um I wasn’t able to um submit my exams, sit my 
exams or submit the required course work because my thinking was 
deteriorating and um when I was around um, I was living with 2 guys I went 
to infant school with who happened to be in Adelaide and um they were a bit 
concerned for my welfare and around the same time, I left university um and 
they found me a job in a petrol station where I was in a petrol station for 
about um 12 months working and unfortunately, again it was quite socially 
isolating in that I worked the night shift and um had trouble taking care of 
myself.  
 
As we have seen in Chapter 4, there are a number of descriptions of the nature of psychosis, and 
people experience psychosis differently; some may be delusional, others experience hallucinations, 
distorted or confused thinking or present with negative symptoms, and so forth. Furthermore, the 
content of delusion, hallucination or confused thought may change from person to person. The fact 
that such different perspectives may emerge and all be labelled as “schizophrenic” suggests that we 
must be careful with our use of the term, and recognise that the various schizoid illnesses described 
in the DSM cover a variety of pathological mental states. In the current case of Ralph, these 
perspectives point to ontological insecurity; fragmented, divided and lost selves; psychosis as an “I 
am” illness – an illness where the patient “is” schizophrenic, not merely where he or she “has” 
schizophrenia. Again, it seems we must move beyond the mere description of biographical 
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disruption to something more serious, more intense. Ralph describes the psychotic experience as 
“entering a new country”. Such experience again testifies to the individual and distinct nature of 
schizophrenia symptoms: 
Ralph:  when I get unwell, I forget that I’ve ever been well and all of a sudden I’m in 
that country of psychosis that’s always been there, and I forget all those 
strategies that I’ve used to overcome my illness. 
 
This psychosis created circumstances where everyday activities relating to identity may become 
difficult or impossible – the meaningful interaction with particular others is inhibited; the sufferer 
cannot absorb the view of the general other; a good case for the moniker “biographical disruption”: 
Ralph:  I found it so incomprehensible I didn’t know what was wrong with me and 
it’s kind of like trying to run when you’ve got a broken leg, not knowing 
you’ve got a broken leg and just continuing to fall over. 
 
 
Finally, we have a number of distinct responses to having schizophrenia. Interestingly, Michael, who 
was diagnosed with schizophrenia 10 years before the time of interview, spoke of personal 
development coming as a result of having the illness. 
RS:  Did being ill, change your personality? 
Michael: Um, no, I just grew up a lot quicker, that’s all. 
 
Perhaps Michael was denying the real impact the illness had upon him? Indeed, during his interview, 
he remained shy about questions relating to his illness and preferred discussion of his love of fashion 
and how he was out-fitting his apartment. On the other hand, perhaps he did not have as intense an 
experience of schizophrenia as other respondents. The answer to such questions is not always 
forthcoming during such interviews. Michael’s short response indicates, perhaps contrary to the 
thrust of this thesis, that the self may in fact develop or progress as a result of illness. Such a 
possibility, perhaps supported by the case of Ralph (below), would suggest that we could regard 
schizophrenia as an opportunity; a possible time or space for personal development. Such 
development would seem to rely upon the situation and personality of the sufferer, not to mention 
the intensity of residual symptoms. An outcome of this kind would be worthy of further analysis. 
 
114 
 
 
Danielle, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia 20 years before the time of interview, describes the 
strangeness and intensity of pro-dromal and onset of schizophrenia through a desire to “chuck 
everything out” and conflict with her father. It seems as if the pro-dromal phase of schizophrenia has 
itself emerged as a desire to disrupt her own life. This finding points to the importance, not only of 
diagnosis, but of pro-dromal experience as a disruptor of biography and the processes of regular 
symbolic interactionism. Danielle’s experience also clearly included agitation, anger and aggression, 
three emotions marked by Ball et al. (2005) as emergent factors in their “theory of crisis for 
individuals with severe persistent mental illness”. 
Danielle: then one day I just chucked out everything that I had, all those important 
documents and books and everything, and I chucked them all out and that 
was when my parents divorced at the same time as well and from then on it 
all just went downhill and I didn’t really care anymore what happened. 
RS:  Why did you throw your stuff out? 
Danielle: I don’t know, I felt, I think that was the beginning of my illness or something, 
because I felt like, I can’t remember exactly why, but I remember I was about 
to throw them out but I thought I’ll keep them if Dad doesn’t say anything 
and then I threatened to Dad that I was going to throw all these things out 
and he said “Oh, I don’t care, go and throw them” and then I just did and I 
threw them out. 
 
Rejection by one’s parents, as evidenced here, would no doubt have severe personal ramifications. It 
may reinforce the social isolation felt by many people diagnosed with schizophrenia, as well as 
having a negative impact upon rebuilding identity. 
 
The Impact of Diagnosis 
 
It was expected by the researcher that the diagnosis would typically serve as a node, or turning 
point, in the research subjects’ experiences of schizophrenia. In many circumstances this was true, 
supporting Charmaz’s observation (1983) that the doctor/patient relationships could be a significant 
sign of prognosis and could lead to heightened self-concern allowing the patient to analyse 
relationships with other people for discreditation and negative self-reflections, as well as greater 
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dependence on others and a need for social contact. As we have seen, Hayne also points out the 
importance of accepting the diagnosis for individual development: 
[A]s the pain, grief and loss fluctuate in intensity from day to day perhaps, the “prediagnosis self” 
becomes less and less recognizable. The individual must struggle to rebalance, to take stock of altered 
functions, to regroup. This is the only way to move forward and to move forward includes the 
challenges of finding a level of wellness within the illness and within the knowledge of the illness 
brought by diagnosis (2001, p. 17). 
 
A similar argument is made by Kelly and Field (1996). It would seem that diagnosis was generally 
experienced as a negative, perilous experience by the participants interviewed. In any case, the 
symbolic interactionist perspective adopted by this thesis suggests that the impact of the diagnosis 
of schizophrenia must be understood as the outcome of a very particular set of meaningful 
interactions between psychiatrist and patient. We must also acknowledge at this point the analysis 
of Michel Foucault, for whom the nexus of power/knowledge concentrated in the psychiatric 
profession helps shape and, in fact, produce the individual diagnosed with schizophrenia as a willing 
recipient of medication and medical intervention and ready for release into the community. In 
Foucault’s analysis, diagnosis emerges as a vital point of contact, or fulcrum, around which the 
power of the psychiatric profession turns. Indeed, the relationship of power and influence exercised 
by psychiatrists over patients was implicitly accepted by almost all people diagnosed. We may 
perhaps further engage with Foucault’s analysis to see the power exercised by psychiatrists through 
diagnosis as a form of “confession”, in which the sufferer unburdens him or herself of his or her 
symptoms to the all-knowing psychiatrist. This analysis resonates, to some extent, with interviewee 
accounts of diagnosis.  
 
On the other hand, the diagnosis of a psychiatric illness with clear label and treatment options was 
not received by all as a threat, but for some came as a relief. In either case, the diagnosis could be 
seen as an important point upon the patient’s “illness trajectory”. Likewise, time in a clinic or 
hospital, considered below, could come as a relief – as an “asylum” in the true sense of the word. 
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Arthur, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia 41 years before the time of interview, describes a 
strange experience of diagnosis, one where he only found out the specific diagnosis some time after 
seeing a psychiatrist. This was not a common experience although, as we will see, some interviewees 
were only diagnosed after a lengthy period of time. Despite such time, Arthur still trusted the 
opinion of, and submitted to the analysis of, the psychiatrist, confirming Foucault’s analysis of the 
power of the psychiatric profession. 
RS:  Were you diagnosed by a GP or a psychiatrist? 
Arthur: I think he was probably a psychiatrist but I didn’t really get to find out what 
his precise qualifications were, I mean, you know I saw a bloke who was in, 
you know, in charge of whether or not I got pensioned off or not, you know 
and later got his paperwork, I think he was probably a psychiatrist, I think. 
I’m not sure, you know.  Anyway, he’s the one who wrote on the letter, wrote 
on the form that that was his diagnosis, schizophrenia, anyway. 
 
Arthur describes the impact diagnosis had on his life; an impact one could fairly describe as a 
biographical disruption: 
Arthur: Well I didn’t have a psychiatrist at that time, I was working for the public 
service and obviously they saw my hope of doing any work was almost 
nothing, so they sent me to the Commonwealth Medical Officer and he told 
them that he didn’t think that I would ever be able to hold down any kind of 
job, as long as I lived. 
RS:  How did that make you feel? 
Arthur: Ah well, I had already pretty much accepted that was probably going to be 
the reality for me because I was only 20 years old at the time and naturally 
to suddenly be felled with such staggering unusual and crippling problems, 
you know, I didn’t think I would just get up this morning and be like everyone 
else again. 
 
Arthur also commented on the brevity of his visit for diagnosis. Such brevity could cause angst or 
upset in the diagnosed patient; especially when such a significant diagnosis was being pronounced. 
Perhaps it is the implicit trust people have in doctors and the psychiatric apparatus that allowed 
Arthur to pass through this experience without excessive anger: 
Arthur: He was fairly brief, you know, but I think, I guess you know he, I guess he 
could see they symptoms I was talking about were pretty rare, you know and 
I don’t suppose it took him long to come to his conclusion I suppose.   
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As noted above, some people were only diagnosed after a significant period of time. Prescott 
describes the situation where it took a psychiatrist three years to diagnose him. In this case, the 
psychiatric apparatus again seems to have failed in its central mission of the identification of mental 
illness accurately and promptly. Nevertheless, he harbours no ill-will about the time taken before 
diagnosis and does not blame the psychiatric profession: 
Prescott: I originally saw a psychiatrist.  I was admitted to hospital being extremely 
underweight. This was in 1995 and today is 2013, so it took a few years after 
that that I got a diagnosis. So in the first place, um I was admitted to 
hospital and eventually assessed by a psychiatrist to have suffered a 
psychiatric ... sorry, a psychotic episode.   
RS:  How long did that take? 
Prescott: The…? 
RS:  How long did it take for the doctor to diagnose you? 
Prescott: About three years. 
RS:  Three years. Why do you think it took so long? 
Prescott: Because they’re cautious about giving a diagnosis like that without having 
enough substance or experience or exposure to the condition that they won’t 
give a diagnosis for at least three years.   
 
Prescott speaks in fairly positive terms about the diagnosis, one he accepted and trusted without full 
understanding. He clearly accepted the functioning of the psychiatric apparatus. This points again to 
the implicit trust most citizens have in doctors and the medical profession, especially where an 
illness as severe as schizophrenia is diagnosed. The fact that the psychiatrists were friendly serves to 
reinforce their influence: 
RS:  OK, and what did it feel like being diagnosed?   
Prescott: They sort of sat me down and said “look Paul, we believe that you’ve got this 
condition that’s called schizophrenia” and I thought; that was the question, 
wasn’t it, what I thought about it? 
RS:  Hmm. 
Prescott: Um, I thought it made sense, because everything that I experienced was 
similar to what they were explaining to me what it was going to be like. 
RS:  OK, so they gave you an accurate picture of what schizophrenia was like? 
Prescott: Not an accurate picture, they never explained to me what it was that it um, 
what they were looking for in me, but they explained to me that I had this 
condition.  As far as I could understand it was I thought it was. 
RS:  Did you trust what they were saying?   
Prescott: Yes. 
RS:  Were they friendly towards you? 
Prescott: Yes. 
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James describes a circumstance where, like Prescott, it took the acting psychiatrist some time to 
diagnose, but again he implicitly trusted the psychiatrist. As we see, James also built up a trusting 
relationship with his psychiatrist; an important form of symbolic interaction with a specific other : 
James: So I found a psychiatrist, my mum actually rang up a church, a Wesley 
Central Mission and asked them if they knew any Christian psychiatrists, and 
they recommended one and I went to see him and he was really good so I 
started seeing him in the beginning of 1994 but it wasn’t until about 1998 
that he actually diagnosed me with schizophrenia but that was good 
because, like it meant that by the time it happened, he had built up the 
relationship to the point that I felt like I could trust him enough to accept the 
diagnosis. 
 
 
Caitlin, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia 11 years before the time of interview, describes 
ambivalence about adopting her diagnosis, an understandable reaction given that schizophrenia is 
such a heavily stigmatised illness and can present such a serious break in the sufferer’s ontology. 
Perhaps Caitlin was experiencing negative feelings about being “labelled” as a “schizophrenic”. Note 
also how Caitlin associates accepting the diagnosis with taking the correct medication, perhaps 
implying a link between the psychiatric apparatus that diagnoses and the psychopharmaceutical 
complex that medicates. This link will be explored further below: 
Caitlin: I was hearing voices, yeah, yeah, that was the main thing. And I’d get 
messages from the TV and the radio and I’d get very depressed and I’d 
isolate myself and yeah but um, I had severe depression and I went to a 
psychiatrist here about 12 year ago and he said “well you’ve got 
schizophrenia” after talking to him. 
RS:  And how did you feel about that? 
Caitlin: Oh well, it took a while to accept but now everything is you know, I accept it 
and I am taking the right medication and that. 
 
Caitlin has clearly come to the point of accepting her condition and the disruption it entails. She 
repeats her story of accepting the diagnosis, responding to the idea that she was “labelled”: 
RS:  How did it feel like getting diagnosed? 
Caitlin:  Um I was a bit shocked, yeah. 
RS:  Did you feel like you were being labelled? 
Caitlin:  Yeah, sort of yeah.  You know um but now you know, I just accept it, you  
know, it’s just one of those things.  
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Subsequently Caitlin offers a non-committal response about her identity as a person with 
schizophrenia, again pointing to the stigma of the condition, although she still experienced hearing 
negative voices that would form a breakdown of the regular body-in-the-world, and met with a carer 
regularly. We may also understand Caitlin’s non-committal response as a form of resistance against 
the psychiatric apparatus and a society that stigmatises schizophrenia. Such resistance, though 
theorised to some extent in the work of Foucault, will prove, in Chapter 9, a significant feature in the 
theoretical attempt to move beyond Foucault in describing contemporary relations of power in the 
mental health system: 
RS:  So, do you see yourself as a schizophrenic? 
Caitlin:  (pause) I don’t know, that’s a hard question.  You know (pause) yeah.  A very  
hard question.  You don’t like to be labelled do you.  No. (pause) I don’t think 
I can answer that one. 
 
 
Peter also did not trust the diagnosis for a significant period of time. Such a response is not entirely 
unique. Many people outside the study suffering schizophrenia seem to do so without full insight 
into their condition, often disbelieving psychiatrists or family members trying to convince them they 
“have a problem”: 
RS:  OK and what was that like being diagnosed? 
Peter:  Um, well I didn’t believe that there was anything wrong with me, I thought  
that the medication was making me psychotic. 
RS:  And how long did you believe that? 
Peter:  For years, yeah. 
RS:  But you still took the medication? 
Peter: Um, for a while, I took the antidepressants for quite a while and then I took 
the Stelazine for six months and then I decided to go off it all and that’s 10 
years after that I had the extreme psychosis. 
 
Danielle had a generally positive experience with her diagnostician… 
RS:  Were you diagnosed by a GP or a psychiatrist? 
Danielle: By a psychiatrist. 
RS:  How did he behave towards you? 
Danielle: She was quite gentle and sort of, I don’t know, she just was a doctor. 
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…but like Peter resisted her diagnosis. (Note, as an aside, the researcher’s gendered assumption that 
the psychiatrist was male). Resistance to diagnosis must be understood as a fundamental experience 
in our study of schizophrenia and identity. It seems that even when resistance is strong, changes to a 
person’s personality (or identity) can be intense enough to encourage loved ones to seek out 
medical help for the patient. The Foucauldian theme of resistance as an integral part of the 
psychiatric relationship is developed in Chapter 9, and will in fact help us move beyond Foucault’s 
conception of the disciplinary institution: 
RS:  Did you know something was wrong? 
Danielle: No, I didn’t want to know, I didn’t know something was wrong and when I 
got diagnosed later on I kind of didn’t want to be diagnosed with that label 
later on. 
RS:  Why is that? 
Danielle: Oh, cause I don’t know, cause I was brought up just believing that I’m normal 
and you know that I can do things 
 
She made clear what was unwanted about her diagnosis: 
RS:  What did you not like about being diagnosed? 
Danielle: I just like, cause I always thought I was normal and I never thought I had 
anything wrong with me. 
 
 
Ralph had a somewhat different response. He was relieved to make sense of an incomprehensible 
experience. Here we must differentiate between the initial pathological response, often hostile, 
where diagnosis confirms a great personal disruption and points towards further breakdown, and 
the accepting response that seems to be the first step on the path towards self-acceptance and 
rebuilding a sense of identity explored in the next chapter. Interestingly, it was Ralph’s social 
location that forced upon him the realisation of his illness; a kind of acceptance of the view of the 
other as posited in symbolic interactionism: 
Ralph: it was um [pause] about a week after being in hospital I kind of clicked to the 
idea that I was in a psychiatric ward and I kind of thought “you know, if I’m 
in a psychiatric ward there must be something psychiatrically wrong with me 
and if that’s the case, what am I to do’? 
RS: How did that make you feel, knowing that there was something wrong with 
you? 
Ralph:  Relieved. 
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As noted, Ralph’s experience was also one where he turned the diagnosis into a positive life 
outcome. Like our discussion of Michael, it seems that identity disruption of diagnosis may not 
always be an entirely negative experience, as emphasised in the Theory Chapter: 
 
Ralph: I think my diagnosis caused me to become a lot more reflective um, um it 
caused me to become a bit more, I wouldn’t say intuitive, but you know, 
listen, listen to my conscience a bit more um, it certainly caused me to be a 
lot more compassionate towards others. 
 
Ralph also had an experience where he felt close enough to his psychiatrist not only to trust his 
diagnosis, but to discuss possibly living without psychiatric medication. Again, we must emphasise 
the importance of a healthy state of symbolic interaction between two or more valid actors as a 
precursor to illness management, rebuilding a sense of identity and wellness. Ralph’s case also 
complicates a one-dimensional, or top-down, picture of the psychiatric apparatus; in the present 
case, a form of negotiation occurred between the patient and psychiatrist, not entirely a dictation of 
diagnosis and medication by the stronger power. Perhaps such negotiation may be easier in a 
context where there exist a number of psychopharmaceutical interventions from whicih a treating 
doctor may choose, or where the opportunity of psycho-social interventions may be present. The 
presence of the element of negotiation may perhaps also temper historical criticisms of clinics, 
hospitals and asylums. In any case, there would seem to be a correlation here between the 
equanimity with which Ralph accepted his diagnosis and his openness to discussing medication. As 
we show in later chapters, Ralph’s cooperation in determining his medication can be read as a form 
of illness management conducive to rebuilding a sense of identity: 
Ralph:  I even had a conversation with my psychiatrist about whether being, living 
without medication in a psychotic state would be beneficial and I said to him 
“the thing that tires me out the most is that psychotic thinking”, because I 
think I can solve it, whatever it is, I don’t know, that, you know the world is 
an inherently messy place and you know when I’m psychotic and unwell I 
think I can make some understanding or some order of that world. 
 
 
A similar sense of relief upon diagnosis was felt by Michael: 
122 
 
RS:  OK, um, how does it feel, you said it felt good to be diagnosed ... why? 
Michael: Cause it was a lot off my mind, my mind was released.   
 
 
Greg attested to the changes brought on by diagnosis: 
RS:  Was the ...... How did you feel about your diagnosis? 
Greg:  I don’t know, um, I just wanted it to stop. Yeah? 
  
In particular, the strength of his symptoms, equivalent to a disruption of the body-in-the-world, 
caused him identity upset. It is difficult to begin the rebuilding a sense of identity process suggested 
by symbolic interactionism when one feels too persecuted to interact at all: 
Greg: Probably thought it would make sense but the symptoms were so real, yeah.  
I thought even though I had constant screaming in my head, I felt persecuted 
in real life as well.  Yeah. 
RS:  And did this make you a different person? 
Greg:  Yes it did. 
 
And later… 
RS:  And how has it changed your life? 
Greg: Well, um, I lack motivation, um ...pause..., I’m not working at the moment, 
ah, and I’ve worked on and off ever since, different jobs, um, ...pause..., it’s 
just been a real negative in my life. 
 
The emphasis on work here is interesting. The importance of employment for identity formation 
emerges, particularly in a society where the work ethic is closely related to recognised forms of 
identity. Greg also again picks up on the theme of motivation and being a “real negative”. His story is 
incredibly sad and is a testament to the power of external stigma to be internalised by the sufferer 
of schizophrenia: 
Greg: I just don’t think I’m worth much and, um, I lack a lot of confidence now, 
yeah, it’s like I’ve been cut down to size.  Yeah.   
 
 
Finally there is the issue of dual diagnosis, or mental health diagnosis with a substance abuse 
condition. Such problems would seem to complicate the analyses pursued in this thesis. That is to 
say, the expression, behaviour and thoughts of someone with both a substance abuse problem and a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia may be hard to “pin down”, so to speak. It may be unclear whether a 
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disruption of one’s identity has arisen as the result of the substance abuse problem, or the 
psychiatric diagnosis.  
 
 
Nathan commented on his own substance abuse problems, which seemed to have intensified the 
impact of the illness. 
 
Nathan:  I had developed a substance abuse disorder alongside the schizophrenia but I 
found that having the substance abuse disorder made the schizophrenia 
worse; the symptoms of the schizophrenia for me. 
 
Indeed, Nathan paints a picture of himself as a drug addict, “hidden away from society”. Again, 
symbolic interactionism suggests that shying away from social contact may reinforce identity 
disruption and negatively affect processes of identity-reformation. Another significant point to be 
made here is the importance in Nathan’s account of the sense of shame he felt at being a drug user. 
Such shame may represent an internalisation of the external stigma of drug use or mental illness. 
Importantly, however, it also highlights the significance of the emotional state of the actor engaging 
in social interaction – a theme not strongly dealt with in symbolic interactionism. As we will see in 
Chapter 9, symbolic interactionism may perhaps be renovated to take account of such states.  
Nathan: the situation that I was doing it meant that I would have to keep my door 
shut, I had to close myself in my room, smoke my bong and be hidden away 
from society ashamed of myself, yet addicted. 
 
But like other respondents, Nathan did not respond well to the fact of his need for medication. The 
rejection, or negative feeling about being medicated may arise from a desire not to be “labelled’, a 
distrust of the medical/psychiatric establishment, or even a belief, delusional or otherwise, that one 
is not “sick”. One may understand such beliefs as a form of resistance to the psychiatric apparatus; a 
resistance we must take account of in our picture of the power of hospitals, clinics and the 
psychiatric apparatus. In the case of Nathan, the resistance to medication rose out of a desire to 
experience life “naturally’, without the lens or perspective of a mind-altering substance: 
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Nathan: I didn’t like Cipramil, I didn’t like Lexapro, I didn’t like um, Effexor and Zoloft 
and all these different anti-depressants because they made me feel high and 
I didn’t want to feel high, I wanted to feel just more or less enjoying life as 
natural as possible, um but when I was put on schizophrenia, it was like “you 
must take medication for the rest of your life’… 
RS:  It’s OK. 
Nathan: Um, “you must take medication for the rest of your life” and be under 
psychiatric care for the rest of your life. 
 
 
Greg also suffered a dual diagnosis, being an alcoholic when diagnosed, and had smoked pot 
occasionally from age 16. 
 
The Impact of Hospitalisation 
 
Upon hospitalisation many respondents accepted that there was “something wrong” with them – 
typically a form of biographical disruption – and they were going to the “right place”. The progress of 
schizophrenia-diagnosis-hospitalisation can be understood as a common “illness trajectory” and may 
confirm for many patients that there is something significantly wrong with them. Some patients 
came to accept, if not appreciate, the hospital as a place where they could find peace and could exist 
without major stress for a period of time. The hospital in this sense is clearly a fundamental, if 
sometimes brief, aspect of the illness trajectory of the person diagnosed with schizophrenia, as well 
as being for a time the key social structure that surrounds the diagnosed person. With that said, it is 
not surprising that respondents who had been scheduled or otherwise forced into hospitalisation 
generally reacted negatively to this experience. The issues surrounding power and forced 
hospitalisation are treated more extensively later in this thesis. 
 
Prescott was originally hospitalised for a weight condition that gradually formed a psychotic episode. 
Such a career, or trajectory, is not exclusive amongst respondents. Typically, a patient may forget to 
take medication or, once medicated, “feel better” and decide the medicine was un-necessary. Such 
patterns of behaviour typically resulted in re-hospitalisation; having a psychotic episode seemed to 
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be the common denominator amongst people admitted to hospitals, clinics or psychiatric wards. 
Such a pattern emerges in the quote we saw from Prescott on page 116 regarding hospitalisation. 
Later in the interview Prescott continues with the observation that he was re-hospitalised after 
suffering relapse due to “going off” his medication. Such an experience is again common among 
people who were hospitalised multiple times. What is the relevance of this? It confirms the primacy 
of medical intervention, even whilst clinics or wards may play a shortened role in a 
deinstitutionalised environment. The shift towards deinstitutionalisation draws on critiques of the 
asylum or mental hospital such as those given by Goffman, as well as being premised by the belief 
that people with mental illness are best treated within the community. It is a sad reality, however, 
that many people with serious mental illness do not currently receive adequate community support 
and may live isolated, if not fragmented and peripheral, lives: 
Prescott: I was in the hospital initially, for about two months and after that, I was 
returned home, medicated and it wasn’t until another year or two down the 
track that I had the symptoms again after going off the medication.   
 
Prescott’s description here of returning home, medicated, exemplifies the point made above that 
the psychiatric apparatus has exercised a productive power over Prescott’s self, whilst also shedding 
a more positive light on the deinstitutionalisation process. Prescott gives a positive account of co-
patients of the hospital below.  
 
The significance of meeting co-patients, some in better and some in worse condition, is an 
interesting side-issue. Does such a meeting encourage the patient to “do better”, or depress the 
patient about the condition they have? Symbolic interactionism would suggest that any social 
interaction with another should benefit the process of rebuilding a sense of identity. But how would 
such interaction best be provided? Would a person suffering intense paranoia or delusions be best 
treated within the confines of a clinic or psych ward, or perhaps in the open expanses of a farm or 
park, or through social workers and psychiatric carers at home?  
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Prescott uses the term “consumers” to describe fellow people “consuming” the mental health 
product. Such a term seemed to serve to create a distance between the diagnosis of schizophrenia 
and the way it was discussed: 
RS:  Oh, you started in a psychiatric hospital ... So, and how were the other  
  people there. 
Prescott: The staff? 
RS:  Not the staff.  The other patients. 
Prescott: The other consumers?  
RS:  Yeah. 
Prescott: Yeah, I didn’t quite, ahhh, I thought they were just completely normal 
people.  I mean they obviously had their issues and now thinking about it, 
the same time (pause) yeah, it’s a bit of strange situation, all the consumers 
together like that, because there is obviously that locked area that they don’t 
let you in and you got to stay inside the locked area they keep you in and you 
have to relate to people. So, you can’t just run away. 
 
Prescott’s comment here that he thought “they were just completely normal” is interesting; the 
mentally ill seemingly did not express the stigmatic symbols one would expect. Finally, Prescott also 
accounts for a sense of powerlessness in the hospital. Such an experience is not unique. Generally 
persons admitted to mental hospitals or psychiatric clinics had to give up certain freedoms. Their 
experience of dispossession was certainly not as stark as that described by Goffman in Asylums, or 
the disciplinary institution of Foucault in Discipline and Punish, but was nevertheless significant. 
Indeed, Prescott’s comment about “answer[ing] questions from the doctors” brings to mind 
Foucault’s analysis of the confessional as an exemplary social structure: 
RS:  And did you feel that the hospital was exercising power over you? 
Prescott: A little bit.  Um, certainly because I had to take the medication, I had to, you 
know, answer questions from the doctors and that sort of thing.  So, you do 
feel like they had a bit of power over me.   
RS:  Yeah. And did that make you feel powerless? 
Prescott: Well, yeah, it did a little bit; when I first got in the hospitals.   
 
 
Hospitalisation seemed to help Ralph understand his psychiatric situation. He had achieved insight – 
indicated  by the quote from his interview regarding his self-realisation whilst in a psychiatric ward 
on page 119 – a key to avoiding future hospitalisation, and a necessary condition of symbolic 
interaction. Such an achievement is treated by psychiatrist orthodoxy as a positive, if not 
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fundamental, step in recovery, and, it would seem, a step towards the process of rebuilding a sense 
of identity. Indeed, Ralph came to see the psychiatric wing of his hospital as a kind of refuge. Such a 
view certainly seems at odds with historical critiques of the asylum and the social control of people 
with mental illness. Nevertheless, it is an important sub-theme in the data, as it provides a more 
subtle and balanced view of issues of power and hospitalisation: 
Ralph:  I kind of saw um ah, the psych wing as a bit of um an asylum in the old sense 
of the world, as a refuge and where um, how did it make me feel being in 
hospital, a great relief, because I knew I’d be taken care of and all I had to do 
was abide…hospital was probably one of the best places for me to wake up 
slowly, to um you know, re-enter reality because I was trapped in my mind 
trying to piece together what was going on in the world. 
 
 
James had experienced direct psychiatric healthcare in a hospital for depression, and only later was 
diagnosed with schizophrenia. Whether this constituted a failure of the psychiatric apparatus is, 
perhaps, a moot point. He again waited some time before diagnosis emerged. 
RS:  OK.  Do you spend time in a clinic or a hospital? 
James:  Not as an inpatient.   
RS:  OK. 
James:  I’ve been visiting different clinics and things as an outpatient.  
RS:  Can you tell me about the visits to the hospital as an outpatient? 
James: Well that actually .... that was way before I was diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, cause I’ve been diagnosed with depression from when I was 
very young and um, so I used to go and see a psychiatrist at the Sydney clinic 
um I think from when I was 15 for a long time and I was seeing them once a 
week for the treatment of depression.   
RS:  OK. 
James: And that was before I exhibited any of the symptoms that were later be the 
basis of my diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
RS: Do you feel ... did you feel that it was unfair that it took so long for them to 
diagnose schizophrenia? 
James: No, because I felt that if my psychiatrist had given me the diagnosis straight 
up, I just wouldn’t have believed him.   
 
 
Nathan’s experience with multiple hospitalisation, whilst not always pleasant, helped him face drug 
abuse, helping solve some of the problems of analysing dual diagnosis of schizophrenia and 
substance abuse mentioned earlier:  
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RS:  So what got you to stop the cannabis?  
Nathan: Um, there, was 2, actually 3 admissions to psychiatric wards. 
RS:  OK. 
Nathan: Um the first two were drug induced, that is I had drugs in my system and 
was likely to have been under the influence of drugs while I was having 
schizophrenia.  The first time I was admitted I was in the Cummins Unit in 
Royal North Shore Hospital for 3 days and then they took me to Herbert 
Street to detox, second time I was under the influence of what I thought was 
LSD and I was taken to Wyong Hospital and then East Wing at Manly 
Hospital and then the final time which was, hopefully the final time, was I 
was not taking LSD anymore, I was maybe gradually coming off pot. 
 
Despite such statements, Nathan had varying opinions of mental hospitals and psych wings. Such 
variance of opinions bears testimony to the complexity both of the hospitalisation experience and 
the experience of schizophrenia, as well as the problems of memory and the desire to create a 
narrative about significant personal experiences. Such narratives, discussed at greater length in the 
next chapter, would help people diagnosed with schizophrenia make sense out of a biographically 
critical experience. At times Nathan described negative feelings about being taken to “the East 
Wing” if he caused trouble: 
Nathan: I just started to notice things go missing in my room, like my prescription 
glasses, so I rang the police to report my prescription glasses had gone 
missing and my mum said “oh if you do that they will take you to East Wing” 
and they did.   
 
But later, despite this threat, Nathan came to accept, and even like the East Wing. Again, the 
critiques of asylums and the social control thesis may have to be tempered: 
Nathan: East Wing was OK, there was a lot of different patients that I came into 
contact with ah, some were in a far worse state then I was in, some were in 
better states, or appeared more confident than I appeared to be, um, we got 
leave, um, you know, when we got that leave we’d go down to Manly corso 
and we’d uh, we’d uh, get food or go for a walk, around the beach, North 
Head, that sort of thing.  While in hospital, the psychiatric ward there was 
very good uh, they had a basketball court, so I could play basketball. 
 
In any case, Nathan’s complex account also described the contrary, negative features of 
hospitalisation, with echoes of Goffman: 
Nathan: So the mental hospital was clinical, they were kind of restricted entry, like 
you couldn’t leave when you wanted to leave, they took your mobile phone 
from you, they took your cigarettes from you, they kept on changing you, as 
soon as you got comfortable in one bed, in one ward, you’d get moved into 
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another bed in another ward, it was a case of musical beds for a while there, 
where you were just going from one ward to another ward. 
 
 
Involuntary commitment to a hospital, clinic or psych ward is a major issue, not only for the people 
experiencing it, but for this thesis and its concerns with psychiatry and power. Involuntary 
commitment is an absolute expression of power over the body and self of the patient; a blunt blow 
by the psychiatric apparatus and the state; a one-sided manifestation of what Rose describes as 
“governmentality”. Such commission raised serious concerns about the rights and freedoms of the 
psychiatric patient, the trustworthiness of the psychiatric apparatus and the need to balance social 
control with individual rights. We have also seen in Chapter 5 that Rose argues that in the 
governmentality of neoliberal states there may be a blurring of coercion and consent – a blurring 
that may prove significant in the description of contemporary power structures involving people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia. However, involuntary commitment does not seem to contain such 
shades of grey. 
 
Peter was committed to a psychiatric ward involuntarily. Again, the defining issue lay in the fact that 
he did not have awareness of his psychosis: 
RS:  So after your severe psychotic episode, you went back into the hospital? 
Peter: Yeah, yeah I went to Toowoomba psych ward for 3 weeks.  I should have 
been in there longer but because I was very sick. 
RS:  Was it voluntary? 
Peter: Um, it wasn’t voluntary, but cause I thought that I was, I was well and ah I 
wasn’t aware that it was psychosis. 
 
Peter’s subsequent conversation indicated that he had later achieved insight into his illness, implying 
that the involuntary admission and medication had been “successful”. This can also be seen as a 
significant moment in the formation of a new identity, as we have seen before:  
RS: OK and so after you had taken your medication did you think that it was the 
right thing to be in the hospital? 
Peter:  Um, well it took a long time for the medication to kick in and uh, but uh, 
really ah a year or two after that I was feeling better, really. 
RS:  And how do you feel about your medication? 
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Peter: Um, not too bad.  I’m on Seroquel, Abilify and Zoloft and ah, um, I’m 
reasonably happy with it at the moment. 
 
Interestingly, the process of rebuilding identity in Peter’s case seems to have been predicated upon 
successful medication, indeed a cocktail of medications. It is not an entirely isolated experience that 
people with schizophrenia are prescribed a number of different medications. Peter also criticises the 
psychiatric ward he was taken to. Again, we face the issue of whether the psych ward is the best 
place for a person with schizophrenia. The presence of other people with mental illness may 
threaten, confuse or discomfort the person diagnosed with schizophrenia, whilst the institutional 
structure may tend towards discipline or regimentation. 
RS:  And what was it like in the psych ward? 
Peter: I felt very threatened because people were sort of really wanting to, to make 
arguments and stuff like that, they were paranoid themselves and when you 
put a whole lot of paranoid people together in one ward, um, they tend to 
get argumentative. 
 
Following hospitalisation Peter also acquired a support worker from a local psychiatric ward who 
visits him, an experience not entirely unique in a deinstitutionalised environment. The network of 
such relationships may take the place of regular social interaction under a symbolic interactionist 
approach: 
Peter: Richmond PRA is ah, I’m doing, I’ve got a staff member helping me out from 
Richmond PRA at the moment, she’s a support worker for me. 
RS:  And what does she do? 
Peter: She looks after me in that she sees how I’m going and tries to um, get me 
into work and study and stuff. 
 
 
Caitlin’s dominant experience of “hospitalisation” was also outside the institution itself; she was 
assigned a case worker by the hospital who would visit her regularly and look after her medication 
dosage. Such home visitation practices have been facilitated, or necessitated, by the process of 
deinstitutionalisation. As we have seen, deinstitutionalisation problematises historical criticisms of 
the asylum, and an understanding of deinstitutionalisation must come to inform our picture of 
coercive psychiatric power in the contemporary field of severe mental health treatment: 
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Caitlin: At the moment um my case manager is handling my medication like, he’ll 
just give me a few days supply and then he will see me again and then keep 
doing that until I have been feeling a little bit better, but um until I’m you 
know, can look after my own medication. 
 
Caitlin describes the power a hospital exercised over her, confirming the historical critique of 
asylums or hospitals: 
RS: When you go to the hospital, do you have any power?  Can you make 
decisions or are they made for you? 
Caitlin:  They usually make them. 
RS:   Yep. And what kind of decisions...? 
Caitlin: Well they make decisions like you can have leave, or you can have no leave 
or you’re scheduled, or you’re voluntary, those decisions. 
 
This discussion moves into the topic of scheduling – involuntary commitment to a psychiatric ward 
or hospital. Such commission is again a blunt expression of power by the psychiatric apparatus, 
although not an experience typical of all interviewees. Caitlin clearly does not like being scheduled, 
and it is difficult to imagine a person who would like such an experience: 
RS:  And do you accept those decisions? 
Caitlin:  I don’t accept when I’m scheduled.  I don’t like to be scheduled. 
RS:  Tell me about that. 
Caitlin: Because it’s like you’re being locked up, you’ve got no freedom and you 
know I like to go out, go for walks and things like that.  And go take myself 
for a coffee and then come back.   
 
Caitlin expands upon this theme later in the interview, expressing her unease at the possibility of an 
ambulance coming to take her to hospital, or even the police. Rose’s picture of a blurring between 
coercion and consent again seems inadequate. We may also understand Caitlin’s expression of 
unease as a form of resistance to the psychiatric apparatus, if not to the neoliberal state more 
broadly: 
Caitlin: Yeah.  I wonder whether the injections, um, I wonder whether that’s doing 
any good.  When you been on injection for a long period of time, your body 
gets immune to the medication and it doesn’t work, so I’d rather be off that 
but they put me on a community treatment order because I wouldn’t go and 
have it.   
RS:  What’s a community treatment order? 
Caitlin: When you’re forced ... If you don’t want your injection, you’re forced to have 
it. 
RS:  And who made that decision? 
Caitlin:  Um, my case manager. 
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RS:  And you weren’t happy with that? 
Caitlin:  No. 
RS:  Why were you not happy? 
Caitlin: Because I didn’t want the community treatment or whatever, force me to do 
something if I don’t want to do it.  Like, they ring an ambulance if you don’t 
go in and get your injection.  And you have to go with them because they will 
schedule you and if he decides he can ring the police and tell the police to 
take you to hospital and get your injection. 
 
Although only a few of the respondents were scheduled or otherwise forced into treatment, the 
experience is certainly one of theoretical, and humanistic, interest. It is of theoretical interest 
because it confirms the power of the psychiatric apparatus over the sick individual, and perhaps 
somewhat rehabilitates Rose’s picture of a blurring between coercion and consent. It is of 
humanistic interest because it is the meeting point of individual rights to self-determination and the 
interest of society to control and limit that which is perceived as bizarre or a threat. 
 
The Impact of Relapse 
 
We have already seen a number of cases where relapse has led to re-hospitalisation. In a significant 
number of situations, such an illness trajectory has resulted in a positive outcome, insofar as the 
patient may have achieved insight into their condition or may have stabilised on a relatively 
successful medication regime. Like the original experiences of schizophrenia, diagnosis and 
hospitalisation, however, relapse can lead to disruption of one’s biography and identity. As with the 
experience of biographical disruption in schizophrenia, symbolic interactionism as it stands may 
prove insufficient to give a detailed account of the specific symptoms of a dysfunctional self; an issue 
addressed in Chapter 9. 
 
Some patients engaged in illness management (a concept dealt with in the next chapter) and 
seemed to exert control over their medication and relationship with their symptoms. Danielle, for 
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example, seems to have exerted a strong degree of control over her symptoms, including possible 
relapses and recurrent phenomenological discontinuity: 
RS:  OK.  Have you had relapses? 
Danielle: When you say relapse, what do you mean? 
RS:  Some of those bad symptoms coming back like bad thoughts coming back 
  into your head or saying things that you shouldn’t be saying. 
Danielle: Yeah.  They sometimes come in my mind but I try to ignore them.  Yeah. 
RS:  And are you always able to ignore them? 
Danielle: Usually I am yes. 
 
 
Prescott describes coming back from relapse in some detail. His emphasis that “it takes a long time” 
speaks to the intensity of relapse and the difficulty of rebuilding a sense of identity, explored in the 
next chapter.  He describes a number of techniques (such as “getting the routine started”) that 
become significant in later chapters dealing with illness management. His use of the term “normal 
life” is interesting as it implies a process, or illness trajectory, towards wellness and rebuilding a 
sense of identity: 
RS: And how long has it taken you to get back to yourself, your normal self, 
when that happened? 
Prescott: It takes a long time, it does.  It takes a long time.  Once they find you and  
they are able to help you, at the beginning, so you are talking about a short 
period of intensive um, psych ... psychiatry work, psychiatric work, then it 
takes a year to, before you are actually able to live your normal life. 
RS:  And what do you do during that year? 
Prescott: Uh, well, I mean it’s returning to work, it’s returning to study, getting the 
routine started, earning money, being responsible, taking the meds, having 
insight, not missing appointments, yeah so, I think it’s a sign, so, when, a 
sign when you’re not attending your appointments that something is wrong. 
 
 
Ralph describes a career of going in and out of hospital. Ralph describes re-hospitalisation and, along 
the way, “learning the lesson” to take his medication: 
Ralph: You know, you go overseas and you know the moment you step across the 
border whether it’s the food or the type of coffee or um, the fashion in the 
street everything is of its own flavour and um, that’s what happens when I 
become psychotic. It’s that everything has that flavour of psychosis and um 
ah I don’t know whether this is applicable, but um I came to a stage where 
um I’d been in and out of hospital several times um because, you know, I 
forgot to take my medication and within two or three weeks I’d end up in 
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hospital and I learned that lesson and I gotta take my medication and then 
on one occasion I gave up cigarettes and that was so stressful, even though 
my psychiatrist didn’t think that cigarettes was the thing, I reckon because it 
was so stressful, I ended up in hospital.   
 
 
Caitlin also describes the darkness of the relapse experience, a clear biographical disruption of her 
identity experience and ontological breakdown, with a hint of the mental toughness necessary to 
overcome the disruption of mental illness:  
 
Caitlin: Yeah, that’s it.  Because that’s the worst.  I mean that’s happened to me 
before, where I’ve fallen into a hole so dark and deep that you don’t think 
you’ll ever get out of it.  But you do. 
RS:  How do you get out of it? 
Caitlin: With treatment, mainly with a lot of support and yeah, like when you are in 
hospital, you have the nurses to talk to, you have the psychiatrists to talk to 
and yeah. 
 
It is perhaps surprising that people should emphasise the positivity, or construct a positive narrative 
out of, their illness experience, especially after relapse or re-hospitalisation. For example, out of the 
darkness of relapse Caitlin had emphasised a somewhat positive experience. Perhaps such stories, 
beyond the mere fact of probably being true, provide self-esteem and hope to the narrator. The role 
of hope is dealt with in a later chapter: 
Caitlin: It’s interesting because as I said years ago, I used to be withdrawn all the 
time and not be able to speak and hold a conversation and things like that 
but now I can. (pause) I’ve learned that, you know, to express my feelings 
and how I am and how I’m doing and things like that.  I’ve learned over the 
years to do that.  Through a lot of help I’ve gotten and support I’ve gotten. 
 
 
Peter also experienced relapses, though retained the acumen to call a mental health service – a 
necessity in a deinstitutionalised mental health care environment and one where care for the ill has 
been devolved from a neoliberal state: 
RS:  Tell me about your relapse or relapses. 
Peter: Um, well I’ve had relapses even when I was here, I was worried that the 
bikers were out to get me and stuff like that.  I was paranoid and locked 
myself in and all this sort of things.  Um I’ve had relapses like that. 
RS:  OK and do you end up in a psych ward? 
135 
 
Peter: No, no, I tend not to because I go to um, mental health services ... there’s a 
mental health service ah I tend to ring them up and I have appointments 
with them and so forth.  
RS:  And what, how do they work? 
Peter: What happens is that you ah, more or less report in and you tell them your 
symptoms and all that sort of thing then they book you in, talk to the 
relevant person and then they, of mental health, and then they get in 
contact with you and you go in and see them every week or second week for 
about 3 months or something. 
RS:  And does that work well for you? 
Peter: Yeah, yeah it does and um then they discharge you at the end of the 3 
months or whatever and ah until you have another relapse and then you go 
through the same process.  That’s why I don’t end up in hospital because I 
tend to um do the mental health um [pause] go through the mental health 
line and then see a um, a mental health worker. 
 
 
Analysis and Emergent Themes  
 
At this point we may begin to draw together some of the theoretical and analytical threads of the 
thesis. We may reflect on the research data results presented, and begin to explore how such results 
impact upon, confirm or upset the theory outlined in the Theory Chapters. 
 
Perhaps the most significant theme to emerge from the data regarding schizophrenia and identity 
disruption is the sheer scale of disruption many interviewees experienced as a result of illness, 
diagnosis, hospitalisation and relapse. Interviewees spoke of change of identity; of becoming 
another person. Prescott, for example, spoke of being one person in late adolescence, being a 
different person during psychosis, and being a combination of the two after medication and 
stabilisation. Others spoke of intense symptoms that threatened their identity. Ralph, for example, 
told a personal story that reminded one of fragmented, divided and lost selves; psychosis as an “I 
am” illness. Such change seemed to have happened at all points on the illness trajectory – the initial 
impact of schizophrenia was severely disruptive; Ralph talked about entering the “land of psychosis”. 
Diagnosis confirmed for many the importance of their illness. Hospitalisation was greeted often with 
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mixed feelings but, in at least one occasion, convinced the interviewee that he was indeed sick. 
Finally, relapse occurred as an experience that could reignite the disruption of schizophrenia. 
 
This type of disruption certainly constituted a “biographical disruption” in most cases. In fact, it 
would be fair to say that in many cases the disruption of everyday life and self was intense enough 
to merit an intensification of the term biographical disruption; an ontological shock or breakdown 
had occurred. Interestingly, a sub-theme emerged around the fact that a small number of people 
experienced their diagnosis or hospitalisation as a positive experience, one that helped them to 
develop as a person. Such development somewhat complicates our picture of identity disruption. 
 
The second significant theme, or strand of analysis, surrounds the issue of using symbolic 
interactionism to account for identity disruption in people diagnosed with schizophrenia. Certainly, 
as we will see, symbolic interactionism provides a strong theoretical model for understanding the 
rebuilding and maintenance of identity. But what about accounting for an identity that is 
dysfunctional? Disrupted? Undoubtedly, the symbolic interactionist model points to the importance 
of a lack of interaction in the breakdown or ongoing compromise of identity. The model also 
emphasises the need for internalising the view of the general other in avoiding identity breakdown. 
However, symbolic interactionism simply does not account well for the nature of dysfunctional 
selves; it is a model geared towards describing “healthy” self processes. It does not account, for 
example, for paranoia or a sense of persecution. This is perhaps a problem for sociological accounts 
of identity more generally. This problem is here magnified by the fact that symbolic interactionism 
cannot clarify the existence or significance of particular symptoms that a person diagnosed with 
schizophrenia may experience. In light of this problem, we must seek to remodel symbolic 
interactionism to account for “compromised” gestures and interactions that occur in schizophrenia; 
such a project is attempted in Chapter 9. However, the problem also emerges in a slightly different 
way through the inability for symbolic interactionism to account for the impact of interviewee’s 
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emotional states – states such as agitation, anger and aggression, as well as despair or hope. 
Symbolic interactionism is a perspective that focuses on thought and meaning, not emotional 
content. Likewise, the embodied nature of many symptoms of schizophrenia escape symbolic 
interactionist description. In light of this problem, Chapter 9 also attempts to outline a role for 
emotion and embodiment in symbolic interactionist theory.   
 
It is at this point that we may note the uses of phenomenology in describing symptoms of 
schizophrenia. Identity disruption over the schizophrenic illness trajectory may be said, in most 
cases, to constitute a phenomenological breakdown. This reinforces the observation above that 
schizophrenia seemed to often constitute an ontological breach. The central phenomenological 
concept of “body-in-the-world”, borrowed from Merleau-Ponty, provides a flexible tool to account 
for sensory dysfunction, delusion or hallucination; such experiences can be understood as a  
breakdown of the body-in-the-world. Binswanger’s “breakdown in the consistency of natural 
experience” also seems to captured the experience of a number of interviewees. Minkowski’s 
description of “loss of vital contact with reality”, as well as his concept of “poor autism” and Sass’s 
account of negative symptoms brings subtlety to symptom description. Indeed, the close, personal 
focus of the phenomenological approach responds well to the call for study of schizophrenia from 
the point of view of those diagnosed with it.  
 
Moving beyond the impact of symptoms, and their description, the data presented here suggests 
that diagnosis was in fact an important turning point in the illness trajectory of interviewees. The 
diagnosis did often contribute to disruption of identity and impacted upon biography. Some 
respondents even received their diagnosis with relief; it made sense of a disordered experience. 
Michael, for example, spoke of his mind being “released” by diagnosis. The emphasis on diagnosis 
also generally affirms Foucault’s analysis of the power of the psychiatric apparatus. Such power is 
evidenced in the impact diagnosis could have. It was also evidenced in the fact that a number of 
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people were content with their diagnosis, even if it arrived a significant period of time later than the 
initial impact of the illness. Interviewees also generally trusted their psychiatrists making a diagnosis 
that could severely affect their lives. Similar opinions expressed by Charmaz and Hayne regarding 
the significance of diagnosis were also confirmed. 
 
The data in this chapter also provides a number of interesting lines of analysis that relate to issues of 
power and social structure. As noted in Chapter 5, hospitalisation is no longer a long-term or life-
long treatment option for most people requiring mental health care. This fact was certainly 
confirmed by the data. Sufferers no longer experienced the degradation of the total institution; they 
no longer experienced seriously institutionalised identities. These facts, of course, are largely 
explained by the historical process of deinstitutionalisation and the emphasis on care in the 
community sector and at home rather than by the state (as Rose suggests). It is a sad aside that 
many people with schizophrenia, and many interviewees, suffered significant isolation under the 
policy of deinstitutionalisation. Isolation was, in fact, a pervasive theme, and will re-occur in 
upcoming Results Chapters. However, even in a deinstitutionalised context, interactions involving 
power still occurred in psychiatric clinics or wards for the (relatively) short period interviewees spent 
there. Interviewees spoke of having choice taken from them; of being kept with other mentally ill or 
paranoid people. In Foucauldian terms, hospitalisation, as well as medication, helped produce 
subjectivities that were “docile” and could be medicated and released back into the community. 
However, some interviewees also spoke of hospitalisation as an “asylum” in the protective sense of 
the word. The clinic became a place where sufferers could gain insight into their illness; where they 
could rehabilitate; where they did not have to face the vicissitudes of mental illness without support. 
Such contrary themes point to the fact that the role of the hospital, clinic or ward is a complex one. 
 
This complexity of experience was further confirmed by the role of coercion, consent, negotiation 
and resistance by interviewees against, or with, the psychiatric apparatus. Rose’s observation that 
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coercion and consent were blurring under the project of governmentality in neoliberal states 
emerged in some of the data; some interviewees spoke in mixed terms of their commission and the 
processes of the psychiatric apparatus. Caitlin, for example, adopted an ambivalent tone towards 
accepting her diagnosis. Likewise, the theme of negotiation with the psychiatric apparatus occurred. 
A number of examples emerged where interviewees negotiated their medication with their 
psychiatrist. Resistance also emerged, particularly in the negative experiences of involuntary 
commitment reported by some people. Such experiences of negotiation and resistance affirm 
Foucault’s observation that all exercises of power or power/knowledge necessarily imply a certain 
resistance on the part of the weaker party. Indeed, negotiation and resistance were perhaps more 
common themes than a reading of Foucault might suggest, since the disciplinary power of the 
asylum as institution is compromised by the ability to negotiate and resist. Such compromise, such 
complexity in the exercise of power by the psychiatric apparatus, will come to form a significant 
theme in Chapter 9 where we seek to move beyond a Foucauldian conception of the power of the 
psychiatric profession.  
 
Whilst negotiation and consent occurred in many circumstances, it is important to note the few 
situations of involuntary commitment or treatment spoken of by interviewees. Such commission 
represents a blunt exercise of power over the body and self of the patient by the psychiatric 
apparatus and the state; a one-sided expression of the dominance that the psychiatric apparatus still 
has in extreme circumstances. Here, there is no blurring or coercion and consent and there is no 
effective resistance. Interviewees clearly did not appreciate involuntary commitment or treatment. 
This theme resonates with the social control thesis explored in Chapter 5. It is indeed an important 
question raised by this thesis – when and in what circumstances can involuntary commitment be 
justified? Where do we find a balance between individual rights to freedom, community interests in 
safety and medical interest in treating pathological states? 
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Finally, some data in this chapter touched on themes to be explored in following chapters: in 
particular, the importance of illness narratives, the use of psychiatric language, the use of the term 
“consumers” and the importance of insight for rebuilding a sense of identity. The thesis now turns to 
data relevant to rebuilding a sense of identity. 
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CHAPTER 7 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Results: Rebuilding Identity  
 
 
 
This chapter presents material relevant to schizophrenia and rebuilding a sense of identity in light of, 
and after, identity disruption. Unfortunately, not all interviewees seemed to have rebuilt fully viable, 
independent senses of self and of identity. Nevertheless, most people, for the most part, had 
established some significant self-identity in the Meadian sense – they were generally able to exist in 
a social world, could project themselves and their communication into that world, and had the 
ability to see themselves from the perspective of others.  
 
The chapter begins with a recognition of the ubiquity of medication as a means to minimise, if not 
remove, symptoms of schizophrenia. Medication is essentially the basis upon which respondents 
could subsequently build a successful identity (although there are some ongoing debates about the 
value and efficacy of medication that are not dealt with here). Perhaps not surprisingly for research 
based upon semi-structured interviews, the significance of “illness narratives” also appeared as a 
means for sufferers to make sense of and shape their experience of identity disruption. The 
importance of language also became apparent with the use of psychiatric terminology by 
respondents to describe their illness situation. As we will see, the term “consumer” is particularly 
significant in this regard, connecting the respondent to a conception of mental health services as a 
market product. From there, the symbolic interaction and self-esteem provided by family and 
friends, as well as paid or unpaid work, surface as significant factors. The terms “illness 
management” and “life management” are used to capture the various active and practical 
behaviours respondents engaged in to help rebuild disrupted lives. Finally, the role of religion, 
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though not universal, also arose as a factor helping isolated individuals to re-connect to friends and 
community, as well as provide a more general source of meaning in life. 
 
On the Scale of Rebuilding a Sense of identity and the Uses of Phenomenology 
 
Before diving into the data relevant to rebuilding a sense of identity, it is worth noting that, just as 
identity disruption proved to be highly significant and intense for people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, so too the process of rebuilding a sense of identity is significant and difficult. Just as 
the person diagnosed with schizophrenia must face a biographical disruption, if not full-scale crisis, 
so too must the person in recovery reconstruct a personal biography carefully and fully. Just as 
diagnosis and hospitalisation involved a fundamental change or challenge to identity, so too must 
the recovering patient attempt, sometimes in vain, to reach the functioning of a pre-illness self. And 
just as the entire illness trajectory of schizophrenia may create an ontological crisis, so too must the 
person diagnosed with schizophrenia reconstruct the ontology of his or her being. 
 
Perhaps at this point, whilst the issue of ontology is mentioned, we may consider the role 
phenomenology may play in describing the process of rebuilding a sense of identity. Put briefly, we 
find that, for all its power to describe the emotional and embodied symptoms of schizophrenia, 
phenomenology falls short of offering a strong account of how those symptoms may be relieved or 
removed. The concept of compromise of body-in-the-world makes sense of certain aspects of 
identity disruption. However, phenomenology does not present us with complementary concepts to  
make sense of the process of rebuilding a sense of identity. It will be an important task of Chapter 9 
to investigate what such concepts may resemble. We may start this task here, however, with the 
two observations that such concepts will in all likelihood draw upon processes further described in 
this chapter and will probably need to account for the diversity of the illness experience. 
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Medication 
 
The use of psychiatric medication emerged as one of the most important and almost ubiquitous 
tools used by people diagnosed with schizophrenia to reduce symptoms and re-buiild a confused or 
diminished identity. The medication typically helped by reducing the intensity of symptoms that 
threatened the respondent’s sense of identity and thereby accelerated the process of rebuilding a 
sense of identity. Of the 12 people interviewed for this thesis, 11 emphasised the importance of 
medication. The one respondent who did not emphasise her medication (Gale) did not seem to have 
insight into her symptoms; she suggested repeatedly during the interview that a prominent member 
of a university in Sydney was trying to kill her and that she received psychic visions.  
 
As evidence of the importance of medication, it is easy to point to the fact that the majority of 
respondents were able to both name their medications and communicate their dosage with a fair 
degree of accuracy. This intimacy with medication suggests the colonisation of psychiatric practice 
by the psychopharmaceutical companies that manufacture anti-psychotic medication. Many 
interviewees take an active interest in providing feedback to doctors and controlling their 
medication intake. This expression of independence becomes significant in the later Chapter 9 
where it presents a form of negotiation or resistance to the psychiatric apparatus. Such negotiation 
or resistance will form a significant part of the attempt to move beyond a Foucauldian theory of 
power exercised over those with severe mental illness. An example of such feedback lies in Nathan’s 
outline of his drug regime and his discussions with doctors regarding his medication. Nathan’s 
account is also significant because it reveals a possible negative side to taking psychiatric 
medication, and a more nuanced relationship between medication and re-establishing a sense of 
identity. Medication may certainly help reduce symptoms, and hence re-establish a sense of identity, 
but often fails to clear the respondent of all symptoms and leads to significant side-effects: 
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Nathan: I’ve always been totally compliant with my medication, except in a situation 
like with Seroquel, sometimes knocks you around a bit and you feel like you 
could sleep for 3 days.  Like 3 days continuously. 
RS:  Yeah. 
Nathan: And then you have to wake up and take it again and you say “Look I’m 
already quite affected by it, I’m still very tired” so in some cases, the doctors 
don’t get it, the doctors don’t listen to my feedback regarding side-effects of 
medicine, they’ve lowered my Seroquel dosage as well and they’ve just 
recently lowered my Paliperidone injection to 75 mgs thinking that maybe as 
I have been sober off cannabis that maybe I don’t require as much anti 
psychotic medication now. 
 
 
 
Sally names her drug regime. Sally also makes a comment, almost an aside, about losing her children 
– “When I lost the kids”. It would seem likely that the loss of one’s children would be a highly 
disruptive and upsetting experience:  
Sally: When I lost the kids I was taking Anatensol but um I’m now taking Effexor 
and um, Zyprexa. 
 
 
What is the significance of this for the themes explored in this thesis? Perhaps we may observe that 
symbolic interactionism must recognise the important emotional attachment a social actor has to 
particular others. That is to say, when the social actor interacts with others, they will evince a closer 
emotional connection to some. Presumably the closer connections will provide more significant 
feedback. The issue also corroborates the observation made in the previous chapter that symbolic 
interactionism does not account well for the emotional and embodied nature of symptoms and, as 
we now see, the emotional process of rebuilding identity.  
 
Often respondents were taking a cocktail of drugs, some to reduce the side-effects of others. Again, 
medicine can play a complex role in the re-establishment of sense of self. Arthur is also able to name 
his medications, and is ruminative about his complex medicine regime: 
RS:  Did they put you on a drug regime? 
Arthur: Oh, very heavy stuff, you know, Diazepam, stelazine, some other one, what 
was that other one now, something to cut the side-effects of the Stelazine, I 
145 
 
can’t remember the name of it now, so you know, yeah, it was just a drug to 
cut the side-effects of the heavy dose of the Stelazine, I don’t know if you’ve 
even heard of Stelazine, have you?  Well, it might have been phased out by 
now, that’s a long time ago, you know.  Diazepam is another name for 
Valium, you’ve probably heard of that, I guess…. Diazepam I think is the 
medical name for it, isn’t it?  I used to be on a heavy dose of that and a 
heavy dose of stelazine and then there was - Cogentum - that’s it, yeah, I 
think that’s it, and it was a drug given just to cut the side-effects of the 
selazine which caused you to slow your speech and make you shake if you 
didn’t take the Cogentum, I think. 
 
 
 
Michael emphasises the importance of medication to his stability: 
 
RS:  OK and you started taking medication? 
Michael: Yeah, Risperidone and then a whole heap of other ones ... I’m on Clozapine  
the moment, this is really good, that’s been working for me for about 7 years 
now, so I’m stable.  
 
 
 
It is also important to note that respondents sometimes built their sense of identity around the fact 
of their medication. Indeed, for some interviewees their medication becomes their identity. Prescott 
goes so far as to affirm that it is “part of my identity”.  This, as we shall see, indicates the importance 
of medicine from a broader perspective of identity creation, and the power of the 
psychopharmaceutical complex. The emphasis placed on medication to heal dysfunctional processes 
of brain chemistry implies that the self is not only amenable to medication, but in fact that the self 
arises out of a neurochemical process in the brain; as predicted by Rose, a “neurochemical self” 
arises. The emphasis on medication also implies that the process of rebuilding a disrupted identity or 
self relies upon correct medication and in fact necessitates the existence of the 
psychopharmaceutical complex. Psychopharmacology has colonised not only psychiatry, but the 
recovery process and the very self of the patient: 
RS:  And do you still feel like you are schizophrenic? 
Prescott: Ah, yeah. Cause I take my meds everyday and ... 
RS:  ...so it’s really part of your identity? 
Prescott: Yes, it is part of my identity.  
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Danielle relates a story of the “lesson” she learnt about stopping her medication. As we have seen in 
the previous chapter, similar stories have been told by respondents who stopped their medication 
and suffered relapse: 
Danielle: ‘cause the times when I tried to get off the medication I felt like I didn’t need 
the label and I felt like I could just do it on my own.  But then it’s like I was 
proved wrong or something and I had to go back on the medication. 
 
Perhaps it is not surprising Danielle would reject her medication. Typically anti-psychotic medication 
has mild to severe side-effects. Indeed, Danielle was unhappy with the initial psychiatric control of 
her drug regime, especially as she seemed to exercise no choice over her medication. Such 
unhappiness often comes to form a resistance to the power of the psychiatric apparatus. Examples 
of resistance such as this complicate the “one-way” picture of social control being exerted by mental 
health workers and psychiatrists over patients. Resistance and negotiation of treatment will become 
a significant issue in Chapter 9, where we seek to move beyond the Foucauldian conception of 
power exercised by psychiatrists and the psychiatric apparatus. Resistance again emerges in the 
words of Danielle: 
RS:  And did you have any control over which drugs you would take? 
Danielle: No. 
RS:  How did that make you feel? 
Danielle: I was a bit upset and angry. 
 
 
 
Peter also emphasises the “lesson” of “taking his meds”: 
 
Peter: And then went through a very severe psychosis and then after that, I very 
slowly got well, but, I’ve never ah, I’ve always stuck to my medication from 
then on and that tends to be the reason why I don’t go to hospital these 
days. 
 
Unlike some respondents, Peter had some control over his medication intake; asserting his identity 
through an exercise of negotiated power with his psychiatrist. Such exercises again become relevant 
in Chapter 9:  
RS:  Do you find the doctors respect you? 
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Peter: Um, they tend to, they tend to be respecting, although in one sense, in one 
sense ah, they tend to try and put you on Clozapine and all this sort of stuff 
and I always have to say no to it? 
RS:  OK, why do you say “no’? 
Peter: Um Clozapine is ah, although it’s a good drug for your illness, it can have 
very severe side-effects, can have, and so you gotta have blood tests every 
second day, or every day for a month or something and so and then every 
month after that, so, you know.  I’m not all that keen on Clozapine. 
 
 
 
Greg took a variety of medications, but still experienced symptoms that led him to have a negative 
outlook upon his identity: 
RS:  How do you feel about your medication? 
Greg:  [...pause...], It probably helps me but I don’t think very much. Yeah. 
RS:  So, why does it not help you very much? 
Greg:  Because I still have symptoms. 
RS:  You still have symptoms? 
Greg: Yeah. I’ve sort of given up on life.  I’m not gonna commit suicide or anything, 
but I’ve just lost the spirit. 
 
 
 
The ubiquity of medication as a therapeutic tool and the acceptance of psychiatric medicines by 
patients and psychiatrists points to an important point made in Chapter 5 of this thesis – that the 
psychopharmaceutical industry has “colonised” psychiatry, and especially the psychiatry of 
schizophrenia. One may certainly say that this has happened because of the relative success of 
medication in reducing psychotic symptoms and allowing a sense of identity to re-emerge. However, 
these medications are not successful in all cases. Indeed, it is probable that interviewees for this 
thesis had more successful outcomes with their medication than many people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia; these interviewees were probably at the “better” end of the illness spectrum, with 
less severe symptoms, an ability to communicate despite the presence of symptoms, and a degree of 
insight into their condition. It would be a difficult task to gather relevant information from people in 
the midst of psychosis, or otherwise lacking insight. 
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We end this section with an interesting quote that makes a connection between the taking of 
medication and the social control of people behaving bizarrely. The comment tends to support the 
thesis that treatment of schizophrenia is primarily an act of social control and is significant coming 
from a person who is diagnosed with schizophrenia. Here Rose’s argument about the blurring of 
coercion and consent in contemporary governmentality seems apposite: 
Ralph: I suppose by being on medication I’ve given up some ownership of my own 
responses by being medicated for the benefit of others in society because I 
can’t exist, you know, in a psychotic state for long because it’s so, my world, 
reality is so fragmented, um and I think that, you know, if social cohesion um 
is necessary at the cost of medicating some individuals in society um, you 
know, not that that question ever appears but I kind of think that um in one 
way its required for social cohesion to exist, um if people were to be 
medicated, maybe it’s necessary. 
 
Illness Narratives  
 
Another tool used for the rebuilding of identity after the disruption of schizophrenia and its 
attendant institutions was the creation by respondents of narratives that “made sense” of their 
illness. Such illness narratives were discussed in Chapter 3 as a form of symbolic interaction (see 
Williams 1984; Strauss and Corbin 1987; Corbin and Strauss 1991; Bury 2001; Locock et al 2009). 
Illness narratives turn the experience of mental illness into a story that might be told to relatives, 
friends, or mental health professionals. This story typically describes the patient’s pathological 
experience and plots his or her illness trajectory towards well-being. These stories can be important 
tools in helping the patient understand and grasp (or construct) the meaning of their experience 
with schizophrenia, as well as healing the temporal breach of biographical disruption. In this sense, 
illness narratives emerge as a natural response to biographical disruption. And, just as biographical 
disruption can sometimes become crisis, so too must these narratives bear the weight of rebuilding 
identity to a pre-crisis level, a task at which they do not often succeed. At the same time, these 
stories can bear witnesses to reversals or relapses in a patient’s condition, and there would seem to 
be a variety of possible narratives amongst respondents.  
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As seen in Chapter 3, Bury describes “contingent’, “moral” and “core” narratives co-existing in the 
patient’s dialogue. To return to Bury’s account, contingent narrative is one that: 
address[es] beliefs about the origins of the disease, the proximate causes of an illness episode, and 
the immediate effects of illness on everyday life (2001, p. 263). 
 
The moral narrative is one that: 
 
provide[s] accounts of (and help to constitute) changes between the person, the illness and social 
identity, which help to (re)establish the moral status of the individual or helps maintain social 
distance (2001, p. 263). 
 
The core narrative is one that: 
 
reveal[s] connections between the lay person’s experiences and deeper cultural levels of meaning 
attached to suffering and illness (2001, p. 263). 
 
These narratives may have a “stable”, “progressive” or “regressive” quality: a stable narrative is one 
where the speaker remains on a stable trajectory regarding his or her illness; a progressive narrative 
is one where the speaker has made or is making positive progress with their illness; a regressive 
narrative is one where the illness is worsening. 
 
The effect of these narratives has been described as “biographical work”. At this point it is important 
to point out that biographical work through illness narratives typically takes the form of a narrative 
communicated from one person to another. In this sense, it confirms the symbolic interactionist 
principle that developed communication between peers lies at the heart of self and identity. It is fair 
to say that many of the respondents had some form of narrative, however tenuous or fragmented, 
around their experience of, and return from schizophrenia. However, some respondents seemed to 
resist turning their experience into a narrative, as we shall see. It is also important to note that the 
creation of such narratives forms part of the concept of “identity work” suggested in Chapter 9. 
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Of the respondents interviewed, two – Prescott and Ralph – had strong positive illness narratives. 
Prescott’s narrative of wellness can best be described as “moral” with a “progressive” quality. It 
began with independent research into schizophrenia: 
Prescott: Yes, so I started with that, and I started reading books about Surviving 
Schizophrenia; I think was one of them, um and there are a couple of other 
books and I wrote down what I explained ... what schizophrenia was, so I 
don’t have that with me today, but it was about a paragraph or two, 
explaining about delusions, a racing mind, the snap system, the neurons 
working quicker than they would in a normal person, um, creating delusions, 
understanding being completely um .. to contain and completely believable, 
the delusions, completely believable, so it just explaining that to .... 
originally, I used to explain it to a close friend of mine, a girlfriend and she 
sort of had a bit more insight into what was going on in my life as well as 
what she thought was schizophrenia was about.  So, all of those things have 
meant that I’ve had to do some sort of study into working out what 
schizophrenia was about. 
 
As we shall see in Chapter 9, progressive narratives, like this one, are very important from the view 
of language use, power and agency in people diagnosed with schizophrenia. This is because the 
narrative involves the narrator as the natural “agent” of the “story”, focusing on key moments of 
personal transformation or insight on the path to wellness. This, in turn, complicates a model of 
recovery posited centrally around medication without change of the sufferer’s social situation, and 
qualifies the picture of one-way power exerted over people diagnosed with schizophrenia.  
 
Prescott further related the new difficulty of achieving previous goals when asked about his 
diagnosis and goal setting. This narrative seems to have a different tone; a “stable” quality – 
dissimilar to the previous narrative quoted. The co-existence of different forms of narrative within 
the same interview occurred in a number of respondents, attesting to the complexity, even 
contradictory nature, of the narrative process: 
RS:  And how did you feel when you found that out? 
Prescott: Um OK.   I felt fine about it, my issues were being managed, and I understood 
what they were explaining to me about the course of medication I needed to 
be on. 
RS:  How did this make you feel about yourself? 
Prescott: A little bit disappointed.  Um.  I had, you know, great ambitions to be 
someone and to have a condition like schizophrenia ... had been expressed to 
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be the truth of my outlook on life meant that I was going to have more 
problems getting to that sort of stage of my life where I’d reach those goals 
that I was setting. 
RS:  What kind of goals were you setting? 
Prescott: At the time that I was diagnosed? 
RS:  Yes. 
Prescott: They were finish university, they were looking after myself with some sort of 
job and some sort of, you know, family life, girlfriend etc, that sort of thing.  
So those sort of three aspects of it and the way I understood mental illness 
was that this was going to be harder for me to get to that stage that other 
people sort of take as a general step in their life. 
 
In the end, however, Prescott strikes another positive, “progressive” note: 
 
Prescott: I have to accept it and that’s one of the things of the condition, that, I try and 
improve myself so I accept it but whilst I’ve got the ability to move forward, 
I’ve got the ability to apply myself to new things and try my very best to find 
a way of learning things considering I’ve problems remembering specific 
details. 
 
Prescott echoes this note later in the interview: 
 
Prescott: [H]aving a condition that is being capable of being managed and gives you a 
chance to a normal sense of life is great, considering where I’ve come from.  
That delusion, that psychosis, that irrational behaviour, confused thinking, so 
um, certainly, definitely, having the condition managed, having the managed 
condition. 
 
Prescott’s description of “having the condition managed” recalls Rose’s characterisation of 
governmentality in neoliberal states as a phenomenon where people are encouraged to 
“reconceptualise themselves in terms of their own will to be healthy, to enjoy a maximised 
normality” (Rose, 1996b: 52). More on “maximised normality” will be said below. 
 
 
Ralph began his interview with a lengthy description of his life before schizophrenia, the pro-dromal 
phase and his diagnosis. These may fairly be described as a “contingent” narrative and, at this point, 
“regressive”. The narrative, though winding, is certainly intense and clearly personal, including an 
admission of a suicide attempt. In one sense, suicide is the ultimate negation of identity; the end of 
biography; the ultimate biographical crisis. As noted earlier, a significant number of people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia attempt suicide; an indication of the difficulty of certain schizophrenic 
symptoms and side-effects of medication. Another interesting issue raised again by this narrative is 
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that of agency; that is, the narrative does not portray Ralph as the agent of changes made in his life, 
except for the decision to attempt suicide. It is an uncomfortable thought that a person may be so 
entrapped by their illness or situation that suicide presents the only available act of personal agency. 
Again, we may also point out the importance of such issues of agency in the analysis of power in 
Chapter 9: 
Ralph: So two guys I was staying in Adelaide with, Quinnie and Dave, Quinnie was 
leaving back to Sydney and Dave was moving to Melbourne and um, they 
said “what are you going to do” and um I said “I’m probably going to stay in 
Adelaide” because I couldn’t make a decision and um ah, I started getting 
really quite paranoid um, you know thinking conspiracies um thinking um 
unseen [pause] decisions and um movements and um orchestrations was 
happening in lieu of my ability to connect with the world and um, ah, that 
increasingly got worse and I remember working in the um, petrol station and 
just in my own mind creating up stories about who was coming into the 
petrol station and, you know, based on their demeanour, what they looked 
like, what kind of car they drove, how they, you know, interacted with their 
environment and um. [pause]. So my friends were leaving Adelaide and I had 
to make a decision what to do and um, I couldn’t make a decision and I 
remember my room was increasingly becoming messier in that I couldn’t 
keep order and it was deteriorating and becoming quite rubbished, like I kept 
it clean but there was no order and um [pause] my mate, Quinnie, rang my 
parents and said “listen, we’re” - that’s better - um my mate, Quinnie um 
rang my parents and said “listen, something’s up with Ralph, we’ve gotta do 
something, um I think you’re best to come down to Adelaide and um, ah, 
suss him out” so they flew to Adelaide, booked into a hotel, rented a car, 
came around and saw me, made the decision that everything was to be 
chucked in the back of Quinnie’s removalist van and be shipped to Sydney 
and I flew out about 3, 4 days later and I was at home for a week and then 
they took me to my local GP and um, he was a bit concerned, I think but 
again, you know, I think at this stage I was having a breakdown, an acute 
episode and um ah I was at home for a week and had a suicide attempt um 
ah during that time which I didn’t tell anyone for probably about 10 or 15 
years, um and then [pause] obviously it didn’t work and um the next, 
probably 2 or 3 days later my parents thought to get me out of the house, 
cause they weren’t sure what to do and, you know, because I was so 
uncommunicated [sic], I was kind of catatonic, I was thinking, you know, I 
was trying to work out reality that it was like I was suffering the incapacity 
to understand what was going on with the world.  Um and um, you know, it 
was very distressing and I think that was why I tried to take my own life 
whereas because of the distress. 
 
Ralph moves on to describe the impact of diagnosis as a positive, “progressive” narrative; such 
reversals in narrative again attest to the multifaceted nature of narratives of rebuilding in a number 
of respondents. Here the sense of Ralph as the agent of his own narrative is stronger: 
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Ralph: You know, part of um, I think, you know, I was really gung ho before I had 
my diagnosis and I think my diagnosis caused me to become a lot more 
reflective um, um it caused me to become a bit more, I wouldn’t say intuitive, 
but you know, listen, listen to my conscience a bit more um, it certainly 
caused me to be a lot more compassionate towards others um.  It 
subsequently caused me to, you know, if things aren’t going my way, um 
look to what’s going on for someone else, um and think well, you know, life’s 
inherently messy and, you know, maybe what I’m doing is upsetting the 
other party unbeknownst to either of us. 
 
 
 
Despite the significant impact illness narratives seem to have, a few respondents resisted the urge to 
give an expansive account of their illness. Danielle offers a short, ambiguous narrative at the end of a 
number of questions. The use of narrative was not an ubiquitous tool for self rebuilding. Some 
interviewees seemed to prefer not to focus on their illness experience:  
RS:  Do you remember what that medication was? 
Danielle: No, I don’t remember. 
RS:  And were you happy to take that injection? 
Danielle: Half and half. 
RS:  Half and half, why was that? 
Danielle: I don’t know why, I just, I don’t know, half I was sort of glad to just maybe 
forget about all the past and half I didn’t like it because I didn’t like the fact 
that I was being diagnosed or something. 
 
 
 
Michael likewise offers an abbreviated account of what would seem to be a serious, unsettling 
experience.  
RS:  [C]an you tell me the story of your illness? 
Michael: [pause] no story to it really, just that I felt sick in 2002 um, I was taken to 
Maitland Hospital, I had a psychosis attack in hospital and they um reviewed 
it and then they put me on medication and I’ve been on medication ever 
since. 
RS:  What happened during the psychosis attack? 
Michael: Screaming and yelling, um.  
RS:  Were you experiencing hallucinations? 
Michael: No, just, um [pause] ... do you hear hallucinations? 
 
 
 
Finally, it must be observed that a number of respondents emphasised the fact that their mental 
illness derived from a “chemical imbalance” in the brain, or other aspect of brain chemistry. For 
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example, Caitlin makes clear below her understanding of the relationship between schizophrenia 
and brain chemistry. This emphasis is highly significant. It implies that the person diagnosed with 
schizophrenia understands their illness as a biochemical event, process or structure. This in turn 
brings with it a certain degree of reduction; a belief that the illness is deterministic and the sufferer 
cannot interfere except to take medication. Such a belief pushes against the general direction of this 
thesis, which assumes that sociological factors are in fact important, if not vital, to understanding 
recovery processes affecting people diagnosed with schizophrenia. This belief also in turn 
emphasises the need for psychopharmaceuticals and the psychopharmaceutical complex that 
produces them. Finally, such a view casts the individual sufferer as holding an identity determined by 
neurochemistry; what Rose describes as a “neurochemical self”: 
RS:  What was it like having the symptoms of schizophrenia? 
Caitlin: I know it’s a chemical imbalance in the brain ... I know that much and um 
(pause) 
RS: If you were talking to someone who didn’t know anything about it, what 
would you say? 
Caitlin:  I would say it’s a chemical imbalance in the brain and that, um (pause) 
people with schizophrenia do hear voices. 
 
 
 
Prescott makes a similar significant connection between the illness, brain chemistry and medication: 
 
RS:  Do you think that you are schizophrenic? 
Prescott: Yes, Yes I do understand that because I think one of the important things was 
them explaining the physical nature of the illness, the way the brain works 
and the way that the drugs have like chemicals that are absorbed by the 
brain and that helps you bring you to a stage of normality so I think the best 
way about it is to explain the physical parameters of what’s going on, I think 
that’s one true way. 
 
 
 
Likewise Gale, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia 21 years before the time of interview, 
emphasises the link between the illness, brain activity and her diagnosis as a person with 
schizophrenia, or schizoaffective disorder.  
Gale:  I’m just seeing a psychiatrist to get medication and I do see medication as 
sort of therapy for my schizophrenia and sort of regenerating my brain so 
that, so since then I and um, I didn’t really ask about my diagnosis but I got a 
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letter for a medical certificate in uni um saying I was schizoid effective [sic], 
so that was when I first realised it was schizophrenia.   
 
 
Psychiatric Language and “Consumers" 
 
Another important technique used by a few respondents to make sense of, and perhaps provide 
distance from, their illness was the adoption of psychiatric, or semi-psychiatric, language to describe 
their situations. Like the use of narratives of rebuilding just examined, or the naming of medications, 
the use of this language may form an important part of giving people a sense of control over their 
illness and, as such, contribute to the rebuilding of their identity. This practice is also significant 
because it evidences the deep control the psychiatric profession has over the naming of illness, 
diagnosis, treatment and hospitalisation of sufferers who come to them, as well as the influence of 
the DSM series over psychiatric terminology. 
  
James describes the experience of multiple diagnoses using psychiatric language – an experience 
that is somewhat confusing and would probably provide an ambiguous point from which to re-buiild 
a sense of identity. The subtleties of diagnosis emerge here; the fact that James was diagnosed with 
schizoid personality type as opposed to simple schizophrenia attests to the idea of a schizoid 
spectrum, rather than very clear and specific illness categories. It also confirms Foucault’s insight 
that the use of psychiatric discourse goes hand-in-hand with the power of the psychiatric apparatus 
and, in particular, the psychiatric profession to decide on and then change a diagnosis: 
James: Well, um, he [the psychiatrist] diagnosed me, he didn’t actually diagnose 
specifically with schizophrenia, he diagnosed me with a thing called schizoid 
personality type.  Now, that’s not schizo-personality disorder, it’s something 
else.  But since then I haven’t been able to find, like, that guy retired in, at 
the beginning of, somewhere early after the year 2000 and I started seeing a 
new guy and the new guy hasn’t heard of the diagnosis of schizoid 
personality type. So now I’m just under the plain schizophrenia diagnosis. 
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Danielle describes a similarly confusing experience. Her illness trajectory is also complicated by 
multiple diagnoses. Again, the nature of the schizoid spectrum becomes clear: 
RS:  Has your diagnosis changed at all? 
Danielle: Yes, it was first just schizophrenia and then it was like depression so then it 
became schizoaffective disorder and now it’s like still schizo affective 
disorder but more like the moods or something like that.  I don’t know 
exactly. 
 
 
 
Finally, Arthur describes a long history before he was given the accurate psychiatric terms for his 
illness. Perhaps this history has helped him make sense of a complex, difficult experience. One can 
only speculate how Arthur related to the world, and himself, in the long period before diagnosis: 
RS: So did the Commonwealth Medical Officer or the Commonwealth Officer 
explain what diagnosis, what schizophrenia meant? 
Arthur: Oh no, he didn’t use, he didn’t tell me in these terms, this is something that I 
didn’t discover until about 20 years later when I got all the paperwork.  
RS:  How did you get the paperwork? 
Arthur: Well I just applied to the government to have copies of all the paperwork 
about me, you know and they sent it all out in an envelope, you know, about 
an inch thick of something and it had all the details, everything you could 
think of you know, what other officers in the office had said about me, all 
sorts of things and basically all everyone in the office had said I had been 
pretty hopeless for a long time, you know and even on the last day at work, 
they said we all wanted you gone long ago, we didn’t see any hope for you 
and they said it was only the big boss that was keeping me there. 
 
The result of this history was to finally receive the written diagnosis: 
 
Arthur:  I didn’t know, I’d never even heard of the term until 20 years after that bloke, 
see, he only put it on the letter, on the bookwork, written material and I 
didn’t get the written materials, see, I got it 20 or 30 years later when I 
applied for all the documents from the public service and that’s when I saw 
the document.   
 
 
 
A similar use of formal language lies in the application of the term “consumer” to people using 
mental health services. It serves to distance patients from the stigma associated with the term 
“schizophrenic” and the condition “schizophrenia”. At this point, however, we need to make a 
distinction between a person diagnosed with schizophrenia adopting psychiatric language, which 
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enmeshes the speaker in a web of discourse and power/knowledge, and the use of the term 
“consumer”, which deliberately moves beyond psychiatric discourse to avoid stigma. The use of this 
term also has some other important implications. The term consumer constructs the person with 
illness as someone essentially purchasing a saleable good; the consumer is part of the “market” for 
mental health “products” that Rose identifies in neoliberal states. Indeed, the movement of mental 
health care from the state to the community, from public right to market-based product – a process 
identified by Rose – impinges in many ways upon the person diagnosed with schizophrenia. Prescott 
illustrates use of the term “consumer”: 
Prescott: Yeah, I didn’t quite, ahhh, I thought they were just completely normal 
people.  I mean they obviously had their issues and now thinking about it, 
the same time (pause) yeah, it’s a bit of strange situation, all the consumers 
together like that, because there is obviously that locked area that they don’t 
let you in and you got to stay inside the locked area they keep you in and you 
have to relate to people. So, you can’t just run away. 
RS:  You called them consumers? 
Prescott: Yeah, that was what I thought as being the most recent description of 
somebody with my condition.  A mental health consumer. 
RS:  OK and you, what do you think of calling yourself a consumer? 
Prescott: I accept it because they feel as though that the people who run the facilities, 
um, I think that they feel it’s the most appropriate way to call to refer to 
someone as a mental health consumer rather than a patient or anything else 
like that. 
 
 
 
Caitlin is a little more circumspect, but agrees with the moniker: 
 
RS:  Do you ever use the word “consumer” to describe yourself? 
Caitlin:  A consumer? 
RS:  Yes, as a consumer of medication? 
Caitlin:  Yes, we are consumers, I think. Yeah. 
 
We may conclude this section with the observation that symbolic interactionism provides a supple 
tool to analyse language use in rebuilding a sense of identity. Indeed, the use of such psychiatric or 
formal language can also be understood from a symbolic interactionist perspective; that is to say, 
patients need to perceive their illness as an object outside themselves in order to understand and, 
hopefully, overcome it.  
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Family and Friends 
 
One of the recurrent themes arising in the research was the importance of the patient’s family. 
There is an extensive literature pointing to the importance of social support for people with 
schizophrenia (Pratt, 2013; Smolat et al. 2013; MIlnera et al. 2016; Pahwah et al. 2016). The symbolic 
interactionist position would tend to suggest that those having a happy relationship with a 
supportive family and friends would be better able to move beyond their illness and engage in the 
process of rebuilding their identity, whilst those with difficult relationships with family would find it 
more difficult to manage their illness (discussed further below) and would not engage fully in 
rebuilding their identity. Families help provide a sense of identity in a number of ways. They can help 
monitor the ill person for significant changes in personality or behaviour; they can provide practical 
support, such as helping source medication, getting the ill person to psychiatrists and so forth; and 
they can help rebuilding a sense of identity after disruption through providing non-judgmental 
communication and emotional support. They also provide an alternative to staying in a mental 
health clinic or, in a deinstitutionalised environment, seeing mental health workers on some regular 
basis. This position, however, did not emerge in all interviews. There were significant contrary 
results where respondents described difficult relationships with close family members, particularly 
parents and children; relationships which affect the process of re-establishing a sense of identity. 
Indeed, a pattern of social isolation and loneliness emerged in some interviews. 
 
This observation has significance that should be noted, not only because it is a theme that recurs in 
the interviews, but because it confirms a basic tenet of symbolic interactionism, that the self is 
formed through the process of symbolic interaction with significant others, and the generalised 
“other”. The emotional content of symbolic interactions is dealt with in Chapter 9. This study also 
suggests that significant others generally include family and, as seen below, friends.   
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Prescott seemed to have an excellent relationship with his family. Indeed, he was living with his 
family and commented at one stage that he would work in the family business. The fact that he 
perceives his family as supportive and accepting is probably a strong factor in his positive and 
coherent self-presentation. It also confirms the symbolic interactionist tenet that the process of 
rebuilding a sense of identity relies on interactions with others. Here he describes the support of his 
family: 
RS:  …has having schizophrenia affected the relationship with your family? 
Prescott: Certainly.  Certainly does.  They’ve had to be very supportive and very 
accepting and give me all the guidance and lots of help so certainly… 
RS:  OK.  What kind of guidance and help do they give you? 
Prescott: Acceptance and love, in terms of family unit, um, they offer guidance and 
help when I need it, they are there when I need them, also, it’s ah, it’s just 
good to have people who care about you and (pause) through thick and thin. 
 
 
 
Caitlin describes a situation where she had one or two friends; her existence was a lonely one. 
Perhaps to compensate, Caitlin spoke of her two sons and a daughter. Unfortunately her sons did 
not respond well to her medical state, and her relationship with her daughter was ambivalent at 
best. This ambiguity – the need for her daughter to “have a break” – indicates the difficulty a family 
may have in accepting and dealing with a relative with schizophrenia. The sufferer becomes doubly 
disrupted – both by the illness and by the breakdown of interactions with significant others. The 
situation seemed to reflect poorly upon the process of reforming Caitlin’s sense of identity; although 
she was by no means in a state of identity crisis, she did still report auditory hallucinations and was 
generally visited not by relatives but by a mental health care professional: 
RS:  Do you need the support of your family? 
Caitlin: Yeah, I do need the support of my family.  That’s why I’m waiting for my 
daughter to come round, you know, um.  She doesn’t want to be pushed at 
the moment to see me and she wanted a break from me because she always 
looks after me, my mental health when I go and visit her and apparently it’s 
gotten too much for her so she has to have a break and I understand that.   
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James emphasises the familial relationship he has with his mother – a form of life management, 
considered further below. Indeed, James’s reliance upon his mother in one sphere seemed to tie in 
with his ability to lead a fairly independent life in another, more public sphere; a highly gendered 
division of labour that nevertheless allowed him to present a relatively stable identity in public. With 
this gendered division of labour we begin to see some of the relationships of power that surround 
the diagnosis and treatment of schizophrenia: 
James: My mum supports me a lot, um [pause] and my medication helps as well.  
It’s a big help.   
RS:  Can you tell me about the support that your mum gives you? 
James: Well, I live at home and I’m not completely independent.  Um, I can look 
after myself on my own and I have done that but I can’t do it very well and I 
can’t, it takes so much to do it that I can’t do that and study anymore.  There 
was a time I could, but I can’t do it anymore.  Um, so, um, she does like 
almost all the cooking and housework, like 99.9% of it I suppose.  Um, yeah, 
I’m not good with cooking although I’ve made some changes recently that 
might help in that area.  I’m not good with dishes, um, washing my clothes, I 
could probably do if things were organised differently but I’ve gotta walk 
through my mum’s bedroom to get to the backyard to hang them out so 
because of that, I tend to just leave them for her to do it.  Um [pause] and 
housework, the rest of the housework, vacuuming, I’m not good at at all.  
Shopping, yeah, I’m pretty fine with shopping but I’m often busy with 
studying and stuff, so it tends to be just busyness that causes me not to help 
with shopping or do the shopping.  Um [pause]. 
 
 
 
Danielle describes an ambivalent relationship with her parents. She claims that schizophrenia didn’t 
really affect her relationship with her family. However, the fact that Danielle’s mother thought 
Danielle was a “capable, achieving person” seems to have given Danielle confidence in her 
interactions – a confidence that may explain Danielle’s successful employment and clear 
communication. It also appears that Danielle is conscious of, if not upset by, her mother’s refusal to 
believe in the diagnosis. The need for confirmation by a significant other emerges as an 
understandable emotional imperative; a step towards the process of successful rebuilding a sense of 
identity. 
RS:  Did having schizophrenia affect your relationship with your family? 
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Danielle: Not really, I don’t think so.  My mother, she didn’t like it, she, to this day she 
doesn’t believe I have it, she always thought I was a capable positive, 
achieving person, successful. 
 
 
 
We have seen a number of cases where family relationships can have a positive or negative impact 
on the rebuilding of identity. The reliance of respondents on their family and the results of family 
breakdown can be complex. Nathan describes below an episode of familial violence. The background 
of this violence is unclear. The event would appear to bode negatively for Nathan’s process of 
rebuilding a sense of identity. It would seem fair to assume that family breakdown may compromise 
emotional stability, introducing trauma and the breakdown of interaction into the family unit. This 
would seem especially salient for people diagnosed with schizophrenia since having schizophrenia 
may force a person to rely more heavily on their family for support. On the other hand, the person 
suffering family breakdown may still be able to reform his or her sense of self, independent of their 
family. This is clearly suggested elsewhere in the interview, where Nathan expresses significant 
personal goals. We must also accept the possibility that Nathan’s account of such violence may be 
delusional, or was exaggerated by Nathan’s schizophrenic state. In this case, the illness itself seems 
to continue to disrupt Nathan’s process of rebuilding a sense of identity; in particular, disrupting the 
symbolic interactionist process of interaction with others as a basis for rebuilding identity.  
Nathan:  I broke my right hand here because what happened is that my dad accused 
me of robbing my own house which was just totally preposterous and 
somehow, his face just got in the way of my hand and then I broke it and 
when it broke it was all jagged and they couldn’t manipulate it back into 
place, they actually had to put a cast on it and let it heal at an inclined angle 
so it’s never really been straight, it’s always been like 60 degrees, so I get 
phantom pain from that and I also have an emotional pain because it was 
associated with my father and it was associated with his ex-girlfriend. 
 
Later in the interview Nathan further describes his family’s situation. Here the possibility of delusion 
seems weaker. At the same time, the extract attests to the breakdown of interaction in the family 
unit, and again raises the possibility that Nathan’s ability to reform a sense of self may be 
compromised by a failure to interact positively with significant others: 
162 
 
RS:  How is your relationship with your family? 
Nathan: Oh, it’s been a very difficult tightrope to walk and there are times when I feel 
that I’m living somewhere with my mum and with my dad and with my sister 
and with my half brother and then at times I feel like I have absolutely no 
communication with them, they shut off to me, they don’t want to hear what 
I have to say, they don’t wanna hear what my problems are. 
 
 
 
Gale also speaks (perhaps a little confusingly) of family breakdown when questioned about 
symptoms. However, the relationship between apparent family violence, constant crying and 
reforming a sense of identity is a little unclear. It would appear that Gale’s situation of violence and 
persecution would have acted negatively on her identity. The fact, mentioned above, that Gale 
seemed to have ongoing delusional beliefs regarding someone wanting to kill her, and claimed to 
receive psychic visions, attests to this interpretation. Again, however, we must also consider the 
possibility that this violence was contrived in, or exaggerated by, a psychotic state, which makes the 
analysis more difficult. Again, perhaps the illness continues to exert a negative influence on her 
ability to re-establish a sense of identity: 
RS:  What kind of symptoms did you have? 
Gale: Well, the main thing was like I couldn’t stop crying, when, like all through 
growing up, like people teased me and my mother hit me and my uncle hit 
me and then I cried all the time and they picked on me… I always clash with 
my mother and I always hated what she did and she always told me the 
wrong things to do. 
 
 
 
Just as family was significant for most respondents’ process of rebuilding a sense of identity, a few 
respondents reported the significance of friends too – even if only it be their absence. Friends 
generally allowed the diagnosed person to lead a more expansive life. And, as with families, the 
diagnosed person may develop self-recognition through social interaction with friends; and 
interactions with certain people will have a higher significance. This again confirms the symbolic 
interactionist position. 
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Ralph claims to have a “wide net” of friends – perhaps gained through his friendly manner – 
although he had a limited set of close friendships. This network of friends may help explain the sense 
of calm and self-acceptance Ralph seemed to express; perhaps it gave him perspective on his illness 
and life. Certainly it gives him the opportunity for rebuilding a sense of identity through symbolic 
interaction:  
Ralph: I’ve got a wide net of friends but when it comes to intimate relationships I’m 
not crash hot on them because I get really claustrophobic very quickly and 
um if I’m um, I stop thinking basically and I just regress to a um what I’m 
feeling and I just feel claustrophobic. 
 
 
 
Caitlin reports having lost touch with most of her friends, and focusing on her family; indeed, Caitlin 
lived alone and regularly met with a case worker – her situation is not uncommon in light of wide 
practices of deinstitutionalisation that are discussed below. That is to say, Caitlin has moved back 
into the community after a period of treatment in a mental health ward. A number of questions 
surround such treatment. Are people with serious mental illness best treated outside the clinic or 
ward? Would such treatment be practical or affordable? Are sufficient resources being given to 
community support? Finally, does the psychiatric apparatus still exercise power over the person 
diagnosed with schizophrenia if he or she is not in a monitored and controlled residence? With those 
issues in mind, we may take a more subtle view of the nature of relationships with friends and 
family. Indeed, Caitlin’s interview suggests that a loss of relationships with friends has led to her 
already-noted emphasis on family, although in the following quote, as with earlier comments by this 
interviewee, there seems to be some ambivalence in her relationship with her daughter: 
Caitlin:   No, friends, I’ve just lost touch with. 
 RS:  Do you want other friends? 
Caitlin: Not ... um, I’m happy on my own.  I have my sons in Queensland, I have two 
sons in Queensland and um, I have my daughter, but um my daughter and I 
are not on speaking terms, so that friend that rang me up when you came to 
the door, he’s a good friend of mine but he is my daughter’s friend, if you 
know what I mean.  And he um lets me know how she’s going.  Yeah. 
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Finally, Danielle is philosophical about an attrition of friendships. She goes so far as to say that she 
felt abandoned by friends, but does not suggest this was due to her illness. In any case, Danielle 
presented a clear and coherent self; a lack of friends did not seem to compromise such a sense of 
self emerging. Such a finding contradicts the emphasis in symbolic interactionism on interaction as a 
vital part of the process of rebuilding a sense of identity: 
Danielle: I felt like I lost a lot of friends from school.   
RS:  Why did you lose your friends? 
Danielle: They all went to different streams of life, you know, most of them went to 
study something or most of them changed schools or you know they just, I 
felt like they abandoned me actually. 
RS:  Do you feel like particular people abandoned you? 
Danielle: Yeah. 
RS:  And do you think that they abandoned you because you were sick? 
Danielle: I don’t know exactly, I don’t think they necessarily abandoned me cause I 
was sick but just maybe that’s the way life is sometimes. 
 
 
 
Employment 
 
A significant number of respondents engaged in employment of some kind or another. This seemed 
to have a positive impact upon the process of rebuilding their sense of identity. Having meaningful 
employment also seemed a common theme amongst people diagnosed rebuilding their identity. At 
one level we may attribute this to employment offering a regular social interaction with others that 
is so important to symbolic interactionism. Employment seems to also offer other benefits. Most 
particularly, it seems to give some people a sense of purpose and allows them to escape a lifestyle of 
isolation.  
 
This section also gives rise to questions of political economy, such as the availability of employment 
for the mentally ill or whether stressful work exacerbates symptoms, or the importance of “job 
satisfaction” as a motivator in a capitalist economy, that are outside the purview of this thesis. 
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However, this thesis does find a positive relationship between employment and recovery outcomes. 
Whether one precedes the other is unclear. 
 
Sally, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia 18 years before the time of interview, describes having 
a number of occupations. The fact that she changed occupations so frequently did not seem to 
diminish the positive impact working had on her well-being. Interestingly, she began work in the 
Leisure Club, and organisation directed towards those with mental illness. This confirms Goffman’s 
insight, explored at more length in the next chapter, that people with stigmatised conditions will 
search out others with a similar condition: 
Sally: Um, I um, worked [pause] um for the Leisure Club, no the first job after, um, 
no, yeah, that was the Leisure Club was the next job I had after it and I was 
casual for 3 years, um after then um, I worked as um [pause] um, selling 
Homecare products, door to door for about a year and then I went to this 
company and I was doing office cleaning and reception, um, hmmm, [pause] 
I was a cook for a while.  In 2005, um, I went to Pizza Hut in the inbound call 
centre at Gordon. Yeah. 
RS:  And did you like working? 
Sally:  Yeah. 
RS:  What did you like about it? 
Sally:  The money.  [laughs] 
RS:  The money? 
Sally:  Yeah. 
RS:  Did it make you feel good, personally? 
Sally:  Yeah, it was a help. 
 
 
 
Ralph describes some of the positive benefits of employment; in particular, self-esteem and time to 
rebuild his sense of self after visits to the psychiatric hospital. Such employment did not have to be 
complex or overly challenging – Ralph worked packing, grinding and roasting coffee. Indeed, 
amongst the interviewees who worked, most adopted fairly simple jobs. This is possibly explainable 
by a loss of cognitive ability brought on by schizophrenia. Nevertheless, employment seems to have 
a positive impact on processes of rebuilding identity: 
Ralph: I find work is good because it gives me an occupation in the sense that it 
occupies my time, you know.  It gives me an opportunity to um, you know, 
working for 5 years in a coffee factory where all I did was, you know, pack 
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coffee, grind coffee and occasionally roast coffee, for me it was quite 
meditative and, you know, simple tasks that don’t ask much of me but at the 
same time allow me, um, the ability to build a bit of self-esteem on board, 
because I think that’s what happens, every time I end up in hospital is that I 
lose confidence and you know, in all the times I have been back to hospital, 
um, every time I end up back there it takes me longer to rebuild. 
 
 
 
Caitlin offers a similar positive account of employment, connecting personal satisfaction to “doing a 
good job”. She is a well-socialised unit in the structure of neoliberal economies described by Rose:  
Caitlin: You have to strive you know to go to work each day, you know.  But at the 
end of the day you, you know, that’s how you do a good job, so it’s all 
worthwhile.   
 
Interestingly, Caitlin not only used work as a source of well-being, but also as an effective distraction 
from schizophrenic symptoms, no doubt helping her to re-establish an undisturbed sense of self. 
Such distraction allows the sufferer the mental space to engage in a complex physical and social 
world, one where the process of identity development may emerge. At the same time she points to 
a nexus between getting “really sick” and social isolation: 
RS:  How does the work make you feel? 
Caitlin: Well it takes your mind off your illness.  It distracts you from the voices and 
um, yeah. (pause) the system is that if you get sick, they are very supportive 
and they will um like make allowances for you to have time off work and 
then go back to work and things like that. 
RS:  Do you feel like you are a different person at work? 
Caitlin: Oh well, when you distract yourself from the voices then they’re not so bad.  
But when you get really sick then you isolate yourself, don’t do anything, 
that’s when you get really sick.   
 
 
 
Danielle was a highly capable respondent for whom employment is not just a distraction, and a 
venue for symbolic interaction, but also again a source of satisfaction:  
RS:  But you’re holding down a job now? 
Danielle: Yeah. 
RS:  Can you tell me a bit about what you’re doing now? 
Danielle: Yeah, I’m a admin officer.  I just mostly do typing of reports, I make files up 
for patients and I answer incoming phone calls, what else do I do?  
Sometimes I do a lot of manual kind of work, I do a lot of that, like archiving 
files and taking files up to the medical record department when they need it 
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or when we need it, sometimes providing backup for the other departments 
on the phones, yeah, that’s about it. 
RS:  How does the work make you feel? 
Danielle: Yeah, satisfied. 
 
 
 
Peter was perhaps not as capable as Danielle, but wished to work nevertheless: 
Peter: Yeah, it will give me something to do plus it’s, I’m empathetic in that area, so 
I can help people quite a bit with my knowledge of personal mental illness 
and that sort of thing.  The only problem is my sleep problems but if I can get 
past that to a degree and do some part time work like with Richmond PRA or 
something like that then that’ll be good. 
 
Peter describes the reason for his desire to work. An interesting pattern amongst a number of 
respondents emerges here – a desire to work in the mental health sector. Sally, for example, has 
worked at the “Leisure Club”, a meeting space for people with mental illness. Typically respondents 
wanted to use their own experience to help people who may have experienced similar symptoms. In 
this sense they were able to turn the disruption of schizophrenia into a more positive experience. 
This desire also confirms Goffman’s thesis, explored further in the next chapter, that people with a 
stigmatised condition may seek out others with a similar condition. This process probably aided 
respondents to build a positive sense of identity: 
RS:  Would you like to help people? 
Peter:  Yeah, yeah, yeah definitely.  Um, but ah, helping people appeals to me. 
RS:  Yeah, why? 
Peter: Um, it gives me some satisfaction that I can be able to help someone and 
maybe prevent them from suiciding or something like that cause I’ve had 
many friends who have suicided. 
 
 
Finally, Michael saw employment as a means of making money to re-decorate his apartment. In the 
sociological analysis made here, we must not lose sight of the prosaic:  
RS:   OK.  Tell me about decorating your apartment? 
Michael: I go shopping, pick up stuff, like I do fashion design, but I’m just doing home 
at the moment.  Like homewares and stuff.  So I’m just designing my home 
at the moment. 
RS:  Fantastic.  And how do you afford it? 
Michael: I work, I’ve got three jobs.  I work at Croydon, I work at respite at Burwood, I 
also work at PRA in Figtree, Conference Centre at Olympic Park, um, where 
else do I get money from? Oh, that’s all, and I’ve had a couple of private jobs.  
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I’ve only had, sorry, I’ve only had one private job cleaning, I didn’t like it, that 
was last week, she was a bit too messy for me, I couldn’t clean up after her. 
 
Illness Management 
 
Illness management may be thought of as activities that decrease the impact of symptoms upon a 
person’s life. It may involve finding, buying and taking regular medication, meeting with 
psychiatrists, and compensating for permanent and fluctuating symptoms such as paranoia or 
discomfort in social situations. Illness management helps preserve well-developed post-diagnostic 
identities and helps prevent recurrent breakdown. In many cases respondents were helped in 
managing their illness by family members, case workers and psychiatrists. We have already 
encountered many cases of illness management (and mismanagement); be it a failure to take 
medication leading to relapse, or the maintenance of contact with psychiatrists. Such processes will 
form part of the concept of “identity work”, suggested below in Chapter 9. 
 
 
One of the important aspects of illness management is finding out information about the illness. 
With this information, the patient is able to begin constructing a narrative making sense of his or her 
condition. Information is also power. The fact that information generally involved a neurochemical 
explanation of the condition, necessitating neurochemical intervention, reinforces the power of 
psychopharmaceutical companies. Information can also empower the sufferer. It may be used as a 
tool for negotiation with the psychiatric apparatus, and can form the kernel of progressive illness 
narratives or the basis for a positive illness trajectory more generally. We have already seen Prescott 
describe his own efforts at research on the subject, on page 147, taking a proactive attitude.  
 
 
Caitlin has learned vital social skills and, in particular, skills of symbolic interaction, also attesting to 
the help she has received to reach this state: 
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Caitlin: It’s interesting because as I said years ago I used to be withdrawn all the 
time and not be able to speak and hold a conversation and things like that 
but now I can. (pause) I’ve learned that, you know, to express my feelings 
and how I am and how I’m doing and things like that.  I’ve learned over the 
years to do that.  Through a lot of help I’ve gotten and support I’ve gotten. 
 
 
Danielle testifies to the importance of accepting the illness. As we have noted before, such insight is 
commonly seen by psychiatrists as a positive step towards wellness. Accepting the illness also entails 
accepting the psychiatric diagnosis and, usually, medication. Again we find the power of the 
psychopharmaceutical complex over the psychiatric process. Having an accurate self-concept would 
seem to be a firm basis to reform a sense of identity. 
Danielle: Well, I just come to accept the illness and I think I’m generally at the moment 
much happier but that’s only recently.  Up until now I used to think many 
depressing things about myself, like about, I was hopeless or I wish I could 
die or you know, my father would say that I’m a coward if I did something to 
try and end my life or something like that or have that idea.   
 
 
 
Ralph seemed adept at illness management, suggesting the diversity of illness experiences and 
patient responses. He spoke about putting strategies in place when things start to go wrong. Such 
strategies would seem highly important to maintain the interactions of everyday life. They also again 
speak to the significance of the sufferer acting as the agent within the confines of his or her illness. 
Such agency problematises a top-down or one-way picture of power exercised over the person 
diagnosed with schizophrenia. It will also come to form an important part of the concept of “identity 
work” developed in Chapter 9. Finally, the emphasis on agency complicates a reductionist or 
deterministic account of the illness – one where a chemical process can be ameliorated only by 
medical intervention: 
Ralph: So what I’ve gotta do is let that chemical process take its own accord and 
part of that strategy that I have is to do nothing, you know, have a nap, lie 
down with a bean bag over my eyes and a book under my head, you know in 
yoga nidre, doing nothing or do meditation and, you know, let that, not 
engage in that process but just let that process dissipate of its own accord 
and that’s really worked for me. 
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He went on to define a practical life outlook including schizophrenia, one that suggests issues of the 
geography of schizophrenia – where a person diagnosed with the illness can best find a safe and not 
over-stimulating life: 
Ralph: Part of moving down to Bega for the last couple of years is that increasingly 
I’ve found living in a big capital city too difficult and it wasn’t conducive to 
my mental health, so I had to set about moving into a different space, um, I 
think, you know, staying off drugs and alcohol and um keeping out of 
hospital are the two priorities in my life.  You know, and um I don’t question 
them.  You know, um, yeah. 
 
Ralph’s cooperation in determining his medication can be read as a form of illness management 
conducive to rebuilding a sense of identity. This again points to the concept of identity work 
developed in Chapter 9, as well as invoking the patient’s potential agency and ability to negotiate 
with his or her psychiatrist: 
Ralph:  I even had a conversation with my psychiatrist about whether being living 
without medication in a psychotic state would be beneficial and I said to him 
“the thing that tires me out the most is that psychotic thinking”, because I 
think I can solve it, whatever it is, I don’t know, that, you know the world is 
an inherently messy place and you know when I’m psychotic and unwell I 
think I can make some understanding or some order of that world. 
 
 
 
Another form of illness management emerged in the form of compensating for symptoms. Such 
compensation requires a fairly sophisticated degree of self-insight and, from a symbolic 
interactionist perspective, an ability to see the meaning of one’s own gestures from the perspective 
of the other. To illustrate this we may look to the example of James how, knowing that he suffered 
paranoia, was pursuing a sexual interest whose apparent rebuffs he put down to his own paranoid 
perception. Interestingly, it is only with the intervention of friends – significant others – that James 
was able to “correct” his behaviour in light of his perceptions:  
James: So there’s one incidence where I fell in love with a woman at Church and she 
didn’t like me but she didn’t tell me straight out that she didn’t like me she 
just kept doing all these behaviours to give me the message that she didn’t 
like me and that I should back off.  Now cause I knew that one of my 
symptoms is paranoia, I always attributed any negative behaviour on her 
part to um circumstances outside of her control that I didn’t know about and 
I would just with being paranoid if I thought that she was trying to 
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deliberately behave like that so I just assumed that she wasn’t trying to 
deliberately behave like that and so for years I kept trying to be friendly 
towards her while she was trying to be mean towards me. Well I didn’t 
realise she was being mean towards me and finally it took a couple of 
different friends to say “actually, James, she is just not interested in you” and 
um even then like even then after I was pretty sure that she wasn’t 
interested in me I specifically asked her and finally she told me straight out 
she wasn’t but um, in actual fact her behaviour towards me was quite rude 
whereas I always assumed that she wasn’t being rude, it was just me being 
paranoid. 
 
It is very difficult to judge whether such an experience has a positive or negative effect on James’s 
ongoing efforts to re-buiild a sense of identity. On the one hand, compensating for symptoms would 
seem to allow him to interact more naturally with people around him. On the other hand, as we 
have seen, he may over-compensate and progress to a state that was almost delusional. In any case, 
he is engaging in an active labour of stabilisation, working on himself to make fine judgments about 
reality testing and to overcome the limits of his experience of schizophrenia. This suggests a 
connection to Rose’s portrayal of a governmentality that seeks to “reconceptualise themselves in 
terms of their own will to be healthy, to enjoy a maximised normality” (Rose, 1996b: 52). Of course, 
the questions must arise, what is “normal” and who is to judge “normality”? Certainly a picture of 
the functional self is given by symbolic interactionism – the ability to interact with others, the ability 
to understand the meaning implied by one’s own gestures, and the ability to grasp the view of the 
generalised other – and may provide a yard-stick for normality. Regardless of the precise definition 
of normality, work must usually be done by the person diagnosed with schizophrenia to escape 
ontological crisis and biographical disruption. Such work may also happen during identity 
maintenance, as shown in the next chapter, and forms part of the concept of identity work 
suggested in Chapter 9. 
 
 
Finally, Greg began receiving treatment in public hospitals but then sought out private health 
insurance: 
Greg: Well, I was in a public hospital up until about, no. On and off, in and out of 
public hospital psych wards, ah, up until about 2009.  And then I started 
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saving up for health insurance and paying for health insurance but you have 
to wait 12 months before you can claim and after that I started going to 
private hospitals. 
 
Greg also saw a bulk-billing psychiatrist, although he was somewhat ambivalent about the 
psychiatrist: 
RS:  OK.  Um, how do you feel about your psychiatrist? 
Greg: I feel he’s good but I would like to get a second opinion.  Ah, he is a private 
psychiatrist but he bulk bills me because once upon a time when I used to see 
him when I was working these three jobs and everything I used to pay him up 
front and claim.  Yeah, so he lets me bulk bill now.   
 
 
Life Management and Goal Setting 
 
Life management is a term used to refer to the management of day-to-day stresses; domestic and 
work-related. Effective life management allows the diagnosed person greater freedom to pursue 
social and work-related activities with others that can contribute to their rebuilding of a sense of 
identity. Challenges include finding work, finding and maintaining friendships, living happily with 
family members, managing finances, studying, exercising choice over life decisions and setting 
realistic life goals. In many cases, however, the diagnosed person may not be capable of 
comprehensive life management, or may set unrealistic goals. It becomes an interesting point 
whether the setting of unrealistic life goals may in fact still prove a positive aspect of life 
management, insofar as it provides a modicum of hope to people often trapped in a limiting 
situation. 
 
 
Prescott talks about accepting schizophrenia, but still maintains a generally positive attitude. The 
point has been made already that a positive attitude seemed to be an important part of Prescott’s 
process of rebuilding a sense of identity. There is no doubt that Prescott’s successful response to 
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medication is also an important factor in his positive attitude. We may once again make the aside 
that phenomenology as it lies does not provide a strong account of how such phenomena as a 
positive attitude arise, influence recovery and rebuilding identity. As we will see in Chapter 9, the 
concepts of “reformation of body-in-the-world” and “ontological renovation” seek to address this 
flaw: 
 
Prescott: I have to accept it and that’s one of the things of the condition, that, I try and 
improve myself so I accept it but whilst I’ve got the ability to move forward, 
I’ve got the ability to apply myself to new things and try my very best to find 
a way of learning things considering I’ve problems remembering specific 
details. 
 
Prescott’s positivity was translated into a desire to reduce his reliance on social welfare: 
 
Prescott:  I mean but I was talking to the psychiatrist the other day because I’m on 
NewStart at the moment, um, I asked him to write me a letter saying that 
my condition was being  managed cause I told Centrelink because I went on 
the DSP [Disability Support Pension] for a little while, so they knew that and 
I’d been working for the last five years, um, so, um, I asked the doctor to 
write me a letter saying that I had ... that my condition was being managed 
and that I’m able to work.  So, that’s what that was all about.  So I explained, 
I had to tell them about the condition I had there. 
 
 
 
Danielle describes an existence of relatively good life management, a description that chimed well 
with her self-presentation and coherence during the interview. Interestingly, life management 
involves a number of different behaviours, some as banal as presenting oneself positively or 
speaking clearly. Why is this interesting? It shows that the complexity of maintaining a positive 
outlook on life and positive symbolic interactions, among other factors, may come into play in life 
management: 
RS:  OK.  Can you describe your life now? 
Danielle: Yeah, its, I’ve got a good job, I’m good at my job, I usually have a good 
relationship with my family, usually, just reasonably good.  I can look after 
myself reasonably well and look after my unit reasonably well.  My hygiene is 
much better than when I was sick.  I think that’s about it really. 
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As we have seen above, Michael focused on self-presentation and fitting-out his apartment as a way 
to be pro-active and to distinguish himself from other people with schizophrenia. Interestingly, in 
the very act of distinguishing himself, he is re-affirming the stigma that accompanies schizophrenia:  
Michael: I keep myself immaculate ... a lot of schizophrenic people are like very messy 
and they are very untidy but I’m not like that, I’m very immaculate.  I think 
I’ve only got slightly schizophrenia, I don’t think I’ve got it totally, you know.  
Full blown ... cause I still can picture whether it’s real or not. 
RS:  OK.  Tell me about decorating your apartment. 
Michael: I go shopping, pick up stuff, like I do fashion design, but I’m just doing home 
at the moment.  Like homewares and stuff.  So I’m just designing my home 
at the moment. 
 
 
Nathan describes a reliance on a smartphone to “run his life’. This may suggest an interesting side-
issue to research – the reliance of the mentally ill on technology and how technology can be used to 
improve the life quality of sufferers. 
Nathan: I’d have to do like chores, looking after my birds, doing the activities that I 
have to do week by week, planning my weekly activities, my meetings with 
case workers, my meetings with any courses that I’m doing, all of that, it 
started to change and it started to become like a need to um to become 
more organised, but without these electronic smartphones and things like 
that, I would be in a very disorganised disorderly way.  That is my secretary, 
that is my reminder service, it basically runs my life, my smartphone is my 
life. 
 
 
 
Goal setting is an important element in life management. It shows a confidence in life and a forward-
looking perspective, as well as a relatively stable identity. However, a number of respondents 
seemed to have set personal goals that would be hard to achieve, particularly in a competitive, 
deregulated economy and a social world that seriously stigmatises the condition of people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia. In these cases it is difficult to judge whether the goal setting helped 
or hindered the re-establishment of a sense of self: whilst such goals may motivate the respondent, 
their ultimate failure to reach the goal may lead to negative self-esteem and frustration. 
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Prescott talks about the goals he was setting at the time he was diagnosed, and how having 
schizophrenia challenged those goals. We see here an acceptance that his pre-illness goals may be 
much harder to reach; a certain pragmatic realism in attitude that would seem to bode well for the 
process of rebuilding a sense of identity. It is also significant that his goals include having serious 
relationships – significant because it again affirms the need for significant others in symbolic 
interactions: 
Prescott: They were to finish university, they were looking after myself with some sort 
of job and some sort of, you know, family life, girlfriend etc, that sort of 
thing.  So those sort of three aspects of it and the way I understood mental 
illness was that this was going to be harder for me to get to that stage that 
other people sort of take as a general step in their life. 
RS:  Did you feel that it was fair? 
Prescott: No, I didn’t think it was fair.  I was very unlucky to have caught myself with 
this situation, (pause), so I was, um, thought it was very unfair. 
RS:  OK and what did you do with those feelings of unfairness? 
Prescott: OK, um, what did I do with the feelings ... well I sort of thought, you know, 
like I put that into trying to, you know, start on a path that was going to get 
to those goals.  Those goals of ideas that have completed schooling, having a 
job and being a responsible family guy as well as being a supportive person 
to, like, relationships outside of the home in the social situation, in society. 
 
 
 
Typically life goals expressed by respondents involved living a happy life, working and having a 
family. Nathan, for example, outlined the classic position (despite heavy medication that seemed to 
have precluded him from taking part in many life activities). One may only speculate on the power of 
hope – the significance of hoping for a brighter day. Such hope may help combat the thoughts that 
may lead a sufferer down a darker path. Alternatively, to draw on analysis made in the previous 
chapter, hope is an emotion that would affect a sufferer’s symbolic interactions yet hope, as an 
emotion, is not well-theorised in traditional symbolic interactionism: 
RS:  OK. Um, do you have any long term goals? 
Nathan: Um, my long term goals are to live a happy life, to have a good relationship 
with the supreme soul of the universe, to have kids, a couple of kids and have 
a marriage, to become a grandparent and to die. 
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Peter had somewhat less ambitious, but probably more achievable, life goals. Peter seems to have 
let go of more difficult or demanding dreams, having accepted his situation: 
RS:  So what are your goals for 10 years? 
Peter: 10 years, um, to have been working part time in the mental health area to 
have saved a reasonable amount of money, so that I can have plenty of 
money to keep the car on the road and all that sort of thing, to feel that I 
have achieved a fair bit, maybe to complete some more study and that sort 
of thing. 
 
 
 
Nathan emphasised the difficulties he faced in achieving life goals, again struggling with acceptance 
of his situation: 
Nathan: I felt as if like, if there was a race and that race was to achieve in your job 
that I was 10 metres behind cause I was on these inhibitors and so I felt that I 
was severely disabled, because of what I had to do.   
 
He describes far more restricted goals than some respondents. The emphasis he puts on the PHaMs 
(Personal Helpers and Mentors program) below is significant because it shows the degree to which 
rebuilding a sense of identity through successful life management may be abetted by a supportive 
social environment; the social complements the neurochemical intervention. The PHaMs program 
may also be described as a result of the deinstitutionalisation process, focusing on providing care in 
the community. It also accords with Rose’s description of “de-statising” public services; the PHaMs 
mentor may rely on government funds, but the support appears to be provided as a private service. 
As such, we may also understand programs such as PHaMs as necessary elements of care in a 
deinstitutionalised environment. The precise nature of this care – the fact that it appears dispersed 
and capillary rather than centralised in one location – will also inform our analysis of power 
exercised over people with severe mental illness in a deinstitutionalised environment: 
Nathan:  I didn’t like that the schizophrenia actually had control over me and that 
when I ceased using drugs suddenly I started to see the world differently, I 
started to, the clarity started to come back a bit more ... So I, I, the goal, my 
goals took maybe 12 years before I came up with the PHaMs program [a 
Personal Help and Mentor program] and they helped me to work on a 
compass to work out to how do I get to my goal, when’s that to be.  I mean 
before I had schizophrenia I thought I was gonna have the picket fence, the 
job, maybe an engineer, um, a family, at least 2 children, something like that 
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and, you know, that I would be a grandfather and all that sort of thing.  Um, 
now, it’s sort of my goal now is to just meditate and to um ... be patient and 
to just to have the main goal to live happily ever after and to cease using all 
the drugs, illicit drugs, that is. 
 
 
Likewise, Ralph emphasised the change of life goals forced upon him by his illness, and the impact 
this has had on his life: 
Ralph: I’ve kind of let go of a lot, you know, even my work life, um, my ambitions in 
life have to be um [pause] whatever I do in my life, whether it’s in my daily 
life or, you know, the aspirations I have for my 5 years or 10 years down the 
track, my illness also has to be considered.   
 
However, Ralph also seems to have come to terms with his change of life goals: 
 
Ralph: You know, have a bit of compassion for myself, stop taking the whip out and 
whippin myself, for things that I haven’t achieved and I haven’t done 
because I have a mental health condition and I think that compassion, if I 
can be compassionate for myself and understanding of my condition if I then 
transfer that compassion or understanding onto others the world’s gonna be 
a better place, you know.  Maybe it won’t save, you know, it won’t bring 
world peace and harmony, but you know, at least it’s going in the orderly 
direction, at least it’s going in a good direction.   
 
 
 
Arthur seemed to be living a life without goals, contemplating death, giving his interview a certain 
melancholy. A certain grim realism may present yet another strategy in rebuilding and maintaining a 
viable self; even if that self is without hope: 
Arthur: Oh well, I’m just stuck with myself, I guess I’m faced with the reality that I’ll 
probably be dead within five years, you know, so I guess anything is better 
than that I guess, I mean death’s a pretty final thing as far as anyone knows 
anyway. So, you know, I guess anything seems better than death, I guess, 
you know. So what can you do, you know. 
 
It was unclear in the interview why Arthur, at age 62, thought he would be dead in 5 years. 
 
 
Finally, Michael: revealed in his interview that a life goal was to make money. This was a singular 
response amongst interviewees; an interesting insight into one path towards rebuilding a sense of 
self.  
RS:  OK.  What makes you happy? 
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M: Um.  Fashion, my home, my family.  My job, money.  I love money, money 
makes me happy. 
 
Religion 
 
One theme that emerged strongly amongst a very small number of respondents was the importance 
of religion in rebuilding a sense of identity. Participating in religion – through religious services, 
providing a clear symbolic system or world-view, and, perhaps more importantly, religious group 
activities – could help the sufferer come to terms with his or her condition and, through the social 
activity important to symbolic interactionism, re-buiild his or her sense of identity.  
 
Although this would seem to be an important route to rebuilding a sense of identity, only one 
respondent – James – talked at length about the role of religion in his life. However, before 
examining James’s interview it is worth noting the generally positive view of religion held by Sally: 
RS:  Do you have faith or religion? 
Sally:  Have faith? 
RS:  Do you believe in God? 
Sally:  Um, yeah.   
RS: How do you reconcile, um, the fact that you’re sick and the fact that there’s 
a god? 
Sally: Um, I’m pretty happy, um, I go to church every week and um have no 
problem believing in God, you know, I don’t have the symptoms of 
schizophrenia at the moment so, yeah. [pause] I think my religion helps me. 
RS:  How does it help you? 
Sally: Um, like um, I feel comfortable.  Yeah.  Good things happen when I go to 
church and good feelings. 
 
 
 
Similarly Greg, who had converted to Islam relatively recently, spoke fairly positively of religion: 
 
RS:  OK.  And what does religion provide you with? 
Greg: Little bit of hope and um, it’s so hard when I’m feeling down to have faith.  
Yeah. 
 
 
 
179 
 
Where Sally and Greg experience happiness of a certain extent from going to Church, James has a 
significant amount of his life tied up with the institution. Indeed, James emphasises the social role 
Church has for him; one where he could engage in symbolic interaction with a group of people and 
one where it was generally known and accepted that he had schizophrenia. Indeed, Church seems to 
be a central feature of James’s life. Further, religion can provide James with a system of explanation 
in which his illness may be seen as part of “God’s plan”, or otherwise having specific meaning. The 
brief mention of Facebook returns to the side-theme of people using technology to return from 
schizophrenia: 
RS:  How many friends do you have? 
James: I’ve got heaps.  Um ... I’m Christian, I go to church and I’ve got a lot of friends 
from Church.  There’s a Monday afternoon group of people that I meet with 
on a regular basis and there’s a Tuesday evening group of people that I meet 
with on a regular basis and mostly those two groups are the same people 
but not completely.  Um, so there’s the friends from the Monday afternoon 
group and the Tuesday night group that I see every week or twice a week.  
Um, then I’ve got various other friends in the Church.  I play bass in the 
Church band and so I see the people who I play in the band with more often 
than other people in the Church because I’m with the same group of people 
each time so there’s these friends, um, then like with this Tuesday night 
group, Tuesday evening group, I’ve always been in a Tuesday evening group 
since I’ve been at the Church, but for one reason or another I’ve either 
changed groups or the group I’ve been in has disbanded so there’s been a 
couple of different groups I’ve been in so I’ve been friends with all the people 
from the groups I’ve been in previous to the one I’ve been in now and am still 
friends with those people if they’re still at the Church or even I’m Facebook 
friends with some of the people who left the Church and I don’t see very 
often.  Um, then there’s just friends that I just know from being at the Church 
for a long time so I see the same people and I’ve become friends with, 
particularly catching up with people on different um Christian ... on the 
Church camps or other opportunity or conferences… 
 
James goes on to emphasise the change in values that religious life has brought him – he is able to 
pursue compassion and non-earthly pursuits regardless of his schizophrenia; this provides a basis for 
rebuilding a sense of identity. He even claims to want to be like Jesus. In the opinion of the 
interviewer, this was a meaningful life goal rather than a delusion. An issue that has not been 
broached so far is that of the role model. It seems in a stigmatising society a person with the 
stigmatised condition could benefit from positive role models: 
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RS:  [W]hat helps you believe in yourself? 
James: [pause] um Well I think my Christian faith because um I don’t ... my highest 
values are not the things that the world values and so even if I’m not able to 
do things the way that society thinks it’s appropriate it doesn’t matter, 
because the things I can’t do are not the things I think are really valuable 
because of my Christian faith, so like for example I think my character is 
more important than my ability to socialise with really good etiquette for 
example. 
RS:  How would you describe your character? 
James: Well, um, I ... it’s ... I think I’ve got a good character but I am seeking to 
become like Jesus and I think that’s happening over time. 
RS:  How is Jesus?  What about Jesus is it that you want to become? 
James: Oh, there’s lots of things, I mean, um, Jesus was motivated by love, ah, he 
was completely forgiving, um, he never did anything out of revenge or 
seeking to hurt someone or put them down, um [pause], he was motivated 
to help people and make the world a better place. 
 
 
Analysis and Emergent Themes  
 
There are a number of emergent themes and significant lines of analysis that develop from this 
chapter. It is worth noting that some of the emergent themes echo those made in the last chapter. 
In particular, the emphasis on agency and negotiation with the psychiatric apparatus emerges 
strongly. We see a number of interviewees negotiating their medication, or resisting aspects of 
institutionalised or stigmatised identity. We also find a rejection of the one-way, top-down exercise 
of power. Again, the negotiated and consensual aspects of interaction with the psychiatric apparatus 
emerge, and indicate the need to conceptualise new forms of power in an era characterised by 
deinstitutionalisation and psychopharmacology. With agency and negotiation also comes a blurring 
of coercion and consent in some cases. The problem of symbolic interactionism dealing with 
emotions and embodied states also arises. The scale of the process of rebuilding a sense of identity 
stands to be as significant and intense as the disruption that came with the illness. Finally, we find 
that phenomenology, whilst accounting well for identity breakdown in schizophrenia, does not 
provide an adequate conceptualisation of rebuilding identity. Beyond these themes, however, the 
chapter gives rise to a number of important, distinct lines of analysis. 
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The first line of analysis relates to the near-ubiquity of medication as an intervention in the illness 
trajectory of people diagnosed with schizophrenia. Medication is simply seen as the first and most 
important means to dampen schizophrenic symptoms (American Psychiatric Association, 1997; 
Williams et al., 1999; Lehman et al., 2004, Sadock and Sadock, 2007; Busch et al., 2009; Hope and 
Keks, 2015). The importance of medication is reinforced throughout this Chapter; almost all 
interviewees could discuss their medical regime. Some even had enough insight into their condition 
and familiarity with the effects of medication that they could negotiate their medication with their 
psychiatrists. The ubiquity of medication is important to themes both of rebuilding a sense of 
identity and the power exercised over the person diagnosed with schizophrenia. In terms of identity, 
the emphasis on medication tends to imply that the person’s mental state could not only be affected 
by medication but was constituted by the kind of biochemical phenomena that medication could 
influence. Put differently, they experienced themselves as medical identities – as a person who takes 
medication. More fundamentally, they understood their identity as the result of biochemical 
processes in the brain amenable to medication. In this sense, a “neurochemical self” had arrived. In 
terms of power, the ubiquity of medication implies the power of the psychopharmaceutical complex 
to create and define treatment of schizophrenia. The complex has not only colonised the practice of 
psychiatry in relation to people diagnosed with schizophrenia, it has reached into the very identity of 
the sufferer. 
 
The second line of analysis relates to the uses of symbolic interactionism. Symbolic interactionism 
proves an adaptable and useful tool with which to analyse processes of rebuilding a sense of 
identity, and the activities that aid and abet it. In particular, the symbolic interactionist model of 
“self as process” is vital to our understanding of rebuilding identity itself as a process. Symbolic 
interactionism also provides something of a model towards which the process of rebuilding identity 
can strive – a social self that can interact with others, that understands the meaning of its own 
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interaction, and can take on the viewpoint or attitude of the general other. The focus on the 
inevitably social nature of the self is supported by the various social activities that contribute to 
processes of rebuilding identity and that subjects describe in their interviews; activities such as 
interaction with family and friends, visits by mental health workers, and time spent at such mental 
health support organisations as the Leisure Centre. The idea that different parts of the self may 
emerge in different circumstances is also strong; in rebuilding the self, the active patient usually 
interacts comfortably with a range of people in different circumstances. As a reversal of this concept, 
some of the more isolated interviewees would not seem to have the chance to project different 
aspects of identity in different situations, and this may threaten processes of rebuilding a sense of 
identity. The focus on meaning as the product of interaction is also useful as it allows us to analyse 
the meaningful expressions of people diagnosed with schizophrenia – not only the interview 
transcripts themselves, but also the illness narratives sufferers may create (and which are 
considered further below).  
 
A third line of analysis, developing from the first, is the sheer significance interaction played in the 
process of rebuilding a sense of identity. The scope for such interaction was wide. It included the 
interactions noted above – interactions with family and friends, with employers, with psychiatrists 
and mental health workers, and with segments of the community in mental health support 
organisations as the Leisure Centre, or the church. This line of analysis is significant because it 
suggests that some of the key areas affected by certain schizophrenic symptoms – that of reading 
emotional cues, projecting affect, and maintaining meaningful interaction – are in fact closely tied to 
recovery from schizophrenia. The illness thus undermines the self, even when the sufferer may wish 
to recover. Such an insight reinforces the point made in the previous chapter, that schizophrenia can 
prove a vital disruption to the self. 
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Just as interaction seems to have broad significance for rebuilding a sense of identity, so too do 
practical measures that may not appear significant from a strictly medical perspective. By “practical 
measures” this thesis refers to such behaviours as sourcing medication, travelling to see 
psychiatrists, working for money, goal setting, living happily with family members, managing 
finances and so forth. Such activities would not seem to have a direct medical or biochemical impact 
upon schizophrenia. However, the data presented here tends to suggest that these activities are 
significant to the process of rebuilding a sense of identity. We may take the example of working as a 
practical activity. Work provides a venue for social interaction and a distraction from ongoing 
symptoms. It offers a sense of purpose and achievement. And, of course, it provides money for the 
living of a more comfortable life. We can thus perhaps make the argument that sociological factors 
are perhaps sometimes under-developed in medical analyses of recovery from schizophrenia, 
although employment is seen as a positive goal for many psychiatrists. The response to this situation 
should be to recognise such sociological factors. In particular, we must use a more rounded picture 
of the person diagnosed with schizophrenia. Whilst his or her symptoms may prove the reason for 
his or her diagnosis and treatment, and constitute the nature of disruption of his or her experience, 
he or she nevertheless must also go through the practical activities of a well person to fully inhabit 
and express their identity. We may also make the observation that partaking in these practical 
measures also takes the sufferer out of the sphere of influence of the psychiatric profession. 
Although they may still need help to engage in these activities, and such help may come from mental 
health workers, they nevertheless are aiming towards living a life of independence. 
 
Just as interaction and practical management of day-to-day issues prove important, so too is the use 
of specific forms of language. This thesis identifies three important uses of language by people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, and these uses are analysed in depth in Chapter 9. However, we may 
make some preliminary analysis of these uses of language. The first such use lies in illness narratives 
told by sufferers. It would seem such narratives help the person diagnosed with schizophrenia make 
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sense of their illness experience, an often chaotic time. In some sense they heal the “temporal 
breach” caused by biographical disruption, or even biographical crisis. The second use lies in the 
adoption of psychiatric discourse in describing the nature of the sufferer’s experience. Using this 
language clearly implies the reach and influence of the psychiatric profession; from a Foucauldian 
perspective, subjects have adopted the discourse of the disciplinary institution, and involved 
themselves in a complex web of power/knowledge. Such use also may play two important, but 
perhaps slightly contradictory roles. On the one hand, use of psychiatric terminology, along with 
knowledge of medication, may help a person diagnosed with schizophrenia to make sense of his or 
her illness trajectory and experience. On the other hand, the very formality of psychiatric discourse 
may help the sufferer objectify their illness, or create a formal distance between the psychiatric 
reification of illness and their specific, various personal experiences. Finally, we find that some 
interviewees describe themselves as “consumers”. This language use again has multiple 
significances. On the one hand, the term itself does not speak of illness, stigma or disability – it 
escapes psychiatric discourse and allows the sufferer to describe him or herself in less stigmatised 
terms. On the other hand, the term tends to imply that the person diagnosed with schizophrenia is 
“consuming” a mental health “product”. The term thus suggests that the sufferer seeking medical 
help is actually participating in a market for mental health goods. This, in turn, serves to help justify 
the power and influence of the psychopharmaceutical complex. This complex has not only colonised 
psychiatry, it has infiltrated the consumers’ rights movement. 
 
Moving on from language use – a personal and expressive aspect of the illness experience – this 
chapter also addresses issues of power and social structure. The first issue to be dealt with in this 
context is deinstitutionalisation. It was clear that almost all interviewees had in fact spent at least 
some time in a clinic or hospital, but had ended up residing with family or, in some cases, living 
alone. Whilst it is true that many interviewees were visited fairly frequently by mental health 
workers, they still spent an inordinate amount of time without interaction; without socialisation.  
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Such a situation speaks to the pervasive isolation felt by many interviewees. The 
deinstitutionalisation of the mental health sector must be understood as a vital historical process 
leading to this situation. In many cases isolation was expounded by family members who did not 
understand, and sometimes did not accept, their relative’s illness. One must assume that these 
relatives had not been provided with the resources or information necessary to support a family 
member diagnosed with schizophrenia. This situation of deinstitutionalised care has important 
implications for the discussion of power in the thesis. It suggests that the power of the psychiatric 
apparatus is no longer exercised within one or two spaces – the psychiatrist’s office and the asylum 
– but is more dispersed, capillary. It suggests that perhaps psychiatric power is being delegated 
outwards from primary players in the psychiatric apparatus. It also suggests, more broadly, that 
society itself still stigmatises schizophrenia to a significant degree, and has not yet made a real 
commitment to effective in-community care. Indeed, we may look to the statistic related at the 
beginning of this thesis – that something like one in one hundred people will develop schizophrenia 
– and wonder why so little is being done about a problem so vast. 
 
The chapter also implies other issues of social structure. The most obvious issue lies in the 
recognition of the power and influence of the psychiatric apparatus. We have already seen that 
diagnosis – a key interaction with the apparatus – may have important impacts upon the identity of 
the person diagnosed with schizophrenia. The fact that interviewees continued to see their 
psychiatrists or other representatives of the psychiatric apparatus regularly again attests to the 
power of this institution. However, as we have seen, this power may be dispersed in a 
deinstitutionalised era. Whilst interviewees still generally spent some time in clinics or wards, and 
experienced some of the identity-shaping and power effects of such institutions, they had all been 
released into the community at the time of interviewing. For many the only contact with the 
psychiatric apparatus (for some, the social world) was constituted by visits from mental health 
workers. In such a context we must reassess traditional pictures of power exercised by psychiatry; 
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the social control thesis and critique of asylums and disciplinary institutions must give way to 
concepts of newer forms of power. These are explored towards the end of Chapter 9. 
 
We have noted the gendered division of labour James relied upon in order to deal with some of the 
more practical aspects of daily living. One may assume, in a patriarchal society, that such division of 
labour probably still exists for some people diagnosed with schizophrenia living with family or 
partners. The gendered nature of the experience of schizoid illness would seem to provide several 
interesting avenues for future research. More broadly, the family unit seemed to play an important 
role in the process of rebuilding a sense of identity for many interviewees. This was evidenced by the 
fact that interviewees such as Prescott, who appeared to be living with their illness more 
successfully, had strong relationships with their family. Likewise, the experience of family 
breakdown in emotional or physical violence often seemed to intensify the disruption caused by the 
illness and had a negative impact on the process of rebuilding identity. Along similar lines, it has 
been argued that a surfeit of “expressed emotion” in the family of the person with schizophrenia can 
lead to less positive recovery outcomes (Brown et al., 1972; Leff, 1995; Lopez et al., 2009). 
 
The importance of work towards the process of rebuilding a sense of identity also merits analysis. 
We have noted that work often provides a venue for social interaction, a distraction from ongoing 
symptoms and sense of purpose and achievement for people diagnosed with schizophrenia. In terms 
of identity, we may say in an economy with advanced division of labour and where work is seen to 
be vital towards general identity formation, it should come as no surprise that successfully holding 
down a job, or jobs, played an important role in the process of rebuilding identity for people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia. We may also ask the question of political economics whether there is 
room for work for people with mental illness in a fiercely competitive, deregulated economy? 
Certainly the data suggests that when sufferers did find work, it was generally menial in nature. This 
may of course be dictated to some extent by the fact that the illness schizophrenia can decrease 
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cognitive ability. On the other hand, issues of stigma must also play some part in the difficulty 
people with such a stigmatised condition experience when seeking more challenging work.  
 
In terms of social structure, we may also note the theme that many interviewees had spent time 
with organisations geared towards support of people with mental illness. The fact that at least two 
interviewees had visited the Leisure Centre – an organisation for mental health support and 
entertainment – is significant. It points to and reaffirms the observation made by Goffman that 
people with stigmatised identities will often seek out people with similar stigmatic conditions. It also 
makes sense that people suffering the kind of isolation described above would seek out social 
interaction; even if it were compromised by the fact that it is not with the general community but 
with a small segment sharing a lived experience of mental illness. Visiting such centres may also be 
read as an attempt by the sufferer of schizophrenia to move in a social world beyond the psychiatric 
apparatus; a world characterised not by stigma, or the stern rule of the clinic, but by mutual respect 
and a non-judgmental atmosphere. It may be interesting to note at this point that at least one 
interviewee, James, seemed to find such a non-judgmental community in his church. 
 
The final theme to emerge from the data of this chapter is the importance of hope and despair. 
Hope certainly seemed to be an important part of the process of rebuilding a sense of identity for 
many interviewees. Whilst it is true that some interviewees adopted a grimly realistic approach to 
their own lives and goal setting, other interviewees typically hoped to one day lead a “normal” life, 
to work, to marry, to have a family. Hope was expressed in the personal goals set by many 
interviewees, even (or especially) if those goals seemed unlikely to be achieved. Hope for a better 
day seemed to offer some motivation to people, positivity at the prospect of something greater. 
Such hope may be religious; a hope for salvation.  Of course, the flip side of hope was despair, and at 
least a few interviewees spoke of moments of darkness. It is in such an emotional context that we 
may breach the issue of suicide. It is documented that people with schizophrenia have a far higher 
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rate of attempting suicide than the societal average. Suicide attempts, the ultimate negation of all 
identity, of rebuilding and maintain a sense of identity, appeared as dark chapters in many of the 
illness narratives spoken by interviewees. Indeed, the stories of those diagnosed with schizophrenia 
who successfully committed suicide are generally shrouded by sadness and an impenetrable 
darkness; these are stories that are not being told and, perhaps, can never be. 
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CHAPTER 8 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Results: Maintaining Identity  
 
 
 
Schizophrenia is a highly stigmatised condition and, other than processes discussed in the previous 
chapter, people diagnosed with schizophrenia must often go to great lengths to protect a 
stigmatised identity. To this end, this chapter draws particularly on the account of identity 
management given by Goffman (1963) in Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. The 
chapter focuses on such processes as dividing friends into those who “know” and “don’t know”, as 
well as “passing” as normal in social situations and “concealing” stigma symbols such as paranoia or 
weak emotional perception. In many cases, passing and concealing involve respondents 
compensating or actively dissembling their condition. In some cases social isolation is such that 
respondents do not even have the opportunity to seek to pass or conceal. 
 
Passing, Compensating and Isolation 
 
Typically respondents would tell family of their condition, but generally not friends. This confirms 
Goffman’s observation that stigmatised people will often divide their social world into a small group 
who knows and a large group who do not. Caitlin, for example, would not tell her few friends of her 
condition. Caitlin is also interesting, and again confirms Goffman’s analysis, in that she would only 
readily disclose her condition to another person in similar circumstances.  
Caitlin: Well, unless people have got a similar illness, you don’t tell them you got an 
illness.  You don’t mention it. I don’t.  Um, if I had a friend who didn’t have a 
mental illness I would not tell that friend that I’ve got a mental illness.  
That’s the way I am.  Yeah, so. Yeah. 
 
In other situations she would seek to pass as “normal”.  However, Caitlin led a very solitary life and 
would not have had frequent opportunities to pass. Caitlin also confirms Goffman’s analysis in the 
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sense that she has sought out a group of people with similar stigma. Such groups would offer the 
opportunity to interact with other people without needing to pass or conceal stigma symbols, whilst 
participating in “everyday” activities they may otherwise avoid: 
Caitlin: I used to go to a place which is called the Leisure Club which is a house for 
people with mental illness go there and spend the day. Have you heard of 
places like that?... Well you go there and you have lunch there, you buy your 
lunch, you do arts and crafts, you go on outings, ten pin bowling or you go to 
the beach. 
 
Furthermore, Caitlin confirms Goffman’s insight that people with stigma may withdraw from social 
interaction, often losing friends; particularly ones who also suffered schizophrenia. Such withdrawal 
may occur as a foreseeable process in people whose ability to interact is compromised by their 
illness and its symptoms: 
RS:  Do you have friends? 
Caitlin: No, friends, I’ve just lost touch with.  I used to go out with her and everything 
but not anymore, she got sick, she’s got schizophrenia and we’ve never got 
back together again as friends. 
 
 
 
Greg also visited a drop-in centre for a time, but ultimately rejected it for the reason that it was “full 
of sick people”. This action is contrary to Goffman’s insight that stigmatised people may seek to 
spend time with people sharing a stigmatised identity. It may also show a resistance to stigma; in 
particular, a resistance to an externally imposed identity: 
RS:  And are there any places that you go to spend time with other people? 
Greg:  Like a drop in centre? 
RS:  Yes. 
Greg:  Um, I used to but I don’t want to go anymore. 
RS:  Why not? 
Greg: They’re just ......pause...... I don’t know, full of sick people.  I wanna try to 
stay away.  Yeah. 
 
 
Arthur is very conscious of how he is perceived, arguing that he is not perceived as ill by people who 
do not know him, but accepting that people who know him well can probably identify something is 
“different”.  What does this say about stigma? At one level it represents an internalisation of an 
external point of view; we may thus make a link to symbolic interactionism’s focus on internalisation 
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of the perspective of the other. It may also show how serious stigma instigates the futility a person 
diagnosed with schizophrenia may experience at the scale of the task of illness management. Arthur 
is not confident in his ability to pass or conceal stigma symbols. This, amongst other factors, leads 
him to live a solitary life where his sense of self has little opportunity to be maintained. This is 
perhaps a common experience amongst people with severe schizophrenia, bringing, as it does, 
flattened affect, difficulties in maintaining conversation and weak emotional perception, not-to-
mention side-effects of medication that may include tremors, excess saliva production and weight 
gain: 
Arthur: I think increasingly over the years, people have come to see me as something 
pretty sub-normal, generally, you know, but it varies from where I go, I 
suppose, you know, if I’m just walking down the street or shopping centre, I 
don’t suppose people see me much different as someone else, but the 
neighbours in the street, it’s quite clear that they see me as something 
unusual, you know, so, you know, and people who see me on a regular basis 
obviously see me as something unusual.   
 
Arthur is clearly highly conscious of the views of neighbours, the social other, who reinforce his   
sense of his own stigma; that is to say, his hyper-awareness reinforces self-stigma. 
 
 
We have seen that some respondents use the term “consumer” to describe themselves. The term 
may also be understood as an attempt to escape the stigma that accompanies the terms 
“schizophrenia” and “schizophrenic”. Whilst this is a strong example of stigma management, it also 
enjoins the personal interaction to larger, “macro” features of society. We have already noted the 
connection between the term consumer and the creation of a consumer marketplace for medicine, 
implying the power of the psychopharmaceutical complex. The use of such a term to deflect stigma 
also shows that people may internalise the stigmatic view of the other, whilst also constituting a 
winding-back of control over one’s self-description: 
PM …it’s a bit of strange situation, all the consumers together like that, because 
there is obviously that locked area that they don’t let you in and you got to 
stay inside the locked area they keep you in and you have to relate to people. 
So, you can’t just run away. 
RS:  You called them consumers? 
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Prescott: Yeah, that was what I thought as being the most recent description of 
somebody with my condition.  A mental health consumer. 
 
 
 
Peter also describes his social isolation, even admitting that such isolation may in fact worsen 
psychotic symptoms, rather than (or as well as) providing a space where the person with 
schizophrenia does not need to pass or conceal. This certainly emphasises the role of social 
interaction as a core element of identity maintenance: 
Peter: Um, no I’ve been living on my own for many many many years, um, you 
know, extreme amounts of time, I’ve been living on my own and that sort of 
brings isolation in and the schizophrenia tends to play up with me living on 
my own and I tend to think people are out to get me and all that sort of 
thing. 
 
Peter also admits the severe stigma of schizophrenia; perhaps the driving factor behind his isolation. 
He does not – indeed, perhaps cannot – seek to challenge the structural features of society that 
create this stigma, although he does register a sense of the unfairness or hurtfulness of such stigma: 
Peter: Oh, people, a lot of people out there who are so called normal, um, those 
people tend to have a misinterpretation of people with mental illness.  They 
seem to think we are nutcases or fruitcakes or whatever ... 
 
When not isolated, it seems that Peter seeks to compensate for symptoms he may be experiencing. 
More specifically, he tries to be aware of his own tendency to paranoia. Such compensation is a 
conscious, ongoing work of stigma management, a form of concealment fitting comfortably into 
Goffman’s analysis. We may also draw a connection here to Rose’s argument that in neoliberal 
states a system of governmentality exists that seeks processes for people to “maximise normality”: 
Peter: Compensate?  Um, compensate, um, yeah well always trying to, trying to put 
it in perspective all the time, so, I’m always trying to put it in perspective, so 
um, compensate, yeah. I guess I am compensating in that I sort of try to 
ignore when it seems as though people are talking about me and that sort of 
thing, I try to ignore it and say it’s my illness.  
 
Peter’s compensation involves insight into his condition. We have seen the significance placed upon 
insight by the psychiatric apparatus as a key step in recovery. It would seem, judging by the insight 
into their illness held by the majority of respondents, that insight is also a primary step in preserving 
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some sense of identity, although it may have been the sufferers with more insight that self-selected 
as interview subjects, and this may affect the direction of the data. This emphasis oninsight would 
also certainly chime with the importance many psychiatrists place on insight as vital to the healing 
process of people with schizophrenia. Insight into one’s self, and the perception of one’s self by 
others, would also seem to be pre-conditions of stigma management: 
 RS:  What does the insight feel like? 
Peter: It feels good, because at least I know that getting strange ideas, ah and uh 
people talk about me, at least I can look at it and say that they’re obviously, 
they’re not saying that um, they’re saying something else and um 
interpreting it differently. 
 
 
 
Like Caitlin earlier, Danielle makes a point of concealing her illness, confirming Goffman’s analysis. 
Danielle differs from Caitlin, however, in that she works regularly and did not report experiencing 
ongoing symptoms, whereas Caitlin experienced hearing negative voices. This may again point to the 
significance of social interaction as a basis for identity maintenance. Alternatively, it may reveal that 
the extent to which one may manage stigma is affected by the intensity of schizophrenia symptoms. 
She also does not seem as concerned whether people knew she “has something”: 
Danielle: I don’t tell anyone really, that I’ve got schizophrenia.  I just assume that 
people at work know that I have something.  I think not everyone knows but 
some people know that I have it.  Yeah, I don’t really tell anyone that I have 
schizophrenia. 
 
 
 
Greg also compensates for his illness, to the point of admitting he was concentrating during the 
interview. Again, the strength of symptoms affects the sufferer’s ability to manage his or her 
interactions and maintain identity: 
RS: When you have, when you meet people, do you have to compensate for 
what’s going on in your head? 
Greg:  How?  Concentrate more? 
RS:  Concentrate more. 
Greg:  Yes, yes. 
RS:  So what do you do when you concentrate more? 
Greg:  Just really listen intently and focus, try to focus.   
RS:  Yeah.  Are you doing that now? 
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Greg:  Most of the interview. 
 
 
 
The importance of passing is made clear by Michael, who focuses on self-delivery and self-
presentation. Indeed, careful self-presentation by Michael seemed to be his primary strategy, not 
only at passing, but to maintain a sense of self-worth: 
 
Michael: I’m just well aware of myself, I’m just a nice person. 
RS:  OK. 
Michael: That’s what I think, I deliver myself well, I dress well, I speak well. 
 
 
 
Passing is essentially a form of self-presentation. An interesting insight into passing and self-
presentation is made by James, who discusses the importance of etiquette and learned self-
presentation – also a form of symbolic interaction. We may at this point expand on Goffman’s 
account to emphasise the need of sufferers to learn new forms of behaviour management in light of 
the unexpected disruption of schizophrenia: 
James:  Just ... every now and then, it didn’t actually happen very often, it just, every 
now and then I would be aware that I wasn’t within the social norm and I’d 
feel like I was a, yeah, a bit strange .... 
RS:  Was there anything that reinforced that feeling? 
James: Not being familiar with etiquette, like, um, my parents didn’t bring me up 
with all the things that a lot of people in our society regard as etiquette, so 
when I would stumble in these areas, it would make me feel a bit strange as 
well.  Even though that didn’t actually have anything to do with the 
schizophrenia. But I would still feel a bit strange. 
 
James echoes earlier themes in that he would guard against telling too many people: 
 
James: Um [pause] I’ve never had to hide it, um, there’s people that I haven’t told, 
um, there’s people who I’ve known who I’ve thought made more superficial 
judgements about people that I just chose not to tell.  Um, I never felt like I 
had to hide it but I felt like it was a good idea in a number of cases.   
 
 
 
We have seen in the previous chapter the effects of over-compensation by James, so his story will 
not be re-told here. However, Robert gives us a detailed insight (to use a term already emphasised) 
into his condition and the forms of compensation he engages in. His compensation seems to be both 
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external and internal; he recognises the significance of behaviours such as yoga, meditation and 
sleep to a “healthier” sense of self. His story also attests to the role of others in supporting and 
directing stigma management behaviours. Robert certainly appeared at the time of interview to 
have a relatively strong sense of identity.  
Robert: I think part of um compensating for my illness is knowing what’s good for 
me, yoga, meditation, good food, good sleep um supportive people in my life 
who are going to be honest with me, um and who aren’t going to condone 
bad behaviour by me when they see it, not that I do it all the time, but you 
know, sometimes I can say things or do things because I’m not thinking 
properly and I’m not considering the outcomes for other people, um, yeah 
and who aren’t necessarily gonna be overly critical. 
RS: So when you say talking about considering outcomes, are you kind of 
compensating for things that you might do wrong? 
Robert: Yeah, yeah, I’d certainly be mindful that, you know, if I think, if I consider 
that people may be as sensitive as me, I think that’s a good starting place, 
um, you know, if I give them due considerations so that, you know, I’m on 
time, I’m polite, I’m courteous, 
 
Robert confirms the impact of the stigma of schizophrenia, recognising its historical and social 
embeddedness: 
Robert:  I would be um in blissful ignorance if I didn’t also acknowledge the effect 
that it’s had on my family and my friends and my social group and the 
stigma - you know mental health in the last 10 years has come a long way 
but, you know, 25 years ago, there was a lot of stigma.  Still is around um 
mental health and schizophrenia, crikey, that’s a bit red-hot.   
 
Robert clearly knew the stigma of terms like “schizophrenia” or, in the following excerpt, “sufferers”.  
We may also draw attention to the fact that he describes himself as “psychotic on occasion” and 
gets a better response than revealing full-blown schizophrenia. This is clearly a sophisticated form of 
self presentation and another form of passing as more “normal” than he would otherwise be judged. 
This will also prove important in an analysis of the significance of language use in and around 
schizophrenia, by sufferers and others: 
 
Robert: I went once to the Schizophrenia Fellowship meeting and it really surprised 
me and they said, they were at the registration table and they said um, you 
know, are you a doctor, are you a nurse, or where do you fit so that we can 
charge you the right amount and I said “oh I’ve just got schizophrenia” and 
they said “you are a sufferer ...”.  You know, and I thought, OK, I suffer from 
schizophrenia and that’s OK.  You know it’s, um, it, I don’t necessarily use the 
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word a lot because it’s got so much attachment to it and emotional 
attachment and I find, you know, um, where if you just say “I’m psychotic on 
occasion” they, you know, it’s more easily digestible.  It just, schizophrenia, 
you know, for other people who suffer I’m able to talk about it quite openly, 
um, but for people who have got their own baggage around that stuff, I’d 
probably say, you know, I suffer from psychosis on occasion and that’s, that’s 
a bit more digestible. 
 
 
In some cases of stigma, as explored in Chapter 3, stigma becomes absorbed by the subject to the 
detriment of their sense of self. This enforcement of an external view onto the sufferer’s subjectivity 
may appear unfortunate or unfair. Nathan, and one must assume many diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, simply does not have the skills of identity projection necessary to contradict stigma. 
Nathan experienced a loss of self-esteem and, again, a related loneliness and social isolation: 
RS:  What happened to your self esteem? 
Nathan: Well, it went down, um, I worked for a while, I worked until 2007 and I went 
from job to job lacking any meaningful lasting friendships with anyone.  
Always seen as a crazy guy and became quite lonely, quite lonely actually 
and um, after I was diagnosed with schizophrenia, I became lonely… 
RS:  OK.  Are you still lonely? 
Nathan: Um, well there is my mum in the room but I get lonely usually Friday nights 
and Saturdays, uh, Monday through to Friday is usually meetings with case 
managers, um, psychiatrists and psychotherapists and the PHaMs meetings 
and then my birds, which you can hear cheeping away in the backgrounds, 
they keep me company as well. 
 
Despite this self-stigma, however, Nathan still attempts “passing” behaviour:  
  
Nathan: I try and present myself as someone with taste, um, calm, I thank the bus 
driver, I say hello to the bus driver, I’m not one of those people who’ll talk on 
the bus to other bus patrons and loud and stuff like that, I’m known by the 
locals and um, some people would walk right past me and act like they don’t 
even know me, but um, then there are some people that walk up and say 
“Hi, how you’re going?” and give me a tap on the shoulder and say “Oh, I 
hope you’re doing well.”. 
 
 
Analysis and Emergent Themes  
 
There are a number of emergent themes and significant lines of analysis that develop from this 
chapter. As observed early in the chapter, many of the behaviours relevant to the process of 
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rebuilding a sense of identity are also significant to identity maintenance. In particular, the 
significance of ongoing interaction to self-maintenance emerged in this chapter. Such interaction 
typically gave people diagnosed with schizophrenia the opportunity to engage in the process of 
rebuilding identity and, evidently, identity maintenance. Such interaction could be with friends, 
family, the community or even mental health workers. As we will see below, isolation and the lack of 
opportunity to practice stigma management techniques may have compromised identity 
maintenance in some interviewees. The use of specific language also emerged as a theme in identity 
management. In particular, the (loaded) term “consumer” was used by a number of interviewees to 
avoid the more stigmatised word “schizophrenic” or “mentally ill”. The term “schizophrenic” is a 
loaded one. Its use to describe someone who has been diagnosed with schizophrenia suggests that 
the illness constitutes the totality of their identity; they do not “have” schizophrenia”, they are 
“schizophrenic”. As an alternative, “consumer” fares a little better, although we have already seen 
the significance of the word consumer, particularly in relation to the power of the 
psychopharmaceutical complex, and that analysis will not be repeated here. 
 
The dominant theme to emerge from this chapter is a general confirmation of Goffman’s analysis as 
an account of stigma management, and identity maintenance. We have seen such behaviours as 
dividing the social world into those that know and don’t know, passing, and concealment. We may 
begin our analysis of this point with the suggestion that Rose’s description of people 
“reconceptualis[ing] themselves in terms of their own will to be healthy, to enjoy a maximised 
normality” may include Goffman’s stigma management behaviours. In relation to dividing the social 
world, we note that most interviewees were cautious about who they told about their diagnosed 
condition. Caitlin, for example, was careful about disclosing her condition, but was happy to attend 
the Leisure Club, an organisation we have seen that provides social space for people with severe 
mental illness. On the other hand, the theme of attending social spaces with people who share a 
stigmatised condition was contradicted by Greg, who negatively described such spaces as “full of sick 
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people”. Perhaps the very stigma that some people seek to evade in such organisations also proves 
to be a dis-incentive to others attending.  The chapter further suggests that not only are passing and 
concealment close to ubiquitous, but may often overlap in the behaviours of interviewees. The data 
indicates that insight, that important quality in recovery and rebuilding a sense of identity, may also 
play a vital role in passing and concealing. In particular, a realisation of one’s own paranoia or faulty 
judgment may help the person diagnosed with schizophrenia “correct” his or her judgment and 
better pass for normal or conceal his or her condition. The intensity of symptoms may also play 
some role in passing and concealment. Those with particularly intense symptoms may find it difficult 
to manage stigma. This is perhaps a problem made more significant by the particular impact of 
schizophrenia affecting, as it often does, ability to socialise and negotiate social situations. Finally, 
the chapter also suggests a connection between successful self-management and self-esteem; this 
connection is suggested strongly by Michael’s statement that “I deliver myself well, I dress well, I 
speak well”. 
 
Another strong theme in this chapter, and indeed in the data as a whole, lies in the relative isolation 
many interviewees lived in. Many, for example, had few to no friends, and might only be visited at 
intervals by mental health workers. As observed in previous chapters, such isolation must be 
understood as a result of a deinstitutionalised mental health sector. What are we to make of this 
isolation, however, in relation to Goffman’s analysis? Certainly isolation kept interviewees in a 
situation where they did not have to manage stigma; did not have to pass, or conceal or divide the 
social world. On the other hand, social isolation radically reduced the opportunities to interact with 
others. As we have seen, this lack of interaction can have an important impact upon rebuilding a 
sense of identity, and has a similar impact on identity maintenance.  As observed above, sufferers 
simply do not have the opportunity to develop stigma management skills. Finally, the fact of 
isolation highlights  the importance of other people in supporting and nurturing the sufferer’s ability 
to manage his or her stigma.  
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The chapter also points to the importance of the internalisation of stigma by some interviewees. 
Interviewees would see themselves as less capable or less worthy. Some interviewees seemed to 
despair at the futility of facing societal stigma. Such a finding is not entirely predicted by Goffman’s 
analysis. The finding also suggests the sheer size and scale of the social powers that reinforce stigma. 
It is in relation to this observation that we may look to the final emergent theme of the chapter – the 
relationship between illness management and larger issues of power and social structure. We have 
seen that deinstitutionalisation may lead to a situation where the person diagnosed with 
schizophrenia has few opportunities to practice stigma management. We have seen, in a previous 
chapter, that stigma may negatively affect the sufferer’s ability to find gainful employment. We have 
also seen how the scale of stigma can lead to an internalisation of stigma. Perhaps we may also find 
space to recognise the efforts that some interviewees went to avoid, or even contradict, stigma. In 
this sense the progressive illness narratives offered by Ralph may be seen, not only as stigma 
management, but also as a resistance to stigma. Finally, it is a difficult question whether 
psychiatrists themselves reinforce or reduce stigma through their interactions with the diagnosed 
patient. Perhaps the very fact that one has to visit a psychiatrist tends to attract stigma associated 
with mental illness – he, or she, is “nuts” or “crazy” or “loony”. Perhaps also, in the sense given by 
the social control thesis and labelling theory, the experience of visiting a psychiatrist and being 
diagnosed helps constitute someone with the stigmatised identity of “mentral patient”. Certainly the 
attempt to use non-medical terms like “consumer” may suggest that the psychiatric view is 
stigmatising. This may form a question for future research.   
200 
 
CHAPTER 9 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Discussion of Results 
 
 
 
This chapter seeks to test the theoretical frameworks developed in earlier chapters against the 
results of interviews we have seen. The chapter explores themes that emerge from analysis of these 
interviews and seeks to test the limits of existing concepts and frameworks against them. The 
chapter draws upon results showing the intense disruption to identity that schizophrenia can cause. 
In light of the intensity of this disruption, the concept of “biographical crisis” is proposed. The 
chapter moves on to a multifaceted discussion of the main theoretical framework of the thesis, 
Symbolic Interactionism. This discussion brings out previously submerged, or even lacking, elements 
within Symbolic Interactionist thought. This includes both a focus on the need for Symbolic 
Interactionism to provide an account of dysfunctional identity, as well as the emotional and 
embodied elements of identity-related processes emergent in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Taking up the 
theme of an embodied self, the chapter then reflects upon phenomenological accounts of identity 
disruption and rebuilding. In particular, the discussion suggests that rebuilding a sense of identity 
has not been adequately theorised from a phenomenological perspective, and suggests relevant 
new concepts such as “ontological renovation”. The uses of language by participants is then 
examined, particularly, in terms of power and agency. The significance of use of terms such as 
“consumer” is a case in point, linking as it does the protective self-description by respondents to 
conceptions of mental health services as products in a neoliberal economy. The theme of power and 
agency flows into the next section, which seeks to interrogate Foucauldian account of mental health 
institutions in a deinstitutionalised context. The concept of “negotiated power networks” engaged in 
by respondents is suggested and explored as a way to move the Foucauldian account forward. The 
theme of agency again emerges in the final concept developed in the chapter – “identity work”. The 
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concept is suggested as a broad way to capture the various behaviours respondents engage in to re-
buiild and maintain their identity. 
 
Emergent Themes 
 
In Chapter 6, the emergent theme of personal disruption was dominant; a biographical disruption 
generally caused by the development of schizophrenia, diagnosis, hospitalisation and relapse. The 
chapter noted the deteriorated thinking that can be caused by schizophrenia, as well as the use of 
narrative to make sense of complex experiences. In many cases, diagnosis was a turning point in the 
illness, coming to some as a threat and others a relief. In any case, the near-ubiquity of consensual 
relationships with a psychiatrist was evident. Dual diagnosis was noted as a problem facing the 
analysis of the experience of schizophrenia. The practice of scheduling or enforced treatment is 
noted as a negative experience by relevant subjects. Finally, phenomenological theory was explored 
as a means to comprehend breakdown of embodied self in the case of schizophrenia. 
 
In Chapter 7, emergent themes of the importance of medication as prescribed by a psychiatrist were 
highly significant. Such medication typically reduces symptoms to the extent that rebuilding identity 
could take place. Medication could also be seen as a form of social control and often had significant 
side-effects. Another significant theme was the importance of symbolic interaction with others, 
which could take place with members of the public, mental health workers, mental health support 
groups, friends and family. Typically the relationship of the interviewee with family members was 
the most important in rebuilding identity; families could provide or withhold emotional and practical 
support. An accompanying, if contrary, theme was the prevalent social isolation experienced by 
many interviewees. For these interviewees, the infrequent interaction with mental health workers 
provided an entire social existence. The engagement with psychiatrists is significant in that in almost 
all cases it was regular and consensual, although many interviewees practiced some form of 
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negotiation over their treatment. In many cases, interviewees adopted psychiatric language to 
describe their experiences. The element of goal setting in life management also emerged as 
significant, although in some cases goals set seemed unrealistic. Work was important for many 
respondents, both as something intrinsically satisfying and as a form of interaction with others. 
Interestingly, of those interviewees who worked or professed a desire to work, work in the mental 
health sector was emphasised. Finally, engaging in religious practice seemed to give hope and the 
opportunity of non-judgmental social interaction to a few interviewees who engaged in such 
practice.   
 
Chapter 8 explored the means by which people diagnosed with schizophrenia maintained their 
identity. The chapter focused on passing for normal and concealing stigmatising symbols of 
schizophrenia as forms of identity maintenance. In some cases concealing would involve 
compensating for specific symptoms, such as paranoia or inability to read social cues. The theme of 
dividing the social world into those “who knew” (typically family) and those who did not emerged. 
Likewise the chapter uncovered the fact that a significant number of interviewees attended groups 
with similar illnesses, and would use the term “consumer” to refer to themselves, in large part to 
escape the stigma of the term “schizophrenic”. 
 
Biographical Crisis 
 
As noted in the Theory Chapters, and reinforced in Chapter 6, schizophrenia is an illness that can 
bring intense disruption of a person’s sense of self and identity. The concept of “biographical 
disruption” is thus a valid one in the analysis of processes of identity collapse in people with 
schizophrenia. However, as we have also seen, this collapse can in many cases extend beyond mere 
disruption. An ontological dimension – a serious breach of the self – may occur, and such situation 
requires a more practical and accurate description. 
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To describe this state of affairs where identity is wholly overwhelmed we may suggest a concept: 
“biographical crisis”. Biographical crisis obviously draws on, and relates to, biographical disruption. 
However, biographical crisis suggests an experience more intense and serious than biographical 
disruption; an experience of existential threat. The concept also suggests the importance, and 
magnitude, of the task of rebuilding and maintaining a sense of identity that may face the person 
diagnosed with schizophrenia as he or she comes to terms with and develops strategies to cope with 
the illness. Indeed, having suffered identity crisis, recovery becomes in large part a task of identity 
reconstruction. The significance or strength of this crisis may also help explain the pervasive isolation 
felt by many people interviewed, even after many years of treatment and medical support; in light of 
biographical crisis it is simply too difficult to re-establish a pre-psychotic level of identity function 
and interaction with others. This appeared to be the situation with a number of interviewees. 
Indeed, the relationship between biographical crisis and symbolic interaction is also significant – the 
compromised individual must begin anew the process of learning to make symbolic gestures with a 
personal knowledge of the way the other person may respond, and a greater inability to see his or 
herself from the perspective of specific people, let alone the generalised “other”. Biographical crisis 
may also be a result of relapse, in which case, the patient must begin again the work of rebuilding 
and maintaining a sense of identity.  
 
Having proposed this concept, it is also important to note its limitations. The primary limitation 
arises from the fact that identity is not at an existential level of threat in all cases of schizophrenia. 
People may be confused, or have delusions of reference (an experience where everyday objects or 
processes take on specific meaning for the subject) or experience hallucinations without an 
existential breakdown of the self. In such cases, “crisis” is probably too strong a word; the concept is 
not relevant to all cases. Nevertheless, the concept may be applied to states of chronic and mental 
illness other than schizophrenia, where processes of rebuilding and maintaining a sense of identity, 
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such as explored in this thesis, may become necessary again. Perhaps the concept could apply to 
dissociative identity disorder or the early stages of Alzheimers? However, it would seem that in the 
case of most physical chronic illnesses , identity is not sufficiently threatened to justify the 
intensification of the term “disruption” to “crisis”. 
 
Symbolic Interactionism 
 
This thesis has used the perspective of symbolic interactionism to analyse processes of identity 
disruption, rebuilding and maintenance in people diagnosed with schizophrenia. Much has already 
been said about this perspective, this theoretical position. Despite its strength, however, symbolic 
interactionism has a number of limitations, many of which emerge during this study. A significant 
issue lies in the fact that symbolic interactionism, as developed by Mead and Blumer, is a theory of 
self-formation, not self-dysfunction. In terms of the current thesis, symbolic interactionism fails to 
offer a detailed analysis of pathological processes affecting identity. The position fails to capture the 
entire detail and nuance of the pathological experience of schizophrenia. For example, symbolic 
interactionism does not fare well in an attempt to describe such dysfunctional symptoms as 
delusions of reference, delusions of thought transmission, delusions of bodily replacement, flattened 
affect, inability to read emotional cues and aural or visual hallucination.  
 
With that said, we may go some way in a symbolic interactionist account of these symptoms by 
regarding them as a failure of “functional” processes of symbolic interaction. Schizophrenic 
symptoms represent the inverse of functional symbolic interaction. Thus the confused language, or 
“word salad”, that some people diagnosed with schizophrenia display may be understood as 
“compromised gesture”. Further, the confused or disorderly ways a patient interacts as a result of 
confused ideation may be understood as “compromised interaction”. Both concepts involve the 
reversal of an important concept in functional symbolic interactionism. Their ambit may be broad; 
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any type of confused or mis-directed speech may be thought of as “compromised”. James, for 
example, talks of relating to people through “indirect information”, believing he had dreams from 
other people’s point of view. Likewise, any disordered conduct arising from mental illness may be 
thought of as “compromised interaction”. Such concepts certainly shed some light on the influence 
schizophrenia can have on identity disruption, even if each concept is not present in each individual 
case. They may also be significant in analysing the spectrum of schizoid illnesses. Nonetheless, these 
concepts still face the flaw that they do not capture the precise nature of the symptom leading to 
failed symbolic interactionism. Compromised gesture does not encompass the details of word salad. 
Compromised interaction does not encompass the precise confused interactions that a person 
suffering the onset of psychosis in schizophrenia may display. Indeed, it seems that the best the 
symbolic interactionist approach can provide is a description of the implications of such states. For 
example, symbolic interactionism may not be able to describe the detail of thought transmission, 
but it may account for the impact on symbolic interaction and gesture that emerges from that 
symptom. A more successful account of schizophrenia must engage more closely with the precise 
symptomatology of the illness. More specifically, symbolic interactionism could refer to the 
symptoms set out in the DSM-5 series: 
They are defined by abnormalities in one or more of the following five domains: delusions, 
hallucinations, disorganized thinking (speech), grossly disorganized motor behaviour (including 
catatonia), and negative symptoms (APA, 2013, p. 87). 
 
 
 
A further limit of the symbolic interactionist approach lies in its inability to engage with the subject’s 
emotional states. As Mead states:  
Emphasis should be laid on the central position of thinking when considering the nature of the self. 
Self-consciousness, rather than affective experience with its motor accompaniments, provides the 
core and primary structure of the self, which is thus essentially a cognitive rather than an emotional 
phenomenon (1967, p. 173). 
 
Emotion can play a complex role in schizophrenia. For many people, flattened affect – the lack of 
emotional expression – is a defining feature of the condition, as is recognised in the DSM-5. The 
inability to read emotional cues has also been emphasised in some descriptions of schizophrenia. 
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Alternatively, a person suffering from the related illness of schizoaffective disorder may suffer from 
depression, anxiety or mania, as well as such symptoms as delusions or hallucinations. The research 
data also suggests that a number of people diagnosed with schizophrenia have reactive emotional 
states; that having schizophrenia may lead them to despair, anger or fear. All these emotions make 
up a significant part of the experience of schizophrenia and identity. For example, a sense of 
assurance may help the person diagnosed with schizophrenia interact more fully with others. A 
sense of fear may drive the person diagnosed to trust no-one, or only trust a limited number of 
people. Unfortunately, such emotions are not captured in detail or nuance by a symbolic 
interactionism that focuses on cognition and language. Indeed, such emotions may only emerge as 
significant when they interfere with processes of self-formation or maintenance in a symbolic 
interactionist perspective. Thus, for example, the emotion of fear accompanied by paranoia may 
present another compromised interaction, insofar as the person diagnosed with schizophrenia may 
not be acting on reliable information, or absorbing the true attitudes, of the other. Fear thus 
becomes a process of dysfunctional self rebuilding and maintenance; another compromised 
interaction. The role that these emotions may play in symbolic interactionism are discussed below.  
 
The final, related, limit in the schizophrenic experience is a failure to engage with the embodied self. 
Although schizophrenia is classed as a mental illness, it can involve significant embodied experience. 
For example, the person diagnosed with schizophrenia may experience his or her body as 
constituted by a foreign material, or may feel bugs “beneath their skin”. Such symptoms appear in a 
number of narratives of schizophrenia. Unfortunately, the data explored does not present a strong 
case of the embodiment of schizophrenia, although Prescott was admitted to hospital grossly 
underweight before he was diagnosed with schizophrenia. In any case, we may regard hallucinations 
as embodied symptoms, as they involve a breakdown of embodied sense and perception. This 
includes embodied perception of both the body and perception of the external world. The 
significance of the body and illness is explored in Chapter 4 – from the perspective of chronic illness 
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in Kelly and Field (1996) and Williams (1996), from the perspective of schizophrenia in Laing (1990) 
and from a phenomenological perspective. Such embodied experiences may also interfere with self 
and identity; indeed, a petrified or engulfed self, as Laing describes, would involve a radical 
disconnection from “normal” physicality, and the self that flows from that. Such embodied states are 
also discussed below. 
 
The inability of symbolic interactionism to take account of emotional and embodied states is clearly 
problematic. Perhaps one could expand symbolic interactionism to take account of emotions and 
embodied states that affect self, significant gesture and the process of symbolic interaction. Such a 
development, however, would take symbolic interactionism far from its roots, into unexplored 
conceptual territory. One would need to move beyond the sole focus on symbolic 
interaction/gesture through language in order to account for emotions and embodied states that 
may influence symbolic interactions. An “emotional interactionism”, so-to-speak, would include a 
description of the subconscious emotional cues people read and display to each other in the course 
of their interaction. These cues are generally expressed through bodily states. They may vary as 
widely as expressing fear, confidence or desire. Emotional interactionism would thus provide an 
additional layer of interaction to the symbolic. The emotional situation of people interacting would 
also shape the symbolic interaction that such a person may make. His or her emotional situation 
may influence the context, colour and content of symbolic interactions. So, for example, a person 
suffering fear as a result of hallucinations or delusions may express this emotion through language. 
One interviewee, fearing the incursion of neighbours, limited his expression in outdoor situations. 
This development of symbolic interactionism would be well-suited to explore aspects of 
schizophrenia such as flattened affect, and could prove useful in understanding symbolic gestures 
made as a result of emotions by people suffering schizo-affective disorder, and perhaps bipolar 
disorder. 
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Again, one could also expand symbolic interactionism to take account of embodied states that affect 
the self. An “embodied interactionism” would recognise that people’s bodies may also be involved 
as the agent projecting subconscious cues to other people through “body language”. Body language 
would involve the vast array of expression that lies within the positioning of various body parts and, 
in particular, facial cues. We thus arrive at a position where significant gestures and symbolic 
interaction are provided with context, colour and content by the emotional state of interacting 
individuals, and the interaction itself takes place not only on the symbolic level, but through bodily 
communication. So, for example, a person suffering the embodied and emotional condition of 
ontological insecurity may communicate that insecurity through specific bodily interactions, such as 
catatonia or grossly disorganised behaviour. Incorporating these ideas into symbolic interactionism 
should hopefully create a more flexible and widely applicable theory of self and communication. 
 
Phenomenology And Rebuilding Body-In-The-World 
 
The embodied state of experiences of schizophrenia has been thematised throughout this thesis. In 
particular, we saw how phenomenological perspectives and, in particular, the work of Merleau-
Ponty gave insight into disruptions of the embodied self; the “body-in-the-world” (a term used in the 
same sense as Merleau-Ponty). 
 
However, relatively little has been said about the rebuilding of “body-in-the-world” after bodily 
disruption or breakdown. Such rebuilding is clearly suggested by the way many research subjects 
had regained a sense of bodily stability after periods of psychosis or schizoid collapse. Although 
Williams (1996) has discussed re-embodiment in the case of chronic illness, his writing does not 
account specifically for schizophrenic disruption of the body and fails to deal clearly with 
phenomenological concepts such as the body-in-the-world. An interrogation of the “rebuilding the 
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body-in-the-world”, given below, represents a significant advance on William’s account of re-
embodiment, as it allows a deeper understanding of schizophrenia in the terms of phenomenology. 
 
“Rebuilding the body-in-the-world” means, for people suffering embodied symptoms of 
schizophrenia, a return to the ontological state of clarity and wellness in their embodied 
consciousness of the world. As our study suggests, this process typically begins with the finding and 
reliance upon successful medication. Such medication often reduces or removes embodied 
symptoms, offering the first steps towards rebuilding the body-in-the-world. For those who continue 
to experience embodied symptoms, the rebuilding of body-in-the-world is a precarious process, 
typically involving an ontological accommodation of ongoing symptoms. A key element in rebuilding 
also lies in the task of re-learning to trust one’s perceptions after hallucination passes; in 
phenomenological terms, to reinstate a more usual function of perception in the body-in-the-world. 
Very often such rebuilding also includes a re-gaining of a pre-illness sense of time and space, 
temporality and spatiality; again fundamental to the phenomenological body-in-the-world. Finally, 
the current research suggests that rebuilding the body-in-the-world involves a return to a pre-illness 
sense of proprioception (the internal perception of bodily space and sensation), as well as clear, in 
the sense of “non-psychotic”, intentionality in actions and speech.  
 
What is the significance of using phenomenological terminology and theory to account for processes 
of rebuilding a sense of identity in schizophrenia? The use of such theory makes clear the 
significance of the process of rebuilding identity – it can be nothing less than the return to an 
ontologically productive or healthy state of being. In this sense, the phenomenological approach 
affirms the ontological emphasis of Laing’s work on schizophrenia and confirms the importance of 
the concept of “biographical crisis”. Indeed, rebuilding body-in-the-world may be considered as 
nothing less than an “ontological renovation”. The use of this theory also helps to clarify the precise 
nature of re-embodiment in people rebuilding their identity in the wake of illness and diagnosis. 
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More specifically, the express use of phenomenological terminology (here, the words of Merleau-
Ponty) provides complex and relatively nuanced tools with which to interrogate distinct aspects of 
identity rebuilding, particularly in its embodied nature. Thus, phenomenological concepts such as 
“intentionality”, “temporality” and “proprioception” help shine light on the affective and embodied 
aspects of the identity rebuilding process.  
 
Language, Power And Agency 
 
Schizophrenia is an illness that emerges, in large part, through language. Language is often the 
medium through which symptoms of schizophrenia express themselves; in particular, the experience 
of “word salad” or a mute lack of communication. Language plays an important role in the 
experience of the person diagnosed with schizophrenia, from diagnosis to treatment, identity 
rebuilding to identity maintenance. Language also entangles the ill subject in ongoing relations of 
power, influence and agency. 
 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of language use in subjects diagnosed with schizophrenia is the 
adoption of psychiatric terminology. As we saw in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, subjects often used 
psychiatric discourse to describe their illness: words such as “schizophrenia”, “schizo-affective 
disorder” and “schizoid personality disorder”; subjects would also use the language of “symptoms” 
and “side-effects” to describe their experiences. The use of such language may possibly serve to 
“objectify” the personal challenges experienced by those diagnosed with schizophrenia. That is to 
say, the use of a formal vocabulary to describe the experience and treatment of schizophrenia may 
potentially help people disassociate or distance themselves emotionally from the more troubling 
aspects of the illness. This is by no means a comprehensive interpetation, however, and may be the 
subject of future research.  
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The adoption of psychiatric discourse also enmeshes subjects in a Foucauldian exercise of 
power/knowledge by the psychiatric apparatus; it suggests that patients have accepted their 
production by psychiatrists and mental health workers as “schizophrenic” subjects. However, 
although some subjects accepted psychiatric terminology to describe their illness and experience, 
some also employed certain kinds of language or discourse to negotiate or even oppose psychiatric 
labelling and, in particular, resist the imposition of certain drug regimes or forcible hospitalisation. 
We may describe such efforts as a “language of negotiation” or “language of resistance”. For 
example, Danielle resisted being labelled as schizophrenic after diagnosis, and spoke of being 
brought up believing she was “normal”. Having regard to Chapters 6, 7 and 8, such language typically 
escaped the more formal dialogue or discourse of psychiatric terminology, and tended to emerge in 
more personal language that focused on negative personal experiences of side-effects or rejection of 
the humiliation of scheduling.  
 
The use of certain kinds of language also enmeshes the subject diagnosed with schizophrenia in a 
dense relationship with the psychopharmaceutical complex. Clearly the knowledge subjects held of 
their medication names, history and dosage reflect a deep engagement in the vision of biochemical 
illness relied upon by the psychopharmaceutical complex. Such a relationship is also evidenced in 
the use of the term “consumer” by subjects to describe people taking psychiatric medication. On the 
one hand, the term consumer may be attractive to them because it avoids the stigmatic implications 
of words like “schizophrenia”; let alone “mad” or “loony”. Interestingly, it seems that some subjects 
appropriated formal psychiatric discourse to help cope with their illness, while others spoke of being 
a consumer. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 suggest that generally the term is appropriated willingly, 
presumably adopted from the mental health support movement, and in lieu of the term "mentally 
ill" or "schizophrenic", but has indirect consequences in terms of implying the “consumption” of a 
mental health “product” and, hence, a bio-medical understanding of the illness and submission to 
the power to the psychopharmaceutical complex. This phenomenon also implies a connection to 
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broader patterns of governance in a neo-liberal context; no longer are the ill described as patients in 
a welfare system, or citizens endowed with particular rights to health services, but as the consumer 
of a mental health product. The term “consumer” also seems to reflect the self-understanding many 
subjects had of their illness as a “chemical imbalance” in the brain, or fault of “brain chemistry”, 
addressed by the medication they consumed. This understanding reinforces the biochemical 
perspective on schizophrenia that underlies the psychopharmaceutical project; a perspective that 
offers the hope of medical intervention, but brings with it the limits of a biologically deterministic 
view of mind, self and illness. Indeed, we may even say, following Rose, that a “bio-medication” of 
the subject’s identity has occurred through the efforts of the psychopharmaceutical complex in 
establishing the importance of medication and colonising the psychiatric apparatus; that a 
“neurochemical self” has emerged. 
 
Finally, emerging from the thesis is an emphasis on the use of language to form “illness narratives”; 
narratives that recount a trajectory from sickness to wellness. As we saw in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7, 
these narratives were broadly autobiographical and dealt specifically with questions of identity being 
both challenged and rebuilt. For the present discussion, however, we focus on positive or 
“progressive” narratives that were offered by subjects during the discussion of their illness. We may 
call these positive narratives “narratives of reestablishment” because they plot the subject’s path 
towards wellness and re-establishing a sense of identity. Such a path may be a literal “return-to-
language” where the formation of narratives may be a moving-on from symptoms of schizophrenia 
that involve a language breakdown; symptoms such as “word salad” or a mute failure to 
communicate. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 also suggest that the creation and expression of narratives of 
reestablishment is wrapped up with the ill person’s experience of time. Typically, such narratives 
must include and “make sense” of a healthy life before illness, a prodromal period, the initial (and 
possible subsequent) disruptions so often tied to schizophrenia, and the return to a more stable 
state of being. Indeed, we may see the narrative act as a personal healing of the temporal breach 
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caused by the crisis of schizophrenia. The biographical nature of these narratives – their focus on 
identity – responds clearly to the biographical disruption or crisis caused by schizophrenia, whilst the 
emphasis on symbolic signification through narration – that is, speaking the story aloud – expressed 
the importance of symbolic gesture, a symbolic interactionist account of identity. These narratives 
also often absorbed the terminology of the psychiatric apparatus, the implications of which have 
already been discussed. The narratives of re-establishment present in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 also 
moved with the rhythms of natural speech, attesting to their deeply personal nature. Indeed, these 
narratives often involved the narrator as the natural “agent” of the “story”, focusing on key 
moments of personal transformation or insight on the path to wellness. For example, Ralph 
emphasised the importance of his realisation that, because he was in a psychiatric ward, there must 
be something “psychiatrically wrong” with him. Such agency sets these narratives apart, to some 
extent, from the direct influence of the psychiatric apparatus and moves beyond the biochemically 
deterministic schizophrenia of the psychopharmaceutical complex.  
 
Beyond Foucault: Negotiated Power Networks 
 
As we have seen, in the world of asylums, passing or past, social control was exercised more or less 
directly by the psychiatric apparatus over people diagnosed and hospitalised with schizophrenia. 
Disciplinary patterns of domination and production emerged. To some extent, such a power still 
exists in the form of power/knowledge exercised by the psychiatric apparatus, as explored above. It 
also exists, to a lesser extent, in the (relatively) shorter stay of people diagnosed with schizophrenia 
in clinics or wards before release. However, as we also have seen, such exercises and patterns have 
come to be challenged in a world of deinstitutionalisation and relatively effective anti-psychotic 
medication. In this new world, a new form of power is developing. Perhaps we may draw its outlines 
here. 
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To begin with, we may observe that the power exercised by the psychiatric apparatus becomes more 
remote – geographically and personally. Yet some contact is usually maintained with the apparatus 
through mental health workers who visit patients, or patients who visit psychiatrists. Such a 
situation could fairly be described as a “network” – an array of mentally ill people living alone or 
with family but connected loosely to more centralised mental health hospitals and clinics. This is 
clearly expressed in the Research Chapters, where the majority of interviewees lived alone and had 
sometimes only tenuous connections to mental health centres through the visit of mental health 
support workers. The interviewee was thus relied upon to monitor his or her own day-to-day 
medication and psychic state. Significantly, this form of reliance moves beyond panopticism as a 
disciplinary power. Under the panopticon, power was exercised through the risk that at any one 
time the panoptic gaze may be levelled upon the subject. In the deinstitutionalised world, a person 
diagnosed with schizophrenia may only be subject to a medical or psychiatric gaze at limited times 
each week or month. The power exercised thus moves beyond the institution; hence, again, a 
“network”. 
 
To further investigate the new form(s) of power we may turn to issues of agency. Consent, 
negotiation and occasional resistance to treatment are amongst the themes that emerged from the 
various Results Chapters, and are discussed above in relation to authoring illness narratives. As Rose 
points out, coercion and consent blur. Such agency – negotiation, consent and resistance – can be 
understood as the product of the exercise of “negotiated power”. The term “negotiated power” may 
sound imprecise, but it is a term that captures a power that is exercised broadly by the psychiatric 
apparatus, and is, simultaneously, often negotiated by the patient. The patient is an active agent 
monitoring his own medication intake and psychic state, who must report to and be directed by a 
psychiatrist, but may often negotiate (within a reasonable framework) the particular terms of his or 
her treatment. Combining the terms networks and negotiated, we arrive at the concept of 
“negotiated power networks”.  
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Power in this structure moves beyond Foucault’s institutional discipline. It is capillary, dispersed and 
negotiated. It is an exercise of power, but it is one consented to by the patient and continued 
through taking medication and monitoring one’s psychological state even when not being observed. 
Following the argument of Rose regarding health services in advanced liberal democracies, the line 
between consent and coercion has been blurred. Negotiation emerges. More broadly, it is the power 
exercised in a service economy, where the patient (the “consumer”) is consuming a mental health 
product of his or her own volition, having been “sold” the treatment by a psychopharmaceutically-
informed psychiatrist.  
 
What are the implications of the concept of “negotiated power networks”? Certainly the concept 
allows us to analyse relations of power in a deinstitutionalised world, and a mental health service 
economy. The concept allows for a linkage to Foucault’s concept of resistance – the phenomenon 
that emerges when the consent in negotiated power networks is removed. The concept also 
emphasises the active role people diagnosed with schizophrenia take in monitoring their own 
medication and managing their own treatment. Negotiated power networks may be overlaid by 
support networks of friends and family, and may be subject to the kinds of emotions and embodied 
experiences surrounding schizophrenia discussed in the above sections of this chapter on Symbolic 
Interactionism and Phenomenology. The term may be re-integrated into medical sociology more 
widely; it may help make sense of people who follow the advice of medical professionals away from 
hospitals or clinics. 
 
Identity Work 
  
As is stated in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, for the person dealing with schizophrenia, the process of 
rebuilding and maintaining a viable self can be difficult, if not seemingly impossible. We have also 
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seen that a number of techniques of rebuilding and maintaining a sense of identity require some 
active effort from the person diagnosed with schizophrenia. The diagnosed person may need to 
manage their illness and their life; manage friendships and family connections; cope with stigma; 
produce narratives to help make sense of their illness trajectory; compensate for elements of their 
illness and study or find suitable work. Perhaps the common theme, or themes, around these tasks is 
that they all relate to identity, and all require some kind of work, effort and agency. Again, these 
processes are not adequately described by Foucault or the other literature reviewed. How can this 
situation of identity and agency be theorised? 
 
At this point the term “identity work” is suggested. Identity work may be thought of as activities 
furthering the process of rebuilding and maintaining a sense of identity as understood in this thesis. 
The term is deliberately wide in its scope, encompassing what we have discussed as illness 
management, life management and stigma management, compensating for symptoms or side-
effects, as well as developing reconstitutive narratives and working or studying. This scope helps us 
comprehend and bring together various aspects of the experience of rebuilding and maintaining a 
sense of identity in people diagnosed with schizophrenia as explored in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. The 
concept is also, unlike the work of Foucault, agent-driven; focusing on the patient reducing the 
impact of symptoms, side-effects and stigma, while setting motivational goals and living a fulfilling 
life (although, of course, friends, families and members of mental health services may help with 
identity work). Identity work may be influenced by psychiatrists and mental health workers, but is 
significantly formed not as an exercise of power, but out of the patient’s desire to re-buiild and 
maintain identity, and improve his or her quality of life. There may also be a mutually beneficial 
relationship between symbolic interactionism and identity work – successful identity work may help 
the use of significant gesture and symbolic interaction by the person diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
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Before concluding, we must briefly consider how “identity work” differs from “biographical work” 
(discussed in Chapter 3). Although the concepts are similar, identity work is aimed more squarely at 
the experience of schizophrenia, rather than chronic illness more widely. As we have seen, 
schizophrenia can involve a biographical crisis, a breakdown of the self, in the context of which 
identity work becomes more salient. The concept also involves more than biographical factors – it 
includes attempts to mitigate stigma, symptoms and side-effects. The term also carries the 
implication that many aspects of the study of identity processes in schizophrenia can be understood 
through a single, broad concept. This should make studying the various phenomena involved more 
practical and, hopefully, meaningful. The concept may also have use in psychiatric conditions such as 
dissociative identity disorder, or chronic illnesses occasioning biographical disruption, where 
personal identity is also highly compromised. 
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CHAPTER 10 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
This thesis has sought to answer the question of how people diagnosed with schizophrenia re-
establish or maintain their identity in light of their illness, diagnosis and treatment, and how 
relations of power inform this process. The thesis engaged in a qualitative case study of twelve 
people with schizophrenia, using semi-structured interviews as the primary research method. This 
method has provided rich data in response to the research question. The value of this thesis lies in 
showing how people with schizophrenia can actively re-buiild a shattered self, and maintain that self 
under difficult circumstances. This thesis also seeks to re-think and revise some of the available 
conceptual tools for understanding the self and other, and to make sense of processes of identity 
disruption, rebuilding and maintenance in people diagnosed with schizophrenia. The thesis 
intervenes in the sociology of chronic illness, proposing the concept of biographical crisis; 
contributes to symbolic interactionism, with the concepts of compromised gesture and emotional 
interactionism; and engages with the theorisation of serious mental illness, by deploying 
developments in the fields of phenomenology and advancing the concept of identity work. Finally, 
the thesis contributes to the theorisation of power relations in serious mental illness, with the 
concept of negotiated power networks and an analysis of the role of language and power. 
 
Synthesising Results And Discussion 
 
The data uncovered by this research is deep and resonant. Interviewees shared significant, personal 
stories with the interviewer. These stories provided fertile material with which to address the 
research question. Stories of identity disruption, rebuilding and maintenance could be found within 
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the pages of data collected. Vital experiences of mental illness, of isolation, of stigma and of power 
emerged. What follows is a concluding summary of the main points of that research, made in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8, integrated with the theoretical contributions made in Chapter 9. 
 
Interviewees generally faced grave disruption to their lives and biographies through their experience 
with schizophrenia. Encounters with the illness itself, as well as with diagnosis, hospitalisation, the 
psychiatric apparatus and the psychopharmaceutical complex all contributed to the disruptive 
nature of the schizophrenic experience. Typically, interviewees experienced a significant breakdown 
in their “self”, as theorised in Mead and Blumer’s work in the symbolic interactionist literature. The 
symbolic interactionist literature was also extended to account for the disruptive, or dysfunctional, 
experience of self-breakdown. The concepts of compromised gesture and compromised interaction 
helped make sense of the breakdown of the self in schizophrenia, and contributed to a richer 
reading of symbolic interactionist theory. Such was the intensity of the disruption of schizophrenia 
that many cases came to constitute a biographical crisis; an ontological breakdown of the very being 
of the interviewee. The embodied, emotive nature of this disruption also emerged, and was 
explored through the use of phenomenological theory, as well as the proposal of embodied, or 
emotional interactionism. The issue of isolation-as-disruption also emerged for a number of 
interviewees who lived alone or rarely socialised. The power of the psychiatric apparatus also began 
to become clear, insofar as diagnosis with a psychiatrist and hospitalisation contributed to these 
processes of identity disruption. 
 
Rebuilding a sense of identity was revealed to be a complex, subtle process involving a number of 
factors. The primary role of medication cannot be underestimated. Medication, in many cases, 
dampened symptoms of schizophrenia sufficiently for the person diagnosed to engage in everyday 
processes of symbolic interaction. Typically, meaningful interaction with others, making meaningful 
gestures and the internalising of the view of the general “other”, as predicted by symbolic 
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interactionist theory, was a vital aspect of the process of rebuilding identity for interviewees. Such 
interactions included (inter alia) relations with family and friends, mental health professionals, other 
sufferers and religious communities. Processes of rebuilding identity involved the sufferers in a 
course of active behaviours aimed at ameliorating the impact of their illness. Typically this included 
negotiating prescriptions of medication, as well as illness and practical life management. Such agent-
driven attempts at self-management were described collectively as identity work; a concept that 
may hold broader significance outside the field of rebuilding a sense of identity in schizophrenia. The 
ontological nature of the breach-in-self that interviewees sought to fill led the researcher to inquire 
into phenomenological readings of schizophrenic symptoms. In particular, the thesis makes the 
suggestion of re-establishing the body-in-the-world, or ontological renovation, as concepts to guide 
our understanding of processes of rebuilding identity. The use of language provided a revealing lens 
with which to understand efforts towards rebuilding identity in people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. Typically interviewees would adopt psychiatric discourse to describe their situations 
and experiences of rebuilding a sense of identity, involving again the influence of the psychiatric 
apparatus. However, language use proved significant for other reasons. In particular, the use of the 
term “consumer” by interviewees using psychiatric medication brought with it a complex 
relationship to the mental health market and the psychopharmaceutical complex. The use of illness 
narratives involved interviewees in a personal re-telling, or re-framing, of their experiences; a re-
framing often involving themselves as an active agent who sought help, negotiated medications, 
searched for work, and so forth. The issue of agency was one which emerged in the theorisation of 
power exercised by the psychiatric apparatus in a context of psychopharmaceutical interventions 
and deinstitutionalisation of psychiatric service provision. The term “negotiated power network” 
captured the relationship of the interviewee who often lived alone, but regularly took psychiatric 
medication and was visited by mental health workers, or visited a psychiatrist. The lone living of 
interviewees – their comparative isolation – also emerged as a strong theme. 
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Finally, interviewees engaged in a number of behaviours to maintain their identities. Strictly 
speaking, such identity maintenance involved a number of the same processes as rebuilding a sense 
of identity; managing medication and doctor’s appointments, for example, contributed both to 
interviewees re-establishing a sense of self as well as maintaining such a self once established. 
Identity maintenance also involved distinct processes of stigma management. Interviewees managed 
the considerable stigma of having schizophrenia by dividing their social world into people who knew 
and did not know, by passing for normal, and by concealing the more noticeable aspects of the 
illness, such as paranoid thinking or misjudging affect. Again, the opportunity to practice these skills 
was important to many interviewees, and issues of isolation sometimes mitigated the processes of 
identity maintenance they could take part in. 
 
Directions for Future Research: Towards a Broader Sociology of Severe Mental Illness 
 
During its exposition, this thesis has developed what is, in many ways, a sociology of identity for 
people suffering schizophrenia. Further research and theorisation could clarify or deepen the 
understanding of issues pertinent to the study of schizophrenia. In particular, a more rigorous, 
perhaps quantitative study might examine the role of the various factors identified here in the 
process of rebuilding viable identity. Of course, such a study would require a more exact measure of 
identity function than the fairly broad concept offered by symbolic interaction and used here. A 
larger study could also address the limitation in this thesis that, perhaps, only subjects who are 
better coping with the illness have responded; it would be important to gain a view of the 
experiences of people who are not as resilient or successful. 
 
However, whilst our academic journey has, hopefully, been rewarding, it could also perhaps 
contribute to wider sociological questions. This research and the theoretical work accomplished 
during this thesis may hold lessons or contributions towards a wider sociology of severe mental 
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illness. To investigate this issue we may engage with one of the major sociologists of mental illness, 
Erving Goffman, and ask the heuristic question: If Goffman were alive today, what would he write 
about severe mental illness? The answer to this question would certainly be multi-faceted and wide-
ranging. Many relevant responses have already been treated in this thesis, and so are only 
mentioned in passing. Other implications may provide interesting issues or foci for future research, 
and these are explored below. 
 
Certainly the response to the heuristic question would involve coming to an understanding of 
deinstitutionalisation. Simply put, severe mental illness at the time of Goffman’s writing was 
generally responded to (or “treated”) in asylums and wards. People with schizophrenia or bipolar 
with psychotic symptoms, amongst other severe disorders, were locked up in “total institutions”, 
and these institutions governed their subjectivity and social world. The situation now, in Australia, is 
very different. People with severe mental illness are usually released from hospital or the clinic 
within some weeks or months of institutionalisation and their treatment will generally involve them 
living in the community; with families, community support or alone. With that said, we must at least 
acknowledge that temporary incarceration in a mental health institution may still affect many 
people with severe mental illness, and practices such as electro-shock therapy and community 
treatment orders still exist. The old critiques of the mental health sector may still hold some 
sociological sting, although not as poignant as they once were. Nevertheless, the sector is 
deinstitutionalised and one may ask, what are the implications of deinstitutionalisation seen through 
Goffman’s eyes for a broader sociology of severe mental illness?  
 
Part of Goffman’s value as a researcher comes through his precise and revealing descriptions of 
everyday behaviour and interaction. This focus on the everyday, the “micro”, in a deinstitutionalised 
environment has served this thesis well and could certainly apply to a broader sociology of severe 
mental illness. We have already seen that a close, interpretive and qualitative research approach 
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may yield interesting data. Symbolic interactionism provides a sensitive account of meaning, 
interaction, mind and identity that can be applied to those suffering mental illness, and perhaps also 
to those around them; an account strengthened by the moves in this thesis to recognise 
compromised gestures or interaction and emotional or embodied interactionism. Indeed, these 
suggested concepts could possibly also be tested and refined in a more controlled setting. The close 
focus on interaction in this thesis, and carried by Goffman, could also provide insights into power 
relations affecting people with severe mental illness; the following of medical regimens; and the 
nature and effect of stigma. 
 
We may ask, however, whether there are any forms of close interaction that might occur in the 
sociology of severe mental illness that are not discussed in this thesis? Three possibilities may be 
identified. Firstly, it seems possible, and perhaps likely, that the stigma associated with mental 
illnesses such as bipolar disorder, severe depression or anxiety is less than that associated with 
schizophrenia. Schizophrenia is still commonly misunderstood as to referring to dissociative 
personality disorder (“multiple personalities”) and/or significantly increased predisposition towards 
violence. Perhaps people with bipolar, severe depression or anxiety would be less concerned with 
passing or concealing their stigma? Second, there is a possibility that in some cases of severe mental 
illness the sufferer may not visit a psychiatrist, instead consulting a general practitioner or even a 
branch of alternative medicine. It remains to be seen whether this kind of consultation would take a 
different form to the relationship with a psychiatrist, and particularly whether it reduces the 
influence of the psychiatric apparatus over the mentally ill. Finally, it seems likely that in a number of 
circumstances people suffering severe mental illness that is not schizophrenia may interact with 
others in a way that is more complex and active as they might not suffer the cognitive deficit that 
often comes with the onset of schizophrenia. 
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Another important aspect of Goffman’s approach is his critical, sociological eye. There is no doubt he 
would offer a critical account of the deinstitutionalised environment for the treatment of severe 
mental illness. As also noted in this thesis, a critical history of deinstitutionalisation in Australia is yet 
to be written. However, we have already seen that deinstitutionalisation may lead to isolation of 
sufferers. We have also seen that the transfer of caring responsibilities from asylums to members of 
the community, especially families, may engage a gendered division of labour in caring for the sick. 
Certainly further research might be conducted to engage with both of these issues. Other critical 
points also arise. There is the possibility that, in a deinstitutionalised environment, there is an 
incentive to discharge early, and people suffering severe mental illness may be released before 
attaining full stability in their illness and the ability to engage with public and communal support. 
There is also the critical possibility that sick people outside the asylum may not have the financial or 
social capital necessary to source medication or work, or find places to live. Indeed, without 
sufficient communal support, homelessness or “trans-institutionalisation” may occur, where the 
sufferer moves through boarding houses, refuges or even jail; a form of “institution-outside-the-
institution”. The connection between severe mental illness and homelessness is indeed a significant 
social and political problem, and deserves future research. 
 
A successful, broad sociology of severe mental illness in a deinstitutionalised context would also 
need to focus to a significant degree on the experience of recovery. What is recovery? How do 
people with mental illness define recovery, and does this differ from their psychiatrists, GPs or 
mental health service providers? How do “illness trajectories” play out for different mental illnesses 
experienced by people in different geographical and socio-economic locations? Perhaps the answer 
to these questions can be aided again by a theoretical move made in this thesis. More specifically, 
the concept of “identity work” could provide a template for the kind of interactions the severely 
mentally ill person outside the clinic or ward sometimes makes towards recovery. The term 
“recovery work” springs to mind; such a concept could, like identity work, take account of the 
225 
 
various prosaic and everyday interactions that a severely mentally ill person may engage in with the 
end of mental health recovery in sight. We may make the provisional observation that such recovery 
work would probably involve sourcing, paying for and taking regular medication; setting up and 
relying on familial or community support groups in lieu of institutional observers and enforcers; 
engaging in fruitful symbolic and emotional interactions with others; and engaging in the kind of 
activities such as exercise or meditation that may lessen the intensity of their illness. 
 
The analysis of recovery can also be related, perhaps inversely, to one of the issues touched upon, 
but not analysed at depth in this thesis – the attempts of people with mental illness to take their 
own lives. A micro-level, interactionist approach could help shed light on “warning signs” and 
dangerous behaviours of people with mental illness at risk of suicide (see, eg, Schwartz and Smith, 
2004). One may wonder whether suicide was more difficult for people caught up in, and constantly 
observed, in a total institution? Perhaps the life alone outside the asylum walls without adequate 
community support, for some, may contribute to the darker emotions that lead to ending one’s life. 
At this point, we may complement the micro-focus with a wider sociological lens, taking in larger 
social structures and socio-economic trends in relation to suicide. Durkheim’s seminal work Suicide 
(2002) in this regard could provide interesting insights. 
 
With regard to the issues of recovery and suicide, a broad sociology of severe mental illness could 
take advantage of another important argument implicit in this thesis, and one that seems to hold 
true in a deinstitutionalised context. That is to say, a sociology of severe mental illness could 
recognise that sociological factors are vital in not only rebuilding a sense of identity in people with 
mental illness, but may in fact play an important part in recovery. At one level, this insight may seem 
obvious or simple – a person without the socio-economic position to afford medication may be 
stranded with their illness. In the case of mental illnesses such as severe depression or anxiety, 
particular relationships may provide support for people to recover. However, and in an important 
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sense, this thesis has argued that the sociological determinants of rebuilding and maintaining a 
sense of identity move beyond the practical and may, in and of themselves, contribute to positive 
identity outcomes. The social interaction of the person with schizophrenia may help him or her to 
rebuild and maintain viable identities. Such an argument is borne out by non-medical, psychological 
treatments that treat cognitive aptitude and the ability to recognise affect in schizophrenia. In this 
sense, an implication of the thesis has been to emphasise that merely being medicated and/or 
hospitalised are not sufficient, on their own, for full recovery – a sick patient could and should 
engage in positive social interaction where possible. The monopoly of the biomedical paradigm on 
recovery processes could and should be widened to include sociological effects. This insight could 
prove foundational for a broader sociology of severe mental illness. 
 
Having explored a number of critical issues for future research towards a broader sociology of severe 
mental illness, we may ask whether further work remains to be done at the broad, “macro” level – at 
the level of society, or state, or globe? Whilst good work on the political economy of recovery of 
schizophrenia has been done (see, particularly, Warner, 1985), we may still ask whether these 
patterns of recovery hold for other severe mental illnesses and, in particular, whether the political 
economy of recovery is altering in a globe that is itself developing and evolving? For example, one 
may question whether effective mental health institutions are being built or provided for the 
expanding middle classes of India or China? Is the psychopharmaceutical complex entering these 
new markets? We have also seen in Foucault’s (1988) Madness and Civilization an analysis of the 
relationship between “madness” and civilization. We may ask, however, whether his insights still 
ring true, and examine the deep cultural and ideational significance of madness and its treatment in 
Australia, the West, and globally.  
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Concluding Thoughts 
 
Schizophrenia sadly remains a persistent, chronic and severe mental illness for a significant portion 
of the population. Whilst this thesis may have engaged with people whose illness did not limit them 
as much as others, there would seem to remain a large population of people living with the illness in 
dire situations. Many may live in isolation, without community support, or without familial 
understanding. Clearly, in a deinstitutionalised world and a world of stigma, community support and 
general education about the illness has become more important. Whilst the New South Wales State 
government has made, during the writing of this thesis, commitments to further fund community 
support for people with severe and persistent mental illness, it seems much still needs to be done. In 
any case, the voices of people with schizophrenia are still largely unheard, and there lie valuable 
pathways – not only in relation to identity, but to the illness and recovery more broadly – for 
sociologically-influenced approaches to help give these voices volume. Hopefully this thesis has 
provided some such voice.  
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